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This thesis focuses on the application of empirical research methods to different economic topics. The first
chapter examines production effects of subsidies with different characteristics. The second chapter evaluates
the impact of an oldage pension program on the welfare of the recipient’s family members. The third chapter
applies an income inequality model to study the influence of differences in citation practices across scientific
fields on the overall citation inequality.
Chapter 1, “Differential Effects on Output Levels of Binding and non-Binding Subsidies under Capital-
ization”. Subsidies on outputs or inputs are usually production-promoting by lowering the marginal cost.
However, if subsidies are binding, i.e. outputs or inputs are partially subsidized, subsidies don’t affect the
output level. If subsidies capitalize into input prices, i.e. subsidies benefit both the recipients and input
providers, outputs will be negatively affected. My paper contributes by empirically assessing production ef-
fects of subsidies taking into account both bindingness and capitalization. I study cattle payments under the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) implemented in the European Union (EU). I set up a simple model to
analyze production effects of these payments. I also estimate the effects with Spanish farm-level data. CAP
1992 and Agenda 2000 are two policy programs of the CAP. Both are designed to reduce over-production in
agriculture. Estimation results suggest that cattle payments have negative impacts on outputs when they are
binding under CAP 1992, and positive impacts when they are non-binding under Agenda 2000.
Chapter 2, “Reassessing the Differential Impact of Grandmothers and Grandfathers: The Old Age Program
in Nepal” (co-authored with Ricardo Mora). We study the effects on infant mortality of the introduction in
1995 of a non-contributory universal pension scheme in Nepal known as the Old age Allowance Program.
We use cross-sectional data from the 1996 and 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys. Following a
standard diff-in-diffs approach, we find positive and significant effects on survival rates for the presence in
the same household of a female beneficiary while negative and sometimes significant effects for the presence
of a male beneficiary. When we conduct pre-treatment common trend tests, we find that we cannot reject it
for the case of the female beneficiaries but we strongly reject it for the case of male beneficiaries. Following
Mora and Reggio (2012), we then propose a more flexible model and identification strategy and find that there
are no differences in the female and the male beneficiary effects. We interpret these results as suggestive that
cross-sectional analysis may bias downwards the estimates of the effect of grandfathers because of gender
differences in endogenous household formation.
Chapter 3 is a combination of two closely related papers, namely “The Measurement of the Effect on Citation
Inequality of Differences in Citation Practices across Scientific Fields” (co-authored with Juan A. Crespo and
Javier Ruiz-Castillo, published in PLoS ONE 8(3): e58727 (2013)), and “The Effect on Citation Inequality
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of Differences in Citation Practices at the Web of Science Subject Category Level” (co-authored with Juan
A. Crespoa, Neus Herranz and Javier Ruiz-Castillo, published in Journal of the American Society for Infor-
mation Science and Technology, 65:1244-1256, (June 2014)). We introduce a novel method for measuring
which part of overall citation inequality can be attributed to differences in citation practices across scientific
fields. In addition, we implement an empirical strategy for making meaningful comparisons between the
numbers of citations received by articles in different scientific fields. Using a dataset of 4.4 million articles
published in 1998-2003 with a five-year citation window, we find that differences in citation practices be-
tween the 22 fields account for about 14% of overall citation inequality. When the classification system goes
from 22 fields to 219 sub-fields, the effect on citation inequality increases to about 18%. For comparisons
of citation counts across fields, we provide a set of exchange rates (ERs) to express citations in any field
into citations in the all-fields case. When the raw citation data are normalized with our ERs, the effect of
differences in citation practices is reduced to around 2% of overall citation inequality in the case of 22 fields.
In the case of 219 sub-fields with the fractional strategy, the normalization of the raw data using the ERs
(or sub-field mean citations) as normalization factors reduces the effect to 3.8% (3.4%) of overall citation









Chapter 1: Differential Effects on Output Levels of Binding and 







According to economic intuitions, subsidies on outputs or inputs are usually production-promoting by low-
ering the marginal cost. However, if subsidies are binding which means that outputs or inputs are partially
subsidized, the marginal product (hence the total output) is determined by the standard equalization condi-
tion between price and marginal cost. Hence, binding subsidies have no effect on the output. Production
effects of subsidies also depend on whether subsidies capitalize into input prices (i.e. subsidies benefit both
the recipients and inputs providers). If subsidies induce input prices to rise, higher marginal cost will result
in a negative impact on the output. If bindingness and capitalization happen at the same time, the output
will decrease compared with the situation without subsidies. If subsidies are non-binding and capitalization
is partial (i.e. subsidies don’t go entirely to input providers), the output will be greater than that without
subsidies.
Capitalization of subsidies rises from two facts. First, if subsidies promote the production, demands for
inputs will increase and thus the input prices (Rolph (1952), Floyd (1965), Roberts (2003), Patton (2008),
Kirwan (2009)). Roberts (2003) also points out that higher input prices will lead to a low supply respond.
Second, subsidies increase the value of marginal product of inputs, where the value is the sum of the market
price and the subsidy (Rolph (1952)). This can happen even if subsidies are binding. In agricultural studies,
there are empirical evidences about the extent to which subsidies capitalize. Kirwan (2009) studies direct
payments on crops in the US and concludes that landlords capture around 20% of the marginal subsidy dollar
through higher rents, tenants’ net returns account for about 70% of the subsidy, while the rest 10% may be
extracted by other input providers. Patton (2008) studies direct payments on beef cattle in the European
Union (EU) during 1994 to 2002 and finds that around 40% of two types of payments goes into land rents.
These studies focus on the distribution of subsidies between the recipients and input providers, especially
landowners, but not on production effects of subsidies.
There are just a few studies concerning bindingness of subsidies while analyzing production effects of sub-
sidies. Chincinga (2008) studies a subsidy program that provides limited amount of fertiliser to farmers and
finds a positive effect on maize yields. The positive effect may come from the fact that the subsidy is not
binding at least for some farmers. In other words, the subsidized amount is enough for the usage. Gohin
(2006) models production effects of cattle payments under CAP 1992 and Agenda 2000, both of which are
reform programs of the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) implemented in the EU. He sets up
two model specifications about farmers’ production decisions distinguishing whether the payments are lim-
ited by farm-level quotas. His calibration results show that the output with binding payments is lower than
that with non-binding payments, and a decrease in binding payments has no effect on the output. However,
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he doesn’t consider possible capitalization of cattle payments that may negatively affect the output. This
makes his model incomplete.
So far there is no literature taking into account both bindingness and capitalization when studying produc-
tion effects of subsidies. I extend the model by Gohin (2006) and my paper contributes by including both
bindingness and capitalization. In my model I illustrate rigorously the argument that bindingness and capi-
talization may lead to subsidies having negative effects on the output level, and non-bindingness and partial
capitalization may lead to positive production effects. I take cattle payments under CAP 1992 as a case for
binding subsidies, and those under Agenda 2000 for non-binding ones. Both CAP 1992 and Agenda 2000
are designed to reduce over-production in agriculture in the EU. Binding cattle payments under CAP 1992
can be appropriate for this objective, whereas non-binding payments under Agenda 2000 may go counter to
reducing over-production.
I empirically assess production effects of cattle payments. I take advantage of the availability of Spanish
farm-level data by the European Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN).1 The data are representative and
available for the period under both policy programs. Real output of beef-cattle is measured by market sales
of cattle and the size of the cattle is adjusted according to the European official standard. I specify both a
static and dynamic model for panel data. Fixed Effects and different GMM estimators are used. I compare
the estimated effect of direct payments under CAP 1992 and under Agenda 2000. I define different farm
groups for robustness checks, depending on whether a farm relies on the market for inputs (thus subsidies
are likely to capitalize), and whether the payments are likely to be binding or non-binding.
Without capitalization, the “pure” effect should be zero for binding subsidies and be positive for non-binding
ones. In my estimations, the estimated effect includes both a “pure” effect and, presumably, a negative effect
of higher input prices due to capitalization. Negative impacts of cattle payments on beef-cattle outputs
are captured under CAP 1992. Under Agenda 2000, the estimated effect of cattle payments turns to be
positive. Moreover, the estimated positive effect under Agenda 2000 is statistically different from that under
CAP 1992. In robustness checks, estimated effects are negative under CAP 1992 for specially defined farm
groups, for whom bindingness and capitalization are more likely to happen. Estimated effects are positive
under Agenda 2000 for specially defined groups, for whom the two characteristics are less likely to take
1I study the case of Spain where CAP 1992 takes place between 1994 and 1999 and Agenda 2000 is implemented between 2000
and 2006. Spain is the fifth largest beef producer in Europe. Beef and veal account for around 6% of the value of total agricultural
products and around 20% of the value of the livestock products from 2000 to 2003. Subsidies on beef-cattle occupy a large portion
of total subsidies on livestocks. This portion is about 40% from 1995 to 1999 and increases to a value between 50% to 60% from
2000 to 2003.
For the application of my paper to other countries, I can’t think of any reason why the estimation results I get could not be
replicated with the data from other Member States of the EU.
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place.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the CAP policies and presents a model to
study the effect of cattle payments on beef-cattle outputs under each policy program. Section 3 describes the
data and summarizes relevant variables. Section 4 presents the econometric models and estimation results.
Section 5 gives robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2. Policies and Modelling Framework
2.1. Policy Background
The CAP in the 1960s provides a price support system, mainly based on intervention prices, to agricultural
production. Intervention prices are set by the European Commission (EC) that is obliged to buy in surplus
produce when the internal market price falls below the intervention price. This price support system leads to
massive excess supply in the 1980s and, in order to reduce the over-production, the EU carries out the CAP
1992 reforms, which are intended to bring intervention prices closer to world market prices and enforce
a new system of direct payments to compensate for farmers’ income loss. Agenda 2000 is an extended
continuation of CAP 1992. Under Agenda 2000, intervention prices are further cut down and pre-existing
direct payments are revised.
Within the beef and veal sector, under Agenda 2000 intervention prices are gradually cut down from January
2000 to June 2002 by 20%. Since July 2002, the former intervention system is replaced by a new one under
which both intervention prices and private storage aids are applied. Intervention prices decrease to 45% of
the original level in 2000. To prevent a sharp decrease in the market price, private storage aids are granted to
the farmers when the market price is likely to remain at a basic price, which is set at 66% of the intervention
price in 2000.
Hans van Meijl et. al. (2002) pointed out that beef market prices have historically been on par with interven-
tion prices. The difference between the market price and the intervention price is reversely related with the
extent of the excess supply. Even after the reduction in intervention prices under Agenda 2000, there contin-
ued to be massive excess supply in the cattle-beef sector, hence, market prices should be close to intervention
prices.
Under both sets of policies, there are two kinds of direct payments. One is issued on the basis of the heads
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of cattle raised by a holding and is referred to as headage payments.2 The other kind doesn’t depend on the
heads of cattle and it includes payments to farmers in areas with environmental restrictions, compensatory
allowance in less-favored areas, subsidies to rural development, etc. The latter kind will be referred to as
other payments in the rest of this paper.
For headage payments, potentially eligible cattle are those kept on a holding and are referred to as cattle
stocks. The amount of payment per head varies according to the type of the cattle. Headage payments
include Beef Special Premium (BSP), Suckler Cow Premium (SCP) and Extensification Payment (EP). All
these payments are subject to stock density limits measured as the number of livestock units per hectare (LUs
per ha).3 The stock density limit is 2 LUs per ha for BSP and SCP. EP is an additional payment on the other
two payments whose stock density limit is 1.4 or 1 LU per ha for EP. The lower the density, the higher the
payment per head.
Holdings whose stock density is greater than 1.4 LUs per ha are not eligible for EP. The maximum number
of eligible cattle in LUs of a holding in each year is obtained by multiplying the area of land by the density
limit of 2 LUs per ha. This maximum number of eligible cattle can be seen as farm-level quotas. Farmers
can raise more than one type of cattle. If a holding’s stock density is between 1.4 and 2 LUs per ha, its cattle
stock is lower than the number of quotas. It is profitable for the holding to raise more cattle until reaching
the stock density of 2 LUs per ha.
Under Agenda 2000, pre-existing headage payments are gradually increased from 2000 to 2002 and main-
tained at the level of 2002 until the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) came into effect in Spain in 2006.4 Stock
density limits remain the same for BSP and SCP while they become stricter for EP. A new payment, Slaugh-
ter Premium (SP), is introduced at the start of 2000, making all beef-cattle eligible as long as the cattle are
killed and sold in the market. There is a regional ceiling set at the country level to limit the maximum number
of eligible cattle for SP. If overall claims made by farmers exceed the regional ceiling, the eligible cattle per
holding will be reduced proportionately. Since farmers can not predict if there will be over-claims when they
2A holding is all the production units (farms) managed by a producer. A producer could be an individual, a company or
partnership.
3 Following the European official regulation, LUs are defined as follows: 0.2 LU for calves younger than 6 months, 0.4 LU for
cattle between 6 months and 1 year, 0.7 LU for cattle between 1 and 2 years, 1.0 LU for cattle older than 2 years and 1.0 LU for
diary and suckler cows.
4The SPS is announced in June 2003 by the EC. Direct payments are decoupled from production by the SPS in the sense that
direct payments only depend on historial payments of reference years and production activity is not a requirement for receiving the
payments.
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claim for SP, it is reasonable to assume that they will claim on all potentially eligible cattle. If there are over-
claims, the payment of SP per cattle declines. Thus, one can think of SP as a payment without farm-level
quotas where the payment per cattle varies depending on the incidence and the extent of over-claims.5
2.2. Modelling of Cattle Payments
Previous studies generally don’t model the unsubsidized cattle explicitly. Instead, they assume that farmers
take into account an average SCP and BSP for all their animals (Binfield et al. (2005)). The marginal animal
(and hence the herd size) is determined by the equalization of price and marginal cost less the average SCP
or BSP. Thus, removing or reducing the SCP will negatively affect the output.
As pointed out by Gohin (2006), from available statistics, nearly 22% of suckler cows and 20% of bulls
and steers are not subsidized in 15 EU Member States. Given this fact, Gohin (2006) provides an alternative
modelling framework by which the presence of unsubsidized cattle matters with respect to production effects
of cattle payments. He sets up two model specifications about farmers’ production decisions distinguishing
whether there are unsubsidized cattle. He models all types of cattle and related cattle payments in the
same way and focuses on suckler cow activity. He concludes that when SCP is limited by quotas and there
are unsubsidized suckler cows, the marginal animal (and hence herd size) is determined by the standard
equalization condition between price and marginal cost. SCP may have very limited production effect and
simply generates rent to quota owners. On the contrary, when all suckler cows are subsidized, SCP have
positive production effects.
I extend the model by Gohin (2006), which will be referred to as the initial model hereafter, by incorporating
several issues as follows. First, capitalization of cattle payments is taken into account. The inclusion of
capitalization alters conclusions of the initial model about production effects of cattle payments. Second,
Gohin (2006) doesn’t model SP initiated under Agenda 2000. Third, stock density requirements on both
SCP and BSP function as quota limits as described in Section 2.1. These requirements add extra source of
bindingness in cattle payments. The inclusion of stock density requirements doesn’t change conclusions of
the initial model. Fourth, since the payment per animal is different between SCP and BSP and farmers can
produce two types of cattle at the same time, it is reasonable to argue that farmers have the incentive to raise
the animal that receive more payment per head.
Suppose there is a representative farmer operating on a piece of land. As mentioned in Section 2.1, market
prices are close to intervention prices. Following Gohin (2006), I denoted one price for the output by p.
5Detailed rules for each headage payment are available in the Appendix.
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Consider the situation without direct payments and denote the output by n0. The profit of the farmer is the
following,
pi = pn0− c(n0)
where c(·) is the total cost function satisfying c′(·)> 0 and c′′(·)< 0.
First order condition with respect to the output is
p = c′(n0)
2.2.1. The Initial Model
The farmer needs the same number of quota certificates to obtain the same units of SCP and the certificates
are given exogenously.6 Denote the number of quota certificates by qˆ.
Case 1: Payments are binding, i.e. qˆ≤ n0. Denote the payment per head by s and total payments the farmer
receivesare S = sqˆ. The profit is
pi = pn+ sqˆ− c(n)
First order condition is
p = c′(n)
The output implied by the above condition is the same as that without direct payments, i.e. n = n0. There is
no production effect of binding payments. This case is relevant with cattle payments under CAP 1992.
According to the rules by the EC, quota certificates of SCP can be traded on the market. Denote the price
of the quota certificate per unit by pq. Suppose the farmer owns initially q0 units of certificates and finally
can have q units through the market and total payments are S = sq. q depends on the availability of quota
certificates on the market.
Suppose that the payments are binding, i.e. q ≤ n0. The farmer needs to choose the ouput level, n, and the
number of quota certificates, q, to maximize its profit,
pi = pn+ sq− c(n)− pqq+ pqq0
First order conditions are,
p = c′(n)
6To distinguish from quotas due to stock density requirements, quotas of SCP studied by Gohin(2006) are referred to as quota
certificates in this paper.
7
s = pq
The first equation implies that the output is the same as that without payments, i.e. n = n0. The second one
indicates that the marginal benefit of obtaining one more unit of quota certificate equals the marginal cost.
Case 2: Payments are non-binding and all units produced are subsidized. Total payments are S = sn. The
profit is
pi = pn+ sn− c(n)
First order condition is
p = c′(n)− s
The output implied by the above condition is greater than that without direct payments, i.e. n > n0. This case
is relevant with cattle payments under Agenda 2000 when SP is introduced. As argued in Section 2.1, SP is
non-binding. s can be thought of the average payment per animal.
2.2.2. Inclusion of Capitalization
I extend the initial model by including capitalization of the payments. Capitalization leads to an increase
in input prices, such as labor prices, capital rents and feeding costs that affect the variable cost. All units
produced are equally affected by the capitalization. Denote the effect of capitalization on the profit by σn,
where σ is the increase in input prices. Moreover, σ is assumed to be positively related with the total
payment, i.e. σ = σ(S) such that σ ′S > 0. Assume that capitalization does not exceed total payments, i.e.
S≥ σn.
Case 1: Payments are binding, i.e. qˆ≤ n0, the profit is
pi = pn+ sqˆ− c(n)−σn
First order condition is
p = c′(n)+σ
Comparing with the situation without payments, if bindingness and capitalization occur, direct payments
negatively affect the output, i.e. n < n0. This case is relevant with cattle payments under CAP 1992.
If quota certificates are traded on the market, suppose that the payments are binding, i.e. q ≤ n0, and total
payments are S = sq. The profit is,
pi = pn+ sq− c(n)−σn− pqq+ pqq0
First order conditions are,
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p = c′(n)+σ
s = pq +σ ′(S)∗ s∗n
The first equation implies that the output is lower than that without payments, i.e. n < n0. The second one
indicates that the marginal benefit of obtaining one more unit of quota certificate equals the marginal cost,
which is the sum of the price of quota certificate and the resulting capitalization due to greater total payments.
Case 2: Payments are non-binding and total payments are S = sn. The profit is
pi = pn+ sn− c(n)−σn
First order condition is
p = c′(n)+σ − s
If capitalization is partial, i.e. S > σn or s > σ , the output will be greater than that without direct payments.
This case is relevant with cattle payments under Agenda 2000.
2.2.3. Incorporating Stock Density Requirements
As mentioned in Section 2.1, stock density limits define the maximum number of eligible cattle for direct
payments. Denote this maximum number (or quotas) by q¯. The farmer doesn’t need to obtain more quota
certificates than the limits, i.e. q≤ q¯.
Case 1: Payments are binding, i.e. q≤ q¯ < n0 or q≤ n0 < q¯.
The analysis of this case is the same as Case 1 in Section 2.2.2.
Case 2: Under Agenda 2000, SP is not limited by stock density requirements and payments are non-binding.
The analysis of this case is the same as Case 2 in Section 2.2.2.
2.2.4. Two types of Cattle Payments
The farmer can apply for both SCP and BSP and the farmer needs to raise two types of cattle accordingly. I
name the cattle that are eligible for SCP as type 1 cattle and those eligible for BSP as type 2 cattle.7 Denote
the output of type 1 cattle without direct payments by n01, and n
0
2 for type 2 cattle.
The sum of two types of eligible cattle cannot exceed the stock density limit, q¯. To receive BSP, the farmer
doesn’t need any certificate. Denote the payment per head of SCP by s1 and by s2 for BSP, such that s1 > s2.
7Suckler cows and calves are treated as a combination and referred to as type 1 cattle. The output of type 1 cattle is the sum of
suckler cows and calves. So are the production costs.
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The farmer needs to choose ouput levels for both types of cattle and the number of quota certificates, q, to
maximize its profit.
Case 1: q¯ < n01, q¯−q < n02. Both types of payments are binding. This case is relevant with cattle payments
under CAP 1992.
For the moment, assume that the farmer is able to obtain the profit-maximizing number of quota certificates
through the market. Total payments are S = qs1 +(q¯−q)s2 or q(s1− s2)+ q¯s2. Denote the effect of capital-
ization on the profit through type 1 cattle by σn1and by σn2 through type 2 cattle. Assume that capitalization
does not exceed the total payment net the cost of quota certificates, i.e. S− pqq≥ σn1 +σn2. The profit is
pi = pn1 + pn2 +S− c1(n1)− c2(n2)−σn1−σn2− pqq+ pqq0
where ci(·) is the total cost function pf type i cattle satisfying c′i(·)> 0 and c′′i (·)< 0, with i = 1, 2.
First order conditions are the following,
p = c′1(n1)+σ
p = c′2(n2)+σ
s1− s2 = pq +(n1 +n2)σ ′S(s1− s2)
The first two equations imply that the output of each type of cattle is lower than that without direct payments,
i.e. ni < n0i , i = 1, 2. The third equation implies that the marginal benefit of having one more unit of quota
certificate equals the related marginal cost. The marginal cost is the sum of the price of the quota certificate
and the increase in the capitalization.
In reality, there is a maximum number of animals at the national level that can receive SCP. Farmers may
not be able to obtain as many certificates as they want. The availability of quota certificates can vary across
farmers. Holding other conditions unchanged, the more certificates a farmer can get, the greater is total
payments, the greater is σ , and the lower the output of each type of cattle. Hence, a negative relation
between total payments and the output (n1, n2 or n1 +n2) can be conjectured.
Case 2: q¯ > n01, q¯− q < n02. BSP is always binding. This case is relevant with cattle payments under CAP
1992.
Case 2.1: Suppose the farmer can not obtain more quota certificates than n01, i.e. q < n
0
1 (SCP is binding),
then the analysis of this case is the same as Case 1 of Section 2.2.4.
Case 2.2: Suppose the farmer is able to obtain more quota certificates than n01, i.e. n
0
1 < q ≤ q¯ (SCP is
non-binding). It is not necessary to keep more certificates than the output level, i.e. n1 = q. The payment
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is non-binding for type 1 cattle, but binding for type 2 cattle. Total payments are S = n1s1 +(q¯− n1)s2 or
n1(s1− s2)+ q¯s2. The profit is
pi = pn1 + pn2 +S− c1(n1)− c2(n2)−σn1−σn2− pqn1 + pqq0
The first order conditions are,




Above two equations mean that the output of type 1 cattle is uncertain compared with n01, while the output
of type 2 cattle is lower than n02.
By looking at the data, it is impossible to differentiate between Case 1 and Case 2. Nevertheless, Case 1 is
more likely to happen if intervention prices are high enough.
Case 3: SP is introduced under Agenda 2000. Consider the case when both SCP and BSP are binding,
i.e.q¯ < n01 and q¯−q < n02.
Denote the amount of SP per head by ssp. Total payments are S = qs1 +(q¯− q)s2 +(n1 + n2)ssp or q(s1−
s2)+ q¯s2 +(n1 +n2)ssp. The profit is,
pi = pn1 + pn2 +S− c1(n1)− c2(n2)−σn1−σn2− pqn1 + pqq0
If the profit-maximizing level of quota certificates of SCP are accessible, then first order conditions are the
following
p = c′1(n1)+σ +((n1 +n2)σ
′
S−1)ssp
p = c′2(n2)+σ +((n1 +n2)σ
′
S−1)ssp
(s1− s2)− (n1 +n2)σ ′S(s1− s2)− pq = 0
From the third equation, we have (n1 + n2)σ
′
S− 1 = pqs2−s1 < 0. The output of either type of cattle can be
greater than the level without direct payments, i.e.n1 > n01, n2 > n
0
2, if σ +((n1 +n2)σ
′
S−1)ssp < 0.
If the profit-maximizing level of quota certificates of SCP are not accessible, total payments will decline.
Then,
(s1− s2)− (n1 +n2)σ ′S(s1− s2)− pq < 0 or (n1 +n2)σ
′
S−1 > pqs2−s1
The output, both n1 and n2, will decrease compared with the situation when the profit-maximizing level of
quota certificates of SCP are accessible. Hence, a positive relation between total payments and the output
(n1, n2 or n1 +n2) can be conjectured.
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2.3. Empirical Identification Strategy
Headage payments are paid to eligible cattle stocks. Implementation rules of headage payments affect cattle
output indirectly measured as market sales. BSP is paid to eligible bulls or steers once in the lifetime of the
cattle, so that farmers have incentives to sell the cattle after receiving the payments. SCP is paid to eligible
suckler cows once a year. On the one hand, old suckler cows need to be replaced with young ones. On the
other hand, suckler cows are kept for the purpose of raising calves for meat production and are not allowed
to provide milk to the market. Hence, SCP affects the output of calves.
Other payments are not coupled to the heads of cattle and should not affect the cattle production directly.
Nevertheless, all types of direct payments can capitalize into input prices. Therefore, other payments should
be taken into account in the analysis of the relation between subsidies and cattle output.
It is reasonable to argue that under both policy programs farmers tend to raise more cattle than the number
of quotas when facing intervention prices. If this is the case, payments are binding under CAP 1992. This
assumption can be checked with the data by comparing the actual output and the heads of cattle that actually
receive direct payments, though the data are only available from 2000 on. This issue about the data will be
discussed in Section 5.2.
The identification strategy of my paper is based on the assumption that the availability of SCP quota certifi-
cates for each holding is exogenous. Thus, the variation in total payments is exogenous. Since latent outputs
without direct payments n01 and n
0
2 are not observable, the identification strategy of this paper is to look at
the change in total direct payments over time and the change in observed outputs over time.
I conduct several robustness checks. First, with available data I compare the actual output and the cattle
that actually receive direct payments. Second, I expect that for farms whose inputs reply on the market
supply to a greater extent, their direct payments are more likely to capitalize into input prices. The degree
of capitalization depends on the competitiveness of the inputs markets. A negative effect of binding direct
payments on outputs is more likely to be captured. Third, there are farms with a relatively high stock density,
implying that they produce at a level above the number of quotas to a greater extent. Again, a negative effect
of binding direct payments is more likely to be captured. Some characteristics of the holdings related with
robustness checks are summarized in Table 1 of Section 3.1.
3. The Data
The data are from the Spanish section of the European Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN), namely the
Red Contable Agraria Nacional (RECAN). This survey is an annual farm survey conducted by the Spanish
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Ministry of Agriculture. The questionnaire is filled in by accountancy agencies that collect information
directly from the commercial farms. A commercial farm is defined as a farm that is large enough to provide
a main activity for the farmer with a level of income sufficient to support his/her family. Since 1985, the
RECAN survey has been part of the European FADN. Importantly, since 1988 it has been conducted with
only minor methodological changes in the definition of livestock products. Although the panel is unbalanced,
most of the farms are present in the survey for several years.8
3.1. Sample Description and Related Issues
I want to estimate the effect of cattle payments on beef-cattle outputs under both CAP 1992 and Agenda
2000. Farm-level data from 1995 to 2003 are used. The sample studied includes holdings that raise beef-
cattle and receive direct payments during this period. I consider four periods. The period under CAP 1992
includes 1995-1998. The announcement period of Agenda 2000 is from May 1999 to the end of 1999. The
transitional period of Agenda 2000 refers to 2000 and 2001 when intervention prices are relatively high and
headage payments are gradually increased. The full-implementation period of Agenda 2000 includes 2002
and 2003, as new policies are finally established in July 2002.9 Year 1999 is dropped from the analysis, as it
partially belongs to the period under CAP 1992 and partially to the announcement period of Agenda 2000.
Farms enter and exit the sample every year for unreported reasons. If farms enter or exit the sample inde-
pendently of the implementation of new policies under Agenda 2000, cross sectional data is a representative
sample and provides reliable estimates for the population of interest. Given that revised direct payments are
designed to partially compensate for farmers’ income loss, reduced intervention prices may cause farms with
low productivity to exit the business. If this is the case, selection problems with the cross sectional data will
bias the estimates for Agenda 2000.
8 In the original dataset, the farm identifier was reused to identify another farm two years after the original farm dropped out of
the sample. To avoid identification problems, in this paper it is assumed that farms that dropped out the sample would not enter the
sample again.
9 Single Payment Scheme (SPS) is another important reform of the CAP which is announced in June 2003 and started in 2006 in
Spain. Since the reference amount of single payment is fixed at the level before the announcement, farmers can not react strategically
to be eligible for more payments after the announcement and before the implementation.
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Balanced longitudinal data are a counter-example to the original sample. Farms that exit or newly enter the
business after the new policies are excluded.10 However, if farms stay in business after the new policies are
with high productivity, the balanced sample also suffers selection bias. I report estimation results with both
the full and the balanced sample. If the results are similar between the two samples, estimates are less likely
to be biased.
Given a common intervention price for all holdings, a holding with high productivity or low production
cost will has a stock density level greater than others with low productivity. Table 1 presents the computed
stock density for the full and the balanced sample. The stock density is computed by dividing cattle stocks
measured in LUs by the land area of a holding.11
(Insert Table 1 around here.)
The mean and standard deviations in parentheses of the computed stock density are reported in columns (2)
and (5) of Table 1, while column (3) and (6) give the percent of holdings with a computed stock density
greater than 1 LU per ha. Holdings from the balanced sample have greater stock density than those from the
full sample, especially from 2000 to 2003. This indicates selection problems with the balanced sample.
The dataset provides accurate information about cattle types for cattle stocks in all years, but not for market
sales before the year 2000. More precisely, diary cows can not be exclude from the output variable before
2000 and they are not eligible for headage payments. I include sales of diary cows under both policies to
maintain the consistency in the measure of outputs. At the time, in order to be eligible for headage payments
under both sets of policies, the number of diary cows that farmers can raise depends on the quantity of milk
quotas they hold. Since milk quota is not reformed throughout the period studied in this paper, the effect of
measurement error can be alleviated by taking time difference in the output variable.
Table 2 gives a summary of diary cow stocks. Stocks are relevant since diary cows are kept for the purpose
of producing milk for the market.
(Insert Table 2 around here.)
10 Balanced longitudinal data which includes holdings present in the sample from 1995 to 2003 will be referred to as the balanced
sample hereafter. The repeated cross sectional data which includes all holdings present in the sample in each year will be referred
to as the full sample hereafter.
11Since the dataset doesn´t provide exact information about how much land of a holding is devoted to cattle-raising, the computed
stock density potentially underestimates the actual stock density.
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Column (2) for the full sample suggests that there is a time trend in the evolution of diary cow stock from
1995 to 2003. This is also true for the balanced sample in column (6). On average, holdings from the full
sample keep more diary cows than those from the balanced sample in all the years, but the difference is
small. Looking at column (4) for the full sample, the percentage of holdings that raise dairy cows remains
relatively stable between 60% and 70% except in 1996, 1999 and 2003. Column (8) for the balanced sample
shows that this percentage is quite close between the two samples and slightly greater with the full sample
in most of the years.
In short, there is no clear evidence of substitutions between beef-cattle and diary cows after the announce-
ment of Agenda 2000, either with the full or the balanced sample. Since the time trend presents with both
types of sample, the issue of including diary cows in the output variable is equally important for both sam-
ples. Taking time difference and including time dummies in regressions can presumably solve this problem.
3.2. Summary of Key Variables of the Estimation Sample
Beef-cattle outputs are measured by market sales. The average sales per holding from 2000 to 2003 is
summarized in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3, measured in LUs and market value separately. The value per
LUs is computed by dividing the aggregate market value of the outputs of all holdings by aggregate outputs
in LUs and is reported in column (4) of Table 3. Panel A of the table contains statistics from the full sample
and Panel B includes those from the balanced sample defined in Section 3.1.
(Insert Table 3 around here.)
Column (2) in Panel A shows that the average sales per holding measured in LUs increases in 2001. Potential
reasons for this trend can be the Agenda 2000 reforms, the recovery from the BSE crisis and an increase in
beef consumption because of the reduction in intervention prices. At the same time, the average market value
per holding decreases in 2001, which likely reflects the cut in intervention prices. Lower intervention prices
are also reflected in the value per LU. All these features are also present in the balanced sample.
The increase in average sales in 2002 can be due to several factors, such as increased direct payments, the
currency reform of Euros and an increase in consumption because of lower market prices. If the composition
of types of cattle remained the same, the value per LUs in column (4) should have declined due to the cut in
intervention prices in 2002. However, this doesn’t seem to be the case. Note that the collected sample varies
over years and, as a result, the composition of different types of cattle can vary in the sample. Moreover, the
biggest cut in intervention prices takes place in July 2002 but the statistics in Table 3 are annual figures.
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We can assess the importance of changes in the composition of cattle over years by looking at the balanced
sample in Panel B, since the composition of cattle in the balanced sample should be more stable than that of
the full sample. Column (2) in Panel B shows that in 2002 the average sales also increase as with the full
sample. Interestingly, the value per LU in column (4) does decrease, which is consistent with the big cut in
intervention prices in 2002.
Table 4 summarizes direct payments on beef-cattle from 1995 to 2003. Figures in panel A are obtained
from the full sample and those in panel B are from the balanced sample. Headage payments are the sum of
all types of headage payments. Overall payments include all types of direct payments, including headage
payments and other payments defined in Section 2.1.
(Insert Table 4 around here.)
Looking at Panel A of Table 4, we can see that aggregate headage payments in column (2) keep on increasing
from 1995 to 2003. Average headage payments in column (3) keep on increasing from 1996 to 1999, but
decrease in 2000. Arguably, the BSE crisis negatively influences the number of cattle raised by a holding.
After that, average headage payments keep on increasing from 2001 to 2003. All of these facts are also true
for the overall payments in columns (4) and (5).
Figures in panel B show that aggregate and average headage payments in columns (2) and (3) keep on
increasing from 1996 to 2003. This is also true for the overall payments in columns (4) and (5). Moreover,
average headage payments are greater with the balanced sample than those with the full sample in all the
years. This is also true for overall payments.
Table 5 gives a summary about each type of headage payment. Average payment per holding and the com-
puted payment per cattle are reported. The payment per cattle is computed by dividing the total amount
of each type of payment by the number of cattle that receive the payment. The full sample is used. The
computed payment per cattle can be compared with the official values in Table 15 in the Appendix.
(Insert Table 5 around here.)
For SCP and BSP, the average payment depends on the number of eligible cattle and the payment per cattle.
As shown in Table 5, the average payment keeps on increasing from 2000 to 2003. This is consistent with
increases in the payment per cattle reported in Table 15 in the Appendix.
The payment per cattle of SP for cattle under seven months old is much lower than the official value (50
euros per cattle) in 2000 and 2001. This is also true for SP for cattle above eight months old whose official
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value is 80 euros per cattle. These facts probably show certain evidence of over-claims for SP. If claims
made by farmers for SP exceed the regional ceiling, as a result, the payment per eligible cattle declines. If
over-claims also happen with BSP, farmers have incentives to sell young cattle instead of keeping them for
future BSP. Farmers have incentives to claim on all eligible cattle for SP. This will reinforce the severeness
of over-claims for SP. The payment per cattle increases in 2002 and 2003 and becomes very close to the
official value in 2003.
The computed payment per head of SCP for suckler cows is quite close to the official values shown in Table
15, whereas that of BSP for bulls is smaller than the official values, which may again imply the incidence of
over-claims.12
Regarding the EP, the average payment depends on the number of eligible cattle and the payment per cattle.
Both the average payment per holding and the payment per cattle are quite stable throughout the four years.
By looking at figures about beef-cattle sales in Table 3 and direct payments in Table 4, it is impossible to
tell the relation between the payments and the cattle output, as there are factors other than direct payments
that affect the output level. We need to run regressions to obtain the effect of direct payments on beef-cattle
outputs while controlling for factors that affect the output and the amount of payments at the same time, such
as farm size and geographic location of the farm. In addition, variables that are arguably determined simul-
taneously with the farm size and also influence the output are included in regressions, namely working hours
devoted to the farmland, costs on machinery, costs exclusively spent on cattle raising, other intermediate
costs.
One potential endogeneity problem is that if there are heterogeneous shocks affecting direct payments and
productivity (thus outputs) at the same time, the identification strategy of this paper may result in biased
estimates. For instance, changes in personal abilities of the farm manager may affect outputs and total
payments in the same direction. In this case, the estimations give conservative estimates under CAP 1992,
but overestimate production effects of direct payments under Agenda 2000. Nevertheless, the period studied
in this paper is quite short and it seems reasonable to expect that unobservable factors such as personal
abilities don’t change much.
Control variables are summarized in Table 6. The mean and the number of observations in parentheses are
presented.
(Insert Table 6 around here.)
12BSP for steers and SCP for heifers are not reported in Table 5, since the number of observations are very small (around 30 or
fewer). The information is available upon request.
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Variable “Rented Land” is the area of farmland that is rented by the farmer, while “Total Land” is the overall
area of farmland utilised by a holding. According to the figures in Table 6, there are around 55% to 70%
farmers rent farmland. “Paid Wage” is the total amount of wage paid to farm workers. “Unpaid Hours” is
the number of working hours that are not paid, “Paid Hours” is the working hours that are paid, and “Total
Hours” is the sum of these two terms. Between 10% to 20% holdings hire farm workers. “Costs on Mach” is
the costs spent on renting, maintaining or renewing of machinery. “Costs on Cattle” is the costs exclusively
spent on raising cattle. As is shown in Table 6, “Costs on cattle” represents an important source of costs for
the holdings. “Inter Costs” are intermediate costs, including water, electricity and insurrance.
4. Econometric Models and Estimation Results
4.1. Econometric Models
4.1.1. A Static Model
As mentioned in Section 3.1, three periods are included in the regressions: the period under CAP 1992
(1995-1998), the transitional period (2000-2001) and the full-implementation period of Agenda 2000 (2002-
2003).
Let t denote different years and let l denote different periods, namely l = l0 i f 1995≤ t ≤ 1998, l = l1 i f t =
2000, 2001 and l = l2 i f t = 2002, 2003. The index i indicates individual holdings which raise cattle and
receive direct payments. Consider the following static model for panel data:
yit = ϕlSit +φ ′l Zit +θt +ηi + vit (1)
where yit is the log of market sales of beef-cattle measured in LUs, Sit is the log of direct payments, and vector
Zit includes the log of the control variables that are summarized in Table 6. Time dummies, θt , capture the
effects of changes in the economic environment such as declines in intervention prices, the BSE crisis, the
Euro reforms, and imports and exports shocks. The time-invariant holding-specific term, ηi, captures time-
invariant heterogeneity among holdings, such as the productivity of farm land and personal abilities of the
farm manager.
The coefficient ϕl contains both the direct payment and the capitalization effect. When both bindingness
and capitalization happen, ϕl is expected be negative. When payments are non-binding and capitalization is
partial, ϕl is expected to be positive. The vector of coefficients {ϕl0 ,ϕl1 ,ϕl2} is the interest of this paper.
The fixed effet, ηi, is assumed to be (strictly) exogenous.
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E(ηi · vit) = 0, f or ∀t = 1, ...T. (2)
Taking first differences in Equation 1, we have
∆yit = ϕl∆Sit +φ ′l∆Zit +∆θt +∆vit (3)
If direct payments, Sit , and other controls, Zit , are (strictly) exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with past, present
and future values of vit , OLS estimator can provide unbiased estimates of ϕl and φ ′l . However, Sit and Zit are
likely to be correlated with past shocks. For instance, if unanticipated technological shocks enable a holding
to raise more of the cattle that are eligible for greater payment per head, total direct payments would increase
from then on. Consequently, production methods would change, hence the input variables included in Zit .
Hence, I assume Sit and Zit to be weakly exogenous (or predetermined).
E(Si,t−k · vit) = 0, E(Zi,t−k · vit) = 0, f or t = 1, ...T, k ≥ 0. (4)
If there is no serial autocorrelation in vit ,
Cov(vit ,vis) = 0, where t 6= s (5)
unbiased estimates of ϕl and φ ′l can be obtained using instrumental variable estimation, i.e. lagged values
Si,t−k and Zi,t−k with k ≥ 1 are valid instruments for ∆Sit and ∆Zit respectively.
To see if ϕl varies significantly in different periods, I specify a flexible model. For simplicity, consider a
model with two periods, l0 and l1. Equation 3 can be reparameterized as
∆yit = ∆θt + τDpt +ϕl0∆Sit + γ∆SitD
p
t +φ ′l0∆Zit +ζ
′∆ZitDpt +∆uit (6)
where Dpt is an indicator, i.e. D
p
t = 1 if t belongs to period l1 and D
p
t = 0 otherwise, time dummies, ∆θt ,
contain the effect of changes in the economic environment within period l0, τ +∆θt captures the effect of
changes in the economic environment within period l1, parameter γ is the differenceϕl1 −ϕl0 that measures
how the effect of direct payments changes from period l0 to l1, the vector of coefficient ζ ′ is φ ′l1 −φ ′l0 , and
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∆uit is ∆vit .13 Equation 6 can be expanded to include more than two periods, and can be applied to different
subperiods within each policy program.
4.1.2. A Dynamic Model
As pointed out by Just (2003), evidence shows that weather is serially correlated which can generate serially
correlated yields. Literatures in agricultural research oftens finds serially correlated shocks in the production
model (Guan (2006)). In addition, adjusting costs in agricultural production make the overall results of a
production plan cover a period of more than one year. As a result, a dynamic model is appropriate.
Following Arellano-Bond (1991), consider a dynamic model based on a first-order autoregressive process as
follows:
yit = αyi,t−1 +ϕlSit +φ ′l Zit +θt +ηi + vit (7)
where the variables and the parameters are the same as those in Equation 1.14 It is reasonable to think that an
unpredictable shock is uncorrelated with past market sales, thus, yit is assumed to be predetermined, i.e. yit
depends on past and present values of vit . If there is no serial correlation as defined in Equation 5, the model
implies the following moment restrictions,
E(yi,t−k ·∆vit) = 0, f or t = 3, ...T, k ≥ 2. (8)
which means that values of y lagged two periods or more are valid instruments for Equation 7 in first differ-
ences. In general, if vit is MA(q) in the following sense,
E(vitvi,t−s) 6= 0, f or s≤ q (9)
moment restrictions become,
E(yi,t−q−k ·∆vit) = 0, f or t = (q+3), ...T, k ≥ 2. (10)
13If there is any time-invariant bias in the estimate of ϕl due to any failure of the exogeneity conditions, we can still obtain an
unbiased estimate of ϕl1 −ϕl0 .
14A second order autoregression model is tried with the data of 1995-1998 and of 2000-2003, however, the estimated coefficient
of yi,t−2 is not significantly different from zero. Estimation results are available upon request. I stick to a first-order autoregression
model in this paper.
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I assume Sit and Zit to be predetermined as defined in Equation 4. If vit is MA(q) with q ≥ 0, Si,t−q−k and
Zi,t−q−k with k ≥ 1 are valid instruments for ∆Sit and ∆Zit respectively. To test for serial correlations of vit ,
I use m1 and m2 statistics by Arellano-Bond (1991). Test results will be reported together with estimation
results.
The estimator exploiting Equation 10 is referred to as GMM-FD in this paper. 15
Similar to Equation 6, Model 7 admits a reparameterization,
∆yit = ∆θt + τDpt +α∆yi,t−1 +ϕl0∆Sit
+γ∆SitDpt +φ ′l0∆Zit +ζ
′∆ZitDpt +∆uit (13)
where τ , ϕl0 , γ , φ ′l0 , ζ
′ and uit are the same as those in Equation 6.
As mentioned in Section 3, farm-level data are collected by agencies directly from farmers. Although there
are main guidelines for collecting data, agencies may differ, if only marginally, in their implementation of the
accounting conventions set up within the FADN statistical framework. In view of possibly correlated errors
of farms with the same agency, cluster-robust standard errors are captured by controlling for agencies.16
15There can be weak-instruments problems with GMM-FD, especially when the value of α increases towards unit or as the
variance of ηi increases. To solve this problem, Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) proposed to exploit moment
conditions under the assumption of no serial correlation as follows:
E(∆yi,t−s · vit) = 0, f or t = 3, ...T, s≥ 1. (11)
If we combine Equation 11 with an additional assumption, E(∆yi,t−s ·ηi) = 0, we have:
E(∆yi,t−s · (ηi + vit)) = 0, f or t = 3, ...T, s≥ 1. (12)
The GMM estimator exploiting both Equation 8 and 12 are usually referred to as System-GMM. The moments of Equation 12
exploits that the first observation comes from the stationary distribution. This may not be the case in my paper, as the institutional
settings are changing and some periods should be required for farms to adapt to new settings. In practice, I use Sargan difference
test by Arellano-Bond (1991) to check the validity of moment restrictions of Equation 12. Under both CAP 1992 and Agenda 2000,
I find that Sargan difference test does’t support the use of additional restrictions of of Equation 12.
16 Most farms in the sample had the same agencies throughout the three periods. However, about 5% of the holdings change their
agencies at some point between 1995 and 1998, and about 6% between 2000 and 2003. For these farms, agencies are chosen to be
those in the first year of a given period.
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4.2. Estimation Results
According to the analysis in Section 2, without capitalization, binding subsidies under CAP 1992 should
have no effect on outputs, while non-binding subsidies under Agenda 2000 should have positive effects.
With capitalization, binding subsidies can negatively influence outputs, whereas non-binding subsidies can
have positive (zero) impacts if the capitalization is partial (full). Non-binding subsidies may even negatively
affect outputs if capitalization overtakes subsidies. In this section, I provide estimation results separately for
each policy program, and I compare the effect of direct payments between the two programs.
4.2.1. Effects of Direct Payments under CAP 1992
As farmers and input providers need time to react to the policies of CAP 1992, I split l0 into two subperiods,
namely h = h0 i f 1995≤ t ≤ 1996 and h = h1 i f 1997≤ t ≤ 1998. I estimate Equation 6 of the static model
using First Differences (FD). Direct payments and other controls are treated as predetermined, i.e. Si,t−k
and Zi,t−k with k ≥ 1 are used as instruments for ∆Sit and ∆Zit respectively. Estimation results for both the
unconditional and conditional models are reported in Table 7. Both types of sample are used.
(Insert Table 7 around here.)
As is shown in the table, m1 and m2 statistics in the four columns indicate the residuals are serially correlated,
which indicates that a dynamic model should be used. The serially correlated residuals don’t characterize
the error term of the dynamic model. Even if the error term of the dynamic model is MA(0), the wrongly
specified static model would present serially correlated residuals as shown in the table.
I estimate Equation 7 of the dynamic model using FD-GMM. Since the data are available only for four
years, lagged values of yit as instruments for yi,t−1 in first differences are available if the error term is MA(q)
with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. I start with estimating the equation by assuming the error to be MA(1). Since the order
of serial correlation of the residuals cannot be identified with m1 statistic alone, I use Sargan difference test
by Arellano-Bond (1991) to indirectly determine the validity of different lags as instruments. In the end,
estimation results using yi,t−3 as a instrument for ∆yi,t−1 and Si,t−k with k ≥ 2 for ∆Sit are reported in Table
8.
(Insert Table 8 around here.)
Columns (1) and (2) contains estimates with the full sample, while columns (3) and (4) for the balanced
sample. In the four columns, the estimated coefficient, αˆ , is negative and within the unit circle. It is only
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significant with the full sample. In previous empirical studies about the agricultural outputs, the sign of the
estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable shows a mixed picure. Some find a estimate between
0 and 1, e.g. Mythili (2008) and Kanwar (2008), while others find a negative one, e.g. Yu et al. (2012) and
Kanwar (2008).
Estimates of S in columns (1) and (2) show that direct payments have negative impacts on outputs during
1997-1998, but they are not significant. The negative impacts mean that with a 1% increase in direct pay-
ments, outputs would decrease by around 0.5%. Looking at columns (3) and (4), the estimated effect of
direct payments is larger in magnitude than that of the full sample. Moreover, the effect is statistically signif-
icant, implying that with a 1% increase in direct payments, outputs would decrease by around 1.2% during
1997-1998.
4.2.2. Effects of Direct Payments under Agenda 2000
As defined in Section 3.1, the period under Agenda 2000 is divided into two periods, i.e. the transitional
period l0 and the full-implementation period l1. I estimate Equation 6 of the static model using FD. Results
are presented in Table 9.
(Insert Table 9 around here.)
Similar to Table 7, m1 and m2 statistics in the four columns indicate the residuals are serially correlated,
implying that a dynamic model is needed.
I estimate Equation 7 of the dynamic model using FD-GMM. Similar to the situation in Section 4.2.1, the
data are available only for four years, i.e. 2000-2003. I apply the same method to determine the validity of
different lags as instruments. Finally, estimation results using yi,t−3 as a instrument for ∆yi,t−1 and Si,t−k with
k ≥ 2 for ∆Sit are reported in Table 10.
(Insert Table 10 around here.)
Similar to the results in Table 8, the estimated coefficient, αˆ , is negative and within the unit circle in the four
columns.
Looking at columns (1) and (2) for the full sample, estimates of S show that direct payments have positive
and maginally significant effects on outputs. If direct payments increase by 1%, the output would increase
by about 0.16% during 2002-2003. Estimates of S in columns (3) and (4) of the balanced sample are also
maginally significant and greater than those of the full sample. That is, if direct payments increase by 1%,
the output would increase by about 0.55% during 2002-2003.
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4.2.3. Comparison of Two Policy Programs
In this subsection I want to check if the effect of direct payments differ between CAP 1992 and Agenda 2000.
I estimate the flexible specifications defined in Equation 13 using FD-GMM. Then, I test if the estimated
coefficient of direct payments differs between the two policy programs. P-values of the tests are reported in
Table 11.
(Insert Table 11 around here.)
Results in columns (1) and (2) are for the full sample. Looking at either the unconditional or the conditional
model, p-values show that the estimated effect of direct payments differs statistically between 1997-1998
and 2002-2003. Results in columns (3) and (4) are for the balanced sample. They also show that estimates
of direct payments under Agenda 2000 are different from those under CAP 1992 at a significance level of
10%.
4.2.4. Decomposition of Policy Effects
How much of the change in the output, y¯il2− y¯il0 , is due to the new policies can be written as ϕˆl2 ∗ S¯il2− ϕˆl0 ∗
S¯il0 . I decompose it into two parts as follows,
ϕˆl0 ∗ (S¯il2− S¯il0)+(ϕˆl2− ϕˆl0)∗ S¯il2 (14)
where the first term measures the counterfactual effect of an increase in payments under Agenda 2000 while
ϕl is maintained at the level under CAP 1992, and the second term measures the counterfactual effect of a
change in ϕl due to new rules of Agenda 2000 while the payments are fixed at the level of Agenda 2000.
Decomposition results using the full sample are reported in Table 12. Estimates of direct payments are
obtained using the dynamic model reported in Tables 8 and 10. Estimates of direct payments during
1997-1998 are used to represent ϕˆl0 , while those during 2002-2003 to represent ϕˆl2 .
(Insert Table 12 around here.)
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Columns with the label “Payments” give the results for the first term of Equation 14 and show that the
percentage increase in direct payments would lead to a decrease in output because ϕˆl0 is negative. Columns
with the label “Policy” give the results for the second term, i.e. the impact on outputs due to changes in the
elasticity between direct payments and outputs. Since ϕˆl2 during 2002-2003 are positive in all
specifications, the second term in Equation 14 is positive and captures the output effect of the policy change
from CAP 1992 to Agenda 2000 even if subsidies are unchanged.
Results in column (3) of the conditional model with the full sample show that the increase in direct payments
would cause outputs to drop under CAP 1992 by 8.2% during 2002-2003. Estimates in column (7) of the
balanced sample show that outputs would decline by 19.1% during 2002-2003. Slightly smaller estimates
are obtained with the unconditional model as shown in columns (1) and (5).
5. Robustness Checks
Under CAP 1992, if a holding has unsubsidized outputs, it means the subsidies are binding. If a holding relies
on market for input supplies, it is more likely to suffer capitalization of subsidies. In this section, I explore
whether a negative association between direct payments and outputs can be capture for these holdings. On
the contrary, I also want to check whether a positive association can be obtained for holdings that are less
likely to suffer from capitalization under Agenda 2000.
I estimate Equation 13 using data from 1995 to 1998 for different groups. Estimation method is the same as
that for Table 8. Results are reported in Table 13.17
(Insert Table 13 around here.)
Estimated effects of direct payments under Agenda 2000 for different groups are reported in Table 14. Esti-
mation method is the same as that for Table 10.
(Insert Table 14 around here.)
17Only results with conditional models and the full sample are reported in Tables 13 and 14. Results with unconditional models
and the balanced sample are available upon request. Results with the unconditional model and with the balanced sample are quite
similar to those in Tables 13 and 14.
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Holdings Producing Above Quotas. As mentioned in Section 2.4, the assumption that the output of beef-
cattle with direct payments is greater than the number of quotas can be checked. Assume that the heads of
cattle that actually receive payments are equal to the number of quotas as long as the output is greater than
the number of quotas. The question turns to be the comparison between the output and the heads of cattle
that actually receive direct payments. I name those holdings with cattle sales greater than the cattle that
actually receive headage payments within a year as “holdings producing above quotas”. The data about the
cattle that actully receive payments are available from 2000 on. To circumvent this problem, I assume that
holdings that produce above quotas from 2000 to 2003 produced above quotas during 1995 to 1998.18
The estimated effect of direct payments under CAP 1992 for holdings producing above quotas is reported in
column (1) of Table 13. The estimate of S is negative but not significant during 1997-1998.
Holdings with High Stock Density. As mentioned in Section 2.3, holdings with relatively high stock den-
sity are likely to produce above the number of quotas and, hence, subsidies are likely to be binding. If
capitalization happens, subsidies have negative impacts on outputs.
Estimated effects of direct payments under CAP 1992 for holdings with stock density above 2 and 3 are
reported in columns (2) and (3) of Table 13 respectively. In both columns, the estimate of S is negative and
insignificant. The estimate in column (2) is quite small in magnitude.
Estimated effects of direct payments under Agenda 2000 for holdings with stock density below 3 and 4 are
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 14 respectively.19 Results in column (1) show that the estimated
effect is positive and marginally significant during 2002-2003. The estimate is also positive in column (2),
but not significant.
Holdings Not Receiving EP. According to the eligibility rules for EP, not receiving EP is a sign of high stock
density and, thus, subsidies are likely to be binding. The information about whether a holding receives EP is
available from 2000. To circumvent this problem, I assume that holdings that don’t receive EP from 2000 to
2003 didn’t receive EP from 1995 to 1998.20 These holdings are referred to as “holdings not receiving EP”
18Even if the ouput is above the number of quotas, it can be that during a calendar year market sales are below the heads of cattle
that actually receive payments. For instance, cattle may die or consumed by the producer afer receiving payments and before being
sold on the market. It can also be that cattle are to be sold in the near future but the payments are already issued in the current year.
To be consevative, only holdings with cattle sales greater than the cattle that actually receive payments are used in the estimation.
For the validity of the assumption, more than 95% of holdings, that produce above quotas in 2000, produce above quotas in 2001.
The same holds from 2001 to 2002, and from 2002 to 2003.
19The limits of stock density (2 and 3 for CAP 1992, and 3 and 4 for Agenda 2000) are chosen to obtain sufficiently large samples.
20For the validity of the assumption, more than 95% of holdings, that don’t receive EP in 2000, don’t receive EP in 2001. The
same holds from 2001 to 2002, and from 2002 to 2003.
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hereafter.
Estimated effects of direct payments under CAP 1992 for holdings not receiving EP are reported in column
(4) of Table 13. The estimated effect of direct payments is negative but not significant.
Holdings Relying on Markets for Inputs. Holdings whose inputs reply on the market supply to a greater
extent are more likely to suffer from capitalization. Given this, different groups of holdings are defined here,
including holdings that hire farm workers and pay salaries, that rent machinery, and that rent land (although
land rent doesn’t affect the variable cost of a holding, it may affect the costs of home-produced feedings).
Estimated effects of direct payments under CAP 1992 for holdings hiring workers, renting machinery and
renting land are reported in columns (5), (6) and (7) of Table 13 separately. Estimate of S in column (5)
is positive but in quite small magnitude, which is probably due to the small sample size. Estimates of S in
columns (6) and (7) are negative and significant in column (7).
The estimated effects under Agenda 2000 for holdings not hiring workers, not renting machinery and not
renting land are reported in columns (3), (4) and (5) of Table 14 respectively. The estimates of S in the three
columns are positive and marginally significant.
Holdings with High/Low Cattle-Ratio. Besides beef-cattle, holdings can produce other crops, such as cereal,
protein crops, vegetables, fruits and other kinds of livestock. I compute for each holding the ratio of the
market value of beef-cattle outputs relative to that of other products. This ratio will be referred to as cattle-
ratio. A holding with a relatively high cattle-ratio is more likely to rely on the market for cattle feedings and
suffer from capitalization.
Estimated effects of direct payments under CAP 1992 for holdings with a cattle-ratio above 20 and 200 are
reported in columns (8) and (9) of Table 13 respectively. The estimated effect of direct payments shown is
negative in both columns.
The estimated effect of direct payments under Agenda 2000 for holdings with a cattle-ratio below 500 are
reported in column (6) of Table 14.21 The estimated effect is positive but not significant.
Among the nine groups in Table 13, the smallest estimate of S happens with holdings with stock density
above 3 as well as holdings with a cattle-ratio above 20. The estimate indicates that if direct payments
increase by 1%, outputs would decrease by around 0.8% during 1997-1998. The estimate is also relatively
small for holdings renting machinery and with a cattle-ratio above 200.
21The limits of cattle-ratio (20 and 200 for CAP 1992 and 500 for Agenda 2000) are chosen to obtain sufficiently large samples.
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Among the six groups in Table 14, the greatest estimate of direct payments happens with holdings not renting
machinery, indicating that if direct payments increase by 1%, outputs would increase by about 0.5% during
2002-2003. Other groups are quite similar in the estimated effect of direct payments.
6. Conclusions
I study production effects of subsidies taking into account both bindingness and capitalization. Without
capitalization, binding subsidies have no production effect, whereas non-binding subsidies have positive
effects. With capitalization, bindingness leads to subsidies having a negative production effect, while non-
bindingness may cause a positive, zero or negative effect depending on the extent of capitalization. I study the
case of cattle payments implemented in Spain using a panel dataset that is representative and includes more
than 1000 observations in each year. Under CAP 1992, eligibility rules on cattle payments and intervention
prices for beef and veal make it likely that payments are binding. Under Agenda 2000, cattle payments
become non-binding.
Estimation results suggest that cattle payments under CAP 1992 have negative impacts on outputs during
1995-1996 as well as during 1997-1998. The estimated effects of cattle payments are highly significant
during 1997-1998. Under Agenda 2000, the estimated effect is positive and marginally significant. The
imprecision in the estimations may be caused by the limited length of the panel data used.
The decompostion analysis of policy effects gives estimates of the counterfactual effect of an increase in
payments in Agenda 2000 period under the CAP 1992 regime. In my preferred model specification, results
show that on average the increase in direct payments during 2002-2003 would cause outputs to decline by
8.2% under the CAP 1992 regime. After restricting the sample to holdings that present in the dataset from
1995 to 2003, results show that outputs would decline by 19.1%.
Results from robustness checks show that, when cattle payments are likely to be binding and holdings count
on markets for input supplies (i.e. capitalization is likely to happen), the estimated effect of the payments
is negative. When cattle payments are non-binding and holdings don’t reply on markets for inputs (i.e.
capitalization is less likely to happen), the estimated effect is positive.
CAP 1992 and Agenda 2000 reforms are both designed to reduce the over-production by cutting down
intervention prices and compensating farmers’ income loss with direct payments. The intention of introduc-
ing direct payments is not to increase the production. Within the beef and veal sector, estimates found in
this paper indicate that cattle payments are negatively associated with beef-cattle outputs under CAP 1992.
However, this association becomes positive under Agenda 2000. The effect goes counter to the objective of
Agenda 2000 to reduce the over-production.
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Table 1: Comparison of the Full and the Balanced Sample
BASIC STATISTICS
Full Sample Balance Sample
Obs. Density % of density>1 Obs. Density % of density>1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995 955 30.3 (200.8) 59% 182 38.2 (256.8) 65%
1996 1337 28.6 (218.7) 55% 376 36.1 (212.5) 64%
1997 1791 22.1 (187.8) 50% 558 25.1 (173.7) 62%
1998 1476 28.1 (205.9) 60% 558 26.5 (176.2) 64%
1999 1389 28.4 (209.7) 60% 446 32.7 (197.1) 61%
2000 1976 17.1 (150.3) 56% 459 36.2 (206.3) 66%
2001 1944 17.9 (156.9) 57% 465 35.4 (207.3) 65%
2002 1558 23.6 (168.8) 62% 489 42.8 (233.5) 67%
2003 1650 25.1 (178.6) 64% 529 42.5 (236.7) 66%
Note: “Density” is the computed stock density. “% of density>1” is the percent
of holdings with a computed stock density greater than 1 LU per ha.
“% Machine” is the percent of holdings that use machinery.
“% Workers” is the percent of holdings that hire workers.
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Table 2: Average Stocks per Holding of Diary Cows
BASIC STATISTICS
Full Sample Balance Sample
Obs. Mean Std. % Obs. Mean Std. %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1995 656 22.7 17.5 69% 122 19.2 15.4 67%
1996 1017 25.3 17.6 76% 283 22.9 13.5 75%
1997 1315 25.3 22.3 73% 375 25.3 15.6 67%
1998 926 26.1 18.8 63% 367 24.9 14.8 66%
1999 779 31.7 23.0 56% 247 25.1 16.6 55%
2000 1358 32.4 22.0 69% 260 28.2 16.7 57%
2001 1277 34.1 23.7 66% 263 31.1 19.5 57%
2002 958 37.9 26.7 61% 290 33.2 22.2 59%
2003 932 41.0 39.8 56% 324 34.0 22.8 61%
Note: “Obs.” is the number of holdings that raise diary cows. “Mean” is
the average heads of diary cows per holding. “Std” is the standard errors.
“%” is the percentage of holdings raising diary cows out of the holdings
that raise beef-cattle and receive direct payments.
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Table 3: Cattle Output Measured by LUs and Market Value
BASIC STATISTICS
Panel A: Full Sample
LUs Value
Obs. Mean Mean Value per LU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000 2004 14.5 15,709 1,085
2001 1965 18.3 15,161 829
2002 1563 20.6 18,977 921
2003 1652 22.8 24,795 1,089
Panel B: Balance Sample
LUs Value
Obs. Mean Mean Value per LU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000 460 14.8 19,915 1,346
2001 465 16.3 19,251 1,184
2002 489 23.3 22,232 954
2003 529 18.1 23,473 1,298
Note: “LUs” is market sales measured in LUs, “Value” is market value
of cattle sales in euros. “Value per LU” is the computed value per LU.
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Table 4: Summary of Direct Payments on Cattle
BASIC STATISTICS
Panel A: Full Sample
Headage Payments Overall Payments
Obs. Aggregate Mean Aggregate Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995 715 2,314,527 3,237.1 2,457,956 3,437,7
1996 1,071 3,431,377 3,203.9 3,676,850 3,433.1
1997 1,147 4,117,397 3,589.7 4,374,314 3,813.7
1998 1,152 4,513,421 3,917.9 4,845,335 4,206.0
1999 1,218 5,943,718 4,879.9 6,164,785 5,061.4
2000 1,849 7,882,381 4,263.1 8,350,565 4,516.3
2001 1,563 8,373,147 5,357.1 9,650,525 6,174.4
2002 1,526 9,097,234 5,961.5 10,753,569 7,046.9
2003 1,654 13,782,782 6,333.0 15,317,553 7,260.9
Panel B: Balanced Sample
Headage Payments Overall Payments
Obs. Aggregate Mean Aggregate Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995 118 454,996 3,855,9 488,515 4,140,0
1996 267 862,116 3,228.9 975,778 3,654.6
1997 380 1,716,992 4,518.4 1,837,095 4,834.5
1998 392 1,746,674 4,455.8 1,914,528 4,884.0
1999 349 1,809,251 5,184.1 1,935,648 5,546.3
2000 386 2,305,308 5,972.3 2,525,814 6,543.6
2001 325 2,549,365 7,844.2 2,823,607 8,688.0
2002 470 2,921,849 6,216.7 3,473,587 7,390.6
2003 521 3,536,055 6,787.1 4,010,033 7,696.8
Note: “Headage Payments” is the sum of all types of headage
payments in euros under CAP 1992 and under Agenda 2000.
“Overall payments” is the sum of “Headage Payments” and other
payments. All payments are measured in euros.
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Table 5: Summary of Different Headage Payments
BASIC STATISTICS













2000 858 743 22.7 595 948 35.4 225 2,911 125.6
2001 657 476 17.3 732 1,010 33.4 325 3,823 141.6
2002 327 981 39.6 1,152 1,593 63.7 334 4,167 164.3
2003 458 800 53.0 1,360 2,190 78.8 462 3,911 195.4









2000 643 5,159 181.0 247 3,487 99.6
2001 681 6,125 166.1 310 3,160 89.7
2002 587 6,349 189.5 290 3,567 96.7
2003 710 7,311 185.0 374 3,967 100.5
Note: “SP<7m” (“SP>8m”) refers to Slaugher Premium for cattle younger than 7 months (older than
8 months). “Avg. Pay.” is the average payment per holding in Euros. “Pay. per Head” is the computed
payment per head in Euros.
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Table 6: Summary of Control Variables
BASIC STATISTICS
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Rented Land 16.7 36.6 35.5 45.9 54.9 49.1 51.4 36.1 41.9
(488) (738) (920) (876) (884) (1113) (1174) (1065) (1154)
Total Land 22.2 34.4 36.2 57.1 69.4 56.6 60.2 54.6 61.2
(956) (1338) (1792) (1480) (1393) (2001) (1965) (1563) (1652)
Paid Wage 2533.3 4339.3 4974.9 4113.7 5884.8 5674.0 6760.7 6222.4 7895.9
(96) (145) (190) (170) (266) (271) (256) (245) (304)
Unpaid Hours 3306.4 3242.1 3046.8 2989.0 3250.0 3307.6 3133.2 3136.2 3231.8
(957) (1336) (1788) (1429) (1388) (2000) (1961) (1559) (1647)
Paid Hours 652.3 907.9 1082.1 945.3 979.2 1118.6 1282.6 1211.1 1287.2
(96) (145) (190) (170) (266) (271) (256) (245) (304)
Total Hours 3368.4 3335.7 3154.6 3097.1 3425.3 3452.3 3294.0 3318.0 3458.9
(958) (1338) (1792) (1431) (1393) (2004) (1965) (1563) (1652)
Costs on Mach 1344.3 1590.6 1971.0 2059.4 2137.9 2281.6 3293.7 3242.1 3636.9
(880) (1283) (1660) (1307) (1220) (1806) (1837) (1446) (1517)
Costs on Cattle 16451.1 21320.0 22019.0 22599.4 28338.3 27549.6 30096.1 34959.8 39351.1
(958) (1338) (1792) (1472) (1393) (2003) (1965) (1563) (1651)
Inter Costs 875.3 1135.1 998.9 1053.5 1692.5 1671.4 1482.3 2050.0 2313.4
(907) (1269) (1599) (1264) (1323) (1883) (1770) (1515) (1602)
Note: The mean and the number of observations in parentheses are reported in the table.
“Rented Land” is the area of farmland that is rented by the farmer. “Total Land” is the overall
area of farmland utilised by a holding. Both variables are in 100 hectares. “Paid Wage” is the
total amount of wage paid to farm workers. “Unpaid Hours” is the number of hours worked
that are not paid, while “Paid Hours” is the hours paid for. “Total Hours” is the sum of these two
terms. “Costs on Mach” is the costs spent on the renting, maintenance or renewing of the machinery.
“Costs on Cattle” is the costs exclusively spent on raising cattle. “Inter Costs” is some intermediate
costs including water, electricity and insurrance. All variables except the land are in Euros.
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Table 7: Effects of Direct Payments under CAP 1992 (Static Model, 1995-1998)
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Full Sample Balanced Sample
Uncondi. Condi. Uncondi. Condi.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S 0.685** 0.507*** 0.414 0.386
(0.274) (0.194) (0.293) (0.262)
S∗D1998 0.228 0.151 -0.112 -0.079
(0.151) (0.119) (0.127) (0.083)
D1996 0.221*** 0.259*** 0.182*** 0.359***
(0.039) (0.038) (0.067) (0.088)
D1997 -0.148** -0.100 -0.133 -0.135
(0.075) (0.066) (0.129) (0.139)
D1998 0.547*** 0.600*** 0.730*** 1.004***
(0.095) (0.082) (0.145) (0.154)
No. of Obs. 2756 2704 1038 1015
m1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
m2 0.012 0.038 0.003 0.089
Sargan test 0.010 0.003 0.302 0.341
Note: S is overall direct payments. S and additional controls are
summarized in Table 4 and Table 6. Estimates of additional controls
are omitted. D1996 is a time dummy that equals 1 during 1996, and 0
otherwise. D1997 and D1998 are also time dummies. Robust standard
errors are given in brackets. For m1, m2 and Sargan tests, p-values are
reported. Instruments used for ∆Sit are Si,t−k f or k ≥ 1. Specifically,
instruments used for ∆Si,1998 are Si,1997, Si,1996 and Si,1995.
*, **, *** means significant at the 90th, 95th, 99th percentile.
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Table 8: Effects of Direct Payments under CAP 1992 (Dynamic Model, 1995-1998)
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Full Sample Balanced Sample
Uncondi. Condi. Uncondi. Condi.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yi,t−1 -0.492** -0.491** -0.786 -0.705
(0.232) (0.254) (0.609) (0.781)
S -0.449 -0.580 -1.167** -1.179*
(0.513) (0.503) (0.592) (0.731)
D1996 0.137 0.201 0.452*** 0.477
(0.131) (0.132) (0.179) (0.305)
D1997 0.648*** 0.702*** 0.519*** 0.480***
(0.126) (0.145) (0.122) (0.126)
D1998 0.712*** 0.747*** 0.884*** 0.863***
(0.090) (0.110) (0.116) (0.158)
No. of Obs. 1584 1552 594 583
m1 0.002 0.003 0.056 0.063
Sargan test 0.329 0.339 0.345 0.264
Note: yi,t−1 is the lagged dependent variable. Refer to Table 7 for defi-
nitions of variables. Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. For
m1 and Sargan tests, p-values are reported. Instruments used for ∆Sit
are Si,t−k f or k ≥ 2, and for ∆yi,t−1 are yi,t−k f or k ≥ 3. Specifically,
instruments used for ∆Si,1998 is Si,1996 and Si,1995, and for ∆yi,1997 is
yi,1995. *, **, *** means significant at the 90th, 95th, 99th percentile.
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Table 9: Effects of Direct Payments under Agenda 2000 (Static Model, 2000-2003)
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Full Sample Balanced Sample
FD (S is pred.) FD (S is pred.)
Uncondi. Condi. Uncondi. Condi.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
S 0.278*** 0.224*** 0.245*** 0.232***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.027) (0.024)
S∗D2003 0.194*** 0.121*** 0.237*** 0.135***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.030) (0.028)
D2001 -0.376*** -0.331*** -0.518*** -0.398***
(0.046) (0.043) (0.060) (0.062)
D2002 0.005 -0.023 0.079*** 0.087***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.030)
D2003 0.172*** 0.173*** 0.127*** 0.042
(0.030) (0.027) (0.040) (0.044)
No. of Obs. 3297 3297 1118 1118
m1 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
m2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Sargan test 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Refer to Table 7 for definitions of variables. D2001 is a time dummy that
equals 1 during 2001, and 0 otherwise. D2002 and D2003 are also time dummies.
Robust standard errors are shown in brackets. For m1, m2 and Sargan tests,
p-values are reported. Instruments used for ∆Sit are Si,t−k f or k ≥ 1.
Specifically, instruments used for ∆Si,2003 are Si,2002, Si,2001 and Si,2000.
*, **, *** means significant at the 90th, 95th, 99th percentile.
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Table 10: Effects of Direct Payments under Agenda 2000 (Dynamic Model, 2000-2003)
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Full Sample Balanced Sample
FD-GMM FD-GMM
Uncondi. Condi. Uncondi. Condi.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
yi,t−1 -0.163*** -0.171*** -0.118 -0.130*
(0.050) (0.049) (0.082) (0.080)
S 0.158* 0.147* 0.546* 0.584*
(0.098) (0.087) (0.314) (0.328)
D2001 -0.084 -0.073 -0.623 -0.680
(0.178) (0.173) (0.530) (0.529)
D2002 0.027 0.043* 0.040 0.075
(0.028) (0.027) (0.056) (0.052)
D2003 0.297*** 0.277*** 0.143 0.149*
(0.051) (0.050) (0.101) (0.088)
No. of Obs. 1483 1483 503 503
m1 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.015
Sargan test 0.151 0.171 0.120 0.141
Note: Refer to Tables 7 and 9 for definitions of variables. Robust standard
errors are in brackets. For m1 and Sargan tests, p-values are reported.
Instruments used for∆Sit are Si,t−k f or k ≥ 2, and for ∆yi,t−1 are yi,t−k
f or k ≥ 3. Specifically, instruments used for ∆Si,2003 is Si,2001 and Si,2000,
and for ∆yi,2002 is yi,2000. *, **, *** means significant at the 90th, 95th,
and 99th percentile.
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Table 11: Comparison of Two Policy Programs
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Compare 2002-2003 with 1997-1998
Full Sample Balanced Sample
Uncondi. Condi. Uncondi. Condi.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
P-values 0.014 0.013 0.073 0.064
No. of Obs. 3067 3035 1097 1086
m1 0.002 0.003 0.016 0.022
Sargan test 0.328 0.228 0.325 0.271
Note: I test if the estimated effect of direct payments during the
period under CAP 1992 and that under Agenda 2000 are different.
P-values of the tests are reported.
Table 12: Decomposition of Policy Effects
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Dynamic Model
Full Sample Balance Sample
Uncondi. Condi. Uncondi. Condi.
Payments Policy Payments Policy Payments Policy Payments Policy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
-6.3% 1.354 -8.2% 1.621 -18.9% 4.052 -19.1% 4.171
Note: “Payments” give the results for the first term of Equation 14, i.e. the percentage
increase in direct payments leads to a percentage decrease in outputs. “Policy” give the
results for the second term, i.e. the impact on outputs due to changes in the elasticity
between direct payments and outputs.
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Table 13: Robustness with Different Farm Groups, CAP 1992
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Dynamic Model (Full Sample)




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
yi,t−1 -0.302 -0.407** -0.431 -0.554** -0.355 -0.620** -0.442 -0.409* -0.492
(0.434) (0.212) (0.378) (0.262) (0.452) (0.255) (0.494) (0.238) (0.339)
S -0.485 -0.039 -0.811 -0.227 0.046 -0.771** -0.457 -0.809 -0.727
(0.746) (0.608) (0.729) (0.453) (0.332) (0.399) (0.454) (0.588) (0.579)
No. of Obs. 968 1008 613 995 137 1427 810 1102 1058
m1 0.016 0.031 0.054 0.003 0.049 0.033 0.089 0.008 0.005
Sargan test 0.970 0.395 0.086 0.697 0.368 0.278 0.440 0.160 0.296
Note: Refer to Tables 7 and 8 for definitions of variables. Robust standard errors are in brackets.
For m1 and Sargan tests, p-values are reported. Instruments for ∆Sit and ∆yi,t−1 are the same as those
described in Table 8. *, **, *** means significant at the 90th, 95th, 99th percentile respectively.
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Table 14: Robustness with Different Farm Groups, Agenda 2000
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS AND STD ERROR
Dynamic Model (Full Sample)
density<3 density<4 no employee no machine no land rent cattle-ratio<500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
yi,t−1 -0.161*** -0.194*** -0.147*** -0.295** -0.239*** -0.163**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.146) (0.058) (0.065)
S 0.161* 0.101 0.186* 0.502** 0.192* 0.167
(0.092) (0.147) (0.109) (0.229) (0.114) (0.137)
No. of Obs. 1006 1191 1309 161 538 658
m1 0.009 0.051 0.010 0.075 0.006 0.006
Sargan test 0.296 0.072 0.518 0.046 0.100 0.730
Note: Refer to Tables 7 and 9 for definitions of variables. Robust standard errors are shown in
brackets. For m1 and Sargan tests, p-values are reported. Instruments for ∆Sit and ∆yi,t−1 are the
same as those described in Table 10. *, **, *** means significant at the 90th, 95th, 99th percentile.
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Appendix
Regulations of each type of headage payments under Agenda 2000 are summarized in Table 15.
Table 15: Regulations of Headage Payments under Agenda 2000
Eligible cattle Frequency Amount Limits
Beef Special Bulls > 9 mths Once in lifetime 210 A regional ceiling
Premium Steers : 9 and 21 mths Twice in lifetime 150 Stock density <2
Suckler Cow Suckler cows and heifers Annual 200 Regional & individual ceilings
Premium Stock density <2
Extensification Additional on BSP and SCP Once in lifetime 40 Stock density (1.4, 1.8]
Payment 80 Stock density (0, 1.4]
Slaughter Bulls, steers, cows > 8 mths Once in lifetime 80 A regional ceiling
Premium Calves < 7 mths, < 160 kg Once in lifetime 50 No limit on stock density
Note: The amount of headage payments were increasing gradually from 2000 to 2002 and remained at
the level of 2002 until the SFP came into effect. The amount in the table is the level of 2002 in Euros. The
regional ceiling for bulls and steers of Spain was 713,999 heads and for suckler cows 1,441,539 heads.
BSP is a payment for bull and steer producers. Eligible animals are bulls from the age of 9 months and steers
at the age of 9 months and 21 months respectively.22 Claims on the BSP should be submitted before the end
22Under CAP 1992, BSP per steer or bull was 109 euros, with an individual (holding) limit of 90 heads within each age bracket.
Individual limit/ceiling was the maximum number of bulls or steers a holding could keep. At the time, the payments were defined
in European currency units (ECU) which ceased to exist on 1 January 2002 in Spain and was replaced by the Euro at an exchange
rate of 1:1.
Under Agenda 2000, BSP per bull was 160 euros in 2000, 185 euros in 2001 and 210 euros in 2002; BSP per steer was 122 euros
in 2000, 136 euros in 2001 and 150 euros in 2002. The premium remained at the same level from 2002 to 2005. The individual limit
of BSP was the same as that of CAP 1992.
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of the year. There is a regional ceiling on the BSP, which is the maximum number of bulls and steers eligible
for the BSP within a member state of the EU of a calendar year. The regional ceiling is fixed on the basis of
the 1996 figures. If the total number of animals claimed by the farmers within a region exceeds the regional
ceiling, the number of eligible animals per holding will be reduced proportionately.
The receipt of BSP is subject to a stock density limit of 2 LUs per forage hectare, with the exception of
holdings having less than 15 LUs.23 Cattle taken into account when computing the stock density include
diary cows, ewes on which Sheep Annual Premium are claimed, male cattle on which BSP are claimed,
and suckler cows and heifers on which Suckler Cow Premium are claimed.24 Cattle and sheep on which no
claims were made didn’t count as LUs.
SCP is an annual payment.25 Eligible animals are cows of meat producing breed kept for rearing calves
for meat, but not for producing diary product for consumers. Such cows include suckler cows and breeding
heifers. The eligibility for SCP is restricted by a minimum number of diary cows which are never eligible
for SCP. Claims on SCP should be submitted before the end of the year. Old suckler cows can be replaced
with young cattle if the old ones are to be sold or killed.
SCP is limited by both regional and individual ceilings. The regional ceiling is set at the highest level of
premium payments in the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 plus 3%. The individual ceiling is equal to SCP quotas
held by a holding by the end of 1999. A holding should make sure that it has enough quotas before applying.
If not, the holding should buy or lease in quotas from the market, or apply for new quotas from the National
Reserve. Newcomers can apply to the National Reserve for SCP quotas. The quotas obtained from the
National Reserve can only be used for the purpose of applying for SCP and can’t be transfered within three
years after the application. The receipt of SCP is also subject to a stock density limit of 2 LUs per forage
hectare. The calculation is the same as that for BSP.
EP is an additional payment per animal based on the cattle which are paid BSP or SCP. Under CAP 1992,
EP is paid as long as the stock density is low enough and the calculation of stock density is the same as that
for BSP and SCP.26 However, under Agenda 2000 the calculation of stock density limit become stricter than
23The stock density limit requirement under CAP 1992 is also 2 LUs/ha.
24The Sheep Annual Premium is implemented under the CAP in November 1992 by the EU. An eligible animal is a female sheep
that is either 12 months old or has given birth to a lamb. Farmers need to hold as many quotas as the number of sheep they want to
claim on. A breeding ewe on which Sheep Annual Premium is claimed is counted as 0.15 LU. The premium is not revised under
Agenda 2000.
25Under CAP 1992, SCP per animal was 145 euros. Under Agenda 2000, SCP per animal was 163 euros in 2000, 182 euros in
2001 and 200 euros in 2002. SCP remained at the same level from 2002 to 2005.
26Under CAP 1992, EP per animal was 36 euros if the stock density was between 1 and 1.4 LUs/ha, and 52 euros if the stock
density was less than 1 LU/ha.
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that for BSP and SCP. First, all cattle aged six months or above and all sheep on a holding are taken into
account. Second, the forage area must include at least 50% of permanent grassland. Similarly, the lower is
the stock density, the higher is the payment.27
SP is paid once in a lifetime of a cattle.28 Eligible animals are calves aged from one month to seven months,
and bulls, steers, cows and heifers aged over eight months. Eligible animals for a calendar year should be
slaughered within the year and claims should be submitted before March of the following year. SP is not
subject to stock density limit. The number of eligible animals is restrained by a regional ceiling which is
determined by the regional number of cattle killed or exported in 1995. If the total number of animals claimed
exceeds the regional ceiling, the number of eligible animals per holding will be reduced proportionately.
For both BSP and SCP, if the stock density limit is exceeded, eligible cattle will be reduced to meet the limit.
For both BSP and SP, 60% of the payment is paid after October of the year. Any reduction in the number
of eligible animals arising from exceeding the regional ceiling (over-claims) is calculated and the balance is
paid between April and June of the following year. Cattle which are not paid either due to excess claims or
exceeding the stock density limit will not be eligible in the following years.
The payment of SCP is also complished in two steps. 60% of the payments is made after October and the
balance is made between April and June in the following year. The payment of EP is made between April
and June in the following year together with the remaining balance of BSP, SCP and/or SP.
In areas designated as "less-favoured", agricultural production or activity is more difficult because of natural
handicaps, e.g. difficult climatic conditions, steep slopes in mountain areas, or low soil productivity in
other less favoured areas. Due to the handicap to farming there is a significant risk of agricultural land
abandonment. To mitigate this risk, the Less Favoured Areas (LFA) payment scheme is an important tool.
LFA payments are granted annually per hectare of utilised agricultural area. The level of the payment can
vary between a minimum of 25 C/hectare and a maximum of 200 C/hectare. 57 % of the overall Utilized
Agricultural Area in the EU is classified as Less Favoured Area. In 2005 approximately 1.4 million farms,
representing about 13% of the total number of farms in the EU25, received support under all LFA schemes.
27In 2000 and 2001, EP per animal was 33 euros if the stock density was between 1.6 and 2.0 LUs/ha and 66 euros if the stock
density was less than 1.6 LUs/ha. In 2002, EP per animal was 40 euros when the stock density was between 1.4 and 1.8 LUs/ha and
80 euros when the stock density was less than 1.4 LUs/ha.
28For cattle from the age of eight months, SP was 27 euros per animal in 2000, 53 euros in 2001 and 80 euros in 2002.
For cattle less than seven months old, SP was 17 euros per animal in 2000, 33 euros in 2001 and 50 euros in 2002. The premium
remained the same level from 2002 to 2005.
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Chapter 2: Reassessing The Differential Impact of
Grandmothers and Grandfathers: The Old Age Program In
Nepal
1 Introduction
In their recent review of the anthropological literature, Sear and Mace (2008) report that many studies
find correlational evidence that maternal grandmothers tend to improve child survival rates (in around
70% of the studies they review) while paternal grandmothers show somewhat more variation in their
effects on child survival. What about grandfathers? They find that the statistical association between
grandfather presence and child survival is much weaker: in 10 of 12 cases, the presence of a maternal
grandfather had no significant effect on child survival rates while paternal grandfathers had no effect in
6 of 12 studies.
The evidence in economic studies of a gender differential in the impact of grandparents on children’s
health is, to our knowledge, limited to Duflo (2000, 2003). These two studies explore the effects on
children’s health of the expansion of the Old Age Pension program in South Africa. They find that
pensions received by women had a positive impact on the health and nutritional status of children
living in the same household. When the beneficiary of the pension is a man, however, no health effects
are found.
A methodological concern for the causal interpretation of these results, which is shared with those from
the anthropological studies, is that conditional on a household’s having three generations, the presence
of an elderly grandparent may be a sign of a relatively healthy household. Duflo (2003) takes advantage
of the fact that the height for age of young children depends on accumulated investments over the life of
the child. Hence, if households with eligibles have worse characteristics than non–eligible households,
older children would be smaller in eligible households. The identifying strategy then is to compare the
difference in height between children in eligible and those in non–eligible households among children
exposed to the program for a fraction of their lives to the same difference among children exposed all
their lives.
In this paper, we study the effects on child mortality of the introduction in 1995 of a non-contributory
universal pension scheme in Nepal known as the Old age Allowance Program, OAP. Under the OAP
all Nepalese with age 75 and above were eligible to a universal flat rate pension of 100 Rupees per
month, around 2 dollars and 12% of the country’s income per capita. We use cross-sectional data from
the 1996 and 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys (NDHS).
We first follow a standard diff-in-diffs approach to estimate the effects on infant mortality of eligibility
to an exogenous increase in the income of an old female and an old male living in the same household.
Our benchmark identification strategy consists of comparing the average changes in survival rates be-
fore and after the implementation of the OAP of children living in three-generation households with at
most one male and one female eligibles to the OAP with four alternative population controls. Using
this approach, we find positive and significant effects on survival rates for the presence of a female
eligible to the OAP while negative and sometimes significant effects for the presence of a male eligible.
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These results are qualitatively similar across alternative definitions of the control group. We also obtain
similar results when we restrict the sample for both boys and girls. Finally, the results are robust to
changing the method employed to exploit retrospective information in our data, to whether the female
(male) eligbile is the only eligible in the household, and to the family status of the beneficiary.
We then conduct pre-treatment common trend tests to justify the validity of the Parallel Paths assump-
tion in the benchmark diff-in-diffs approach and find that we cannot reject it for the case of the female
eligibles but we strongly reject it for the case of male eligibles. This is consistent with a situation
where endogenous composition of households together with economic progress create a downward
sloping trend in the unobservable household quality on households with a male beneficiary. As this
negative trend would be absent in households with only a female beneficiary of the OAP, the standard
diff-in-diffs estimates would be appropriate to estimate the effect of the female beneficiary but would
be inadequate to estimate the effects of the presence of a male beneficiary.
Following Mora and Reggio (2012), we propose a more flexible model and then conduct a test of pre-
treatment common accelerations that would provide justification for a Parallel Growths assumption
(i.e., assuming that without treatment, the change in growth for the treated would have equaled that
of the controls). We cannot reject the presence of pre-treatment common accelerations for the male
eligible effect and we strongly reject it for the female eligibles effect. Hence, we implement a flexible
identification strategy based on the Parallel Growths assumption for the male eligible effect and on the
Parallel Paths assumption for the female eligible effect. The positive effects of the female eligible effect
remain similar to those obtained using the benchmark diff-in-diffs approach. In contrast, the estimates
of the male eligible effect become positive and strongly significant. Thus, with a more flexible approach
that standard diff-in-diffs estimation we do not find significant gender differences.
We are agnostic as to the channels through which the effects reported take place. For example, if only
those eligible that worry more about the family end up collecting the benefits, then our results could
not be compared with studies where only beneficiaries are studied. Finally, we argue that our results
can be interpreted as suggestive that under economic growth and gender differences in the presence of
a beneficiary in the household, cross-sectional analysis may bias downwards the estimates of the effect
of grandfathers.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We first describe the institutional setting in Section 2 and
then present the data and the estimation strategy in Section 3. In Section 4 we report and discuss the
results of the paper. Section 7 concludes.
2 Policy background
In the last decades, Nepal has steadily ranked as one of the least developed countries in the world. In
1995, the year the OAP program was introduced, GDP per capita was 200 US dollars in real terms,
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ranking Nepal as the 211th country in the world. Living conditions for children were also among the
worst in the world. The infant mortality rate in Nepal at the time was 7.6%, higher than the average
among Asian countries (5.4%). Malnutrition incidence among children under 5 years old was 64.5%
using height for age as criterion and 44.1% using weight for age, when the average for other Asian
developing countries was 42.9% and 28.8%, respectively.
The OAP scheme is initially announced on December 1994 as part of a five-year economic plan. All
Nepalese citizens with age 75 and above become eligible to a universal flat rate pension of 100 rupees
per month, i.e. around 2 dollars or 12% of the country’s real GDP per capita. There were five (out of
75) pilot districts in which the program officially started in January 1995, although the actual payments
were delayed until July. During the following Nepalese fiscal year (from 16th July 1995 to 15th July
1996), the OAP is extended to the entire country.1
In the fiscal year 1999-2000, the government updates the OAP from 100 to 150 rupees per month (or,
equivalently, from 7.3% to 11% of real GDP per capita) presumably to accommodate the pensioners’
accumulated loss in purchasing power due to the large increases in nominal GDP. There were two
additional rate updates since 1999. In 2005 the OAP increases from 150 to 200 rupees and in 2008
from 200 to 500 rupees, or 34% of real GDP per capita. In addition, the age threshold is reduced from
75 to 70 years old in 2008.
There are no direct measures of the actual coverage of the program. Looking at the early stages in
the implementation of the program, Rajan (2003) reports that some legitimate beneficiaries may have
initially found difficulties to prove both their citizenship and date of birth. Although the number of
OAP recipients is relatively stable since its inception until 2001 (between 170,000 and 175,000), then
it abruptly increases by 10%. Based on census information, Rajan (2003) estimates the coverage of
OAP to be ranging in that year from 83% to 86% in 2001. Hence, if the observed increase in the
number of recipients in 2001 only reflects coverage improvements, then average coverage during the
first years of the implementation of the OAP may have ranged from 75% to 78%, possibly with lower
coverage in poor isolated areas, where ignorance about the program was presumably larger.
1The Nepalese government introduces for the fiscal year 1996-1997 two additional social programs that could affect
the economic conditions of the elderly. One of these two programs, the Helpless Widows Allowance, is only targeted at old
widows who get neither any care from family members nor a widow pension. As we study only the income effects on children
physically living with the elderly, in our data there are no individuals who can benefit from this allowance. The second social
program introduced at the time, a Disabled Pension of 100 Rupees to adult disabled citizens, affected a very small proportion
of the adult population. See, for example, Rajan (2003) for a more detailed description of these new policies.
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3 Data and estimation strategy
3.1 The Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys
The data come from the 1996 and 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys (NDHS).2 Each survey
is divided into two questionnaires. The household questionnaire provides demographic characteristics
for every member of the household—such as current age, sex, education, and relation with the House-
hold Head—and basic information on the characteristics of the household—such as its regional location
and whether it is located in a rural or urban area. The individual or woman questionnaire is targeted
at women of age between 15 and 49. In addition to their birth history, demographic information—
like current age, education, major occupational category, and ethnic status—for the mother (and her
husband if present) are included.
An important feature of the NDHS is that, for all interviewed women between 15 and 49, it contains
birth information—such as the birth date, sex, birth order, and whether the child has a twin—on all
their children, regardless of whether the children are alive or dead at the time of the interview. For
those children who are dead, the dataset also contains their death date. Therefore, it is possible to
reconstruct monthly survival histories for all the children born from the interviewed women. It is also
possible to reconstruct some retrospective information of the children when they were infants: the
number of siblings they had and the age of their mothers. If the father and the grandparents live in the
household at the time of the interview, it is also possible to obtain their age at the time the child was an
infant.
The data have several shortcomings. First, the NDHS data does not provide information on whether old
people in the survey collected the benefits. We can identify eligible individuals in the household since
eligibility is only based on age, but we cannot be sure that those eligible did collect the OAP pension.
Hence, our results pertain only to the effect of eligibility status. Moreover, since kin relations for each
member of the household can only be reconstructed via his/her relation with the household head, we
also cannot be sure that those eligible are the grand-parents of the infant.
Second, apart form birth and death dates, the data set does not contain retrospective information. This
is a potential problem for those variables whose value at the time of the interview may differ from the
value at the time the child was under one year old. An important example refers to the presence of
grandparents in the household at the time of interview, since this presence does not imply presence
at the birth of the child.3 Hence, when we attempt to capture the effect of the presence at birth of a
grandparent on infant survival by controlling for the presence at the time of interview, we potentially
2Both surveys are part of the worldwide Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) project. Additional information on the
2001 NDHS may be obtained from the Family Health Division, Department of Health Services, Ministry of Health, Nepal.
Additional information about the DHS project may be obtained from ORC Macro (web site: http://www.measuredhs.com).
3Other examples include variables that may change with time, such as the presence of the father, his occupational status,
and the parent’s educational highest achievements.
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incur in a measurement error that is likely larger the larger is the time span between the birth of the
child and the time of the interview. One simple way to limit this measurement error is by restricting
the estimation sample to births close enough to the interview date so that we expect that presence at
the time of interview very likely implies presence at the time of birth. In the results section we present
alternative restrictions of the estimation sample to discuss the sensitivity of our results to alternative
assumptions on retrospective information.
Third, living (at the time of interview) infants whose mothers either do not live in the household (per-
haps because they died before the interview) or are not eligible for the woman’s questionnaire, cannot
be included in the analysis. Although we do have their survival history, we do not have information
for the corresponding population of dead children, i.e. dead infants whose mothers either do not live in
the household at the time of interview or are not eligible for the woman’s questionnaire. Hence, we do
not include living children whose mothers do not live in the household because including them could
potentially create sample selection bias.
Finally, there is no information on induced abortions. Before 2002, abortion was prohibited in Nepal
and physicians could not recommend or perform it. Women seeking abortion did so clandestinely,
frequently put their lives at risk, and suffered sometimes serious health or legal consequences (Thapa,
2004, Thapa and Padhye, 2001). Although there is no accurate direct information about the preva-
lence of abortion in Nepal at the time the OAP was implemented, the information available suggests
that abortion was not a generalized method of birth control. Cross-country comparisons do show that
pregnancy loss at the time was not high in Nepal (Casterline, 1989). Moreover, according to the 1996
and 2001 NDHS surveys, only around 18% of women in reproductive age reported to have had a preg-
nancy that terminated in a miscarriage, abortion, or still birth. Focusing on abortion-related hospital
admissions, several studies show that in the last two decades of the 20th century only between 10 to
20 percent of these admissions were induced abortions (Thapa and Padhye, 2001, and the references
therein). Thus, although it is impossible to know with precision the incidence of induced abortion, the
available figures suggest that it has not been a generalized method of fertility control.4
3.2 The estimation sample
We combine two Surveys—the 1996 and the 2001 surveys—to create our data set. For the period
before the government started implementation of the OAP, i.e. the pre-treatment period, we use the
1996 survey. In our benchmark estimation sample, we include all children born between July 1991 and
June 1994 for the pre-treatment period. We do not include kids born between July 1994 and June 1995
4The law changed in 2004, effectively liberalizing abortion on several general grounds. Importantly, the new bill recog-
nized the right to terminate a pregnancy of up to 12 weeks voluntarily. Presumably, this may have made the use of abortion
as a fertility control mechanism more general. Our results, however, cannot be driven by any changes in fertility control
triggered by the change in the law, as we do not use data after the law changed,
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because in the pre-treatment period we want children not affected by the policy before they are one
year old. We also restrict the sample to kids born at most five years before the time of the interview
to limit potential measurement error regarding retrospective information. Again for this reason, we do
not use observations from the 2001 survey in the pre-treatment period.
For the period after the government started implementation of the OAP—i.e. the post-treatment period—
we use the 2001 survey. We include all children born between July 1995 and June 1998. We do not
include observations from children born after June 1998 because, as explained in Section 2, the govern-
ment updated the amount of the OAP starting in July 1999. We do not include children born between
July 1995 and June 1996 from the 1996 survey because we do not know whether they survived their
first year of life.
In sum, in our benchmark estimation sample we use the survival histories of all kids from the 1996
survey born between July 1991 and June 1994 for the pre-treatment period and all kids from the 2001
survey born between July 1995 and June 1998 for the post-treatment period. One nice feature of this
sample is that it covers births along a span of three years in the two periods. However, the minimum
gap between the birth date and the time of the interview is 1.5 years for the pre-treatment period but
2.5 years for the post-treatment period. We will come back to this issue when we review the robustness
of our results to the use of alternative samples.
3.3 A difference-in-differences strategy
Consider the case of how the presence in the household of an OAP eligible individual may affect an
infant’s survival status one year after birth.5 Variable survival status after one year, S, is equal to 1 if
the infant still lives one year after birth and is equal to 0 otherwise. Let S0 denote survival status in
the hypothetical case that the government does not introduce the OAP and let S1 denote survival status
in case the government introduces the OAP. Additionally, let D = 1 if the infant lives in a household
with an eligible individual and D = 0 otherwise. We refer to infants for whom D = 1 as the treated
and infants for whom D = 0 as the controls. Potential and observed survival statuses are related by
S= S1D+S0 (1−D).
We follow a standard latent-variable specification for both S1 and S0:
Sv ≡
{
1 if S∗v ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(1)
where S∗1 is survival score in case the government implements the OAP and S∗0 is survival score in
case the government does not implement the OAP. Both survival scores S∗1 and S∗0 are unobservable
5In the empirical application, we restrict the sample to households with at most one male eligible and one female eligible
and allow for gender differences in the effects on the child survival status. For notational simplicity, we present in this section
the model assuming at most only one eligible individual.
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latent-variables which, together with D, drive survival status S. Note that, given equation (1), S also
follows a latent variable specification:
S≡
{
1 if S∗ ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(2)
where S∗ = S∗1D+ S∗0 (1−D). We define the average effect on survival score for the treated as the
expected change in survival score among those treated after implementation of the OAP:
φ ≡ E [S∗1−S∗0|D= 1] . (3)
The estimation of expectation E
[
S∗1|D= 1] is not difficult because it equals E [S∗|D= 1].6 What
makes identification of φ difficult is the identification of the average survival score for the treated in the
absence of policy, E
[
S∗0|D= 1].
Assume we have information on survival status S before and after the start of the OAP both for infants
living with and without an eligible individual. Define ∆S∗v as the change in survival score S∗v when
any given infant goes from being born before the implementation of the OAP to being born after the
implementation of the OAP. The parallel path assumption in this context states that, conditional on a
vector of individual characteristics x, the average change in survival score in the absence of treatment
is the same for treated and controls:
E
[
∆S∗0|D= 1,x]= E [∆S∗0|D= 0,x] . (4)
As a result of technological progress, survival scores improve with time. In Nepal, these improvements
may have been overshadowed by the negative effects of the civil unrest that started in 1996 and ended
in 2006. Moreover, development failure might have been the root of the civil conflict (Sharma, 2006).
Equation (4) specifies that, in case the government never implements the OAP, the average changes
in survival scores are similar for the population of infants who live with an OAP eligible and the
population of infants who do not live with an OAP eligible.
Average survival score levels may still differ across the treated and the controls. This would likely be the
case when there is endogenous formation of households. For example, if households with OAP eligibles
are statistically associated with worse economic conditions, then average survival scores will tend to be
lower for the treated than for the controls. Thus, the parallel-path assumption allows for group-specific,
time-invariant, unobservable heterogeneity which may arise from endogenous formation of households.
Assuming equation (4) immediately leads to a difference-in-differences moment condition for φ based
6One can, for example, assume S∗ ∼ N (β0,σ2) and estimate E [S∗|D= 1] by ML.
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on changes in survival score S∗:
φ = E [∆S∗|D= 1,x]−E [∆S∗|D= 0,x] . (5)
We base our benchmark identification strategy on equation (5). Assuming linearity in E [S∗|D,x], con-
dition (5) leads to a linear standard diff-in-diffs specification for survival score:
S∗ = β0+βx+ γDD+ γPPost+φD×Post+ ε (6)
where E [ε|D,x] = 0 and Post is a dummy variable for birth after the implementation of the OAP. Under
the assumption of normality for error term ε we have a standard probit specification for the conditional
expectation of observed survival status S:
Pr (S= 1|D,x) =Φ(β0+βx+ γDD+ γPPost+φD×Post) . (7)
Consistent estimation by ML estimation of parameter φ in equation (7) gives a consistent estimate of
the causal effect of the policy implementation on the survival score for the treated. To asses how this
increase in the survival score affects survival probabilities, we focus our results on the average marginal
effect of a score increase of size φ :
α ≡ E [Φ(β0+βx+ γDD+ γPPost+φ)−Φ(β0+βx+ γDD+ γPPost)] (8)
3.4 Alternative control groups
To ensure a simple and tractable definition of treatment, we do not include in our analysis those infants
who live with more than one eligible woman or with more than one eligible man. We only consider
two types of treatments. An infant receives the first type of treatment if there is an eligible woman–i.e.
a woman who is older than 75 at the time the infant is born–in the same household. An infant receives
the second type of treatment if there is an eligible man.7 Accordingly, there are three types of treated
infants: those who live with an eligible woman, those who live with an eligible man, and those who
live both with an eligible woman and an eligible man. As shown in Table 1, almost 100 infants both
before and after treatment are treated.
Although controls and treated may differ in levels in a typical diff-in-diffs setup, the usual parallel-
path assumption still imposes group homogeneity in pre-treatment dynamics, so it is reasonable to look
for controls that are as similar as possible to the treated. We consider four alternative control groups.
The first control group—that we refer to as control 1 infants—includes all infants who do not live with
7With complete retrospective information, we could separate those infants who have lived since birth with OAP eligibles
from those who have only lived with OAP eligibles during a fraction of their first year. However, we can only look at children
who live with OAP eligibles at the time of the interview.
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Table 1: Number of controls and treated (all observations)
Control Pre-treatment Post-treatment All
Treated infants 99 98 197
Control 1 infants 3424 4068 7492
Control 2 infants 598 680 1278
Control 3 infants 1965 2341 4306
Control 4 infants 487 546 1033
Note: Control 1 infants are infants who do not live with either an eligible woman or an eligible man. Control 2 infants are infants who live with people
who were between 60 and 74 at the infant’s birth date. Controls 3 infants are infants who do not live with people older than 60 in households where the
household head is not older than 40 years of age. Control 4 infants are infants who live with non-eligible old people who were between 60 and 69 at the
infant’s birth date.
either an eligible woman or an eligible man. Control 1 infants are a very large group because it includes
households with old people (defining old people as those older than 60 at the infant’s birth date) and
households without old people.
An alternative control group—that we refer to as control 2 infants—would restrict the comparison to
infants who live with old people who are still non-eligible, i.e. infants who live with people who were
between 60 and 74 at the infant’s birth date. The number of control 2 infants is around 600 both
before and after treatment. Given that the age eligibility limit, 74, was fixed by the government without
considering how old people may help infants, control 2 infants are an interesting control group. One
potential problem for control 2 infants, however, is that, with the introduction of the OAP program,
old people who will soon become eligible may choose to increase their contributions to the household
even before they become eligible because their permanent income raises with the announcement of the
program. Hence, infants living in households where non-eligibles will soon become eligibles may not
be convincing controls as they might actually receive benefits similar to those received by the treated.
One way to avoid the problem that arises with permanent income increases among old non-eligibles is
to consider as controls those infants who do not live with people older than 60. To make this control
group as homogeneous as possible, we additionally impose that the household head is not older than 40
years of age. Hence, most control 3 infants are newborns living in two-generation households.8 Clearly,
among the control 3 infants the introduction of the OAP program does not lead to an increase in the
household available resources. However, in the presence of endogeneity in the member composition
of the households, it can be argued that control 3 infants can be less appealing as a control group than
control 2 infants. For example, suppose that young couples attempt to live in their own houses as soon
as they reach a minimum income. As economic conditions improve nationwide, economic conditions
in households with grandparents will worsen relative to households without grandparents and this trend
differential will make the standard parallel-paths assumption inappropriate. Finally, grandparents who
do not live in the household may still live close enough to have an influence in the welfare of the infant,
so that control 3 infants we may have infants that could be considered to be under a weak version of
treatment.
8Note that the sum of the number of control 2 and 3 infants is actually smaller than the number of control 1 infants because
in the latter group there are also infants who live only with their non-eligible grand-parents.
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A less radical way to avoid the permanent income increase problem is to consider as control group only
infants who live with non-eligible old people younger than 69. We refer to them as control 4 infants.
Control 4 infants are a subset of control 2 infants, the sample size being, unsurprisingly, the smallest
among the four control definitions (487 before treatment and 546 after treatment). Admittedly, there
could still be an increase in the household resources driven by the elderly expectations to receive the
benefits in the future. We believe, however, that this effect should be smaller than the effect for control
2 infants for two complementary reasons. First, for the elderly living in households of control 4 infants,
the minimum time interval before any benefits are obtained is five years. Second, life expectancy at 60
for the 1995 to 2000 period was around 16 years for women and 15 years for men.9 Hence, a large
proportion of non-eligible elderly between 60 and 69 do not survive to become eligible.
4 Diff-in-diffs results
4.1 The basic diff-in-diffs estimates
In Table 2 we report the estimated average marginal effects as defined by equation (8) under the four
alternative control groups. We report the p-values for the significance tests of the estimates in paren-
thesis. We allow for different effects for male and female eligible and present two specifications. The
unconditional specification allows for month of birth and region fixed effects.10 In addition to the fixed
effects included in the unconditional specification, the conditional specification includes two dummy
variables for the education of the mother (for primary, for secondary, and for higher education), the
mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for whether the child is female, the number of
kids younger than five—at birth of infant—in the household, and two dummies for the ethnicity of the
mother.11
We model survival status for four alternative time intervals: survival after 3, 6, 9, and 12 months.
Consider, first, survival status after 3 months. Using control 1 infants as controls, we find that the
grandmother effect is positive and significant. Inclusion of additional control variables does not change
the results fundamentally, but reduces both the significance and the size of the effects (see columns 1
9Figures obtained from the Gender Info database from the United Nations Statistical Division.
10In the original DHS surveys, two geographical variables are included: a binary variable that distinguishes between rural
an urban areas and a dichotomous variable that distinguishes between mountain, hill, or plain terrain. We create regional
dummy variables obtained from the interaction of these two geographical variables.
11To ensure comparability between the surveys, we constructed an ethnicity variable that considers 6 ethnic groups. The
ancestors of the brahmin/chhetri come from India. The Newar and the Janajati—who include many of Nepal’s indigenous
nationalities, such as the Gurung, the Magar, the Tamang, the Tharu, and the Rai— are sometimes referred to as old Nepalese
groups. The Muslin are a minority in Nepal, comprising about 4% of the total population. The Dalit, sometimes referred to
as “untouchables”, are the lowest caste in the Hindu caste system. Finally, all the other ethnic groups, who represent around
10% of the population, are classified together. In the specifications, we report the results after controlling for a binary variable
for Dalit, and a dummy variable for others. Using all the other dummies for ethnic categories does not change significantly
the results and none of the other ethnic variables is significant in any of the specifications (results are available upon request).
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Table 2: Average Marginal Effects. Basic difference-in-differences results
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Control 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Female eligible 0.036 0.029 0.049 0.040 0.053 0.042 0.048 0.039
(0.042) (0.074) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.033) (0.068)
Male eligible -0.008 -0.015 -0.023 -0.036 -0.048 -0.064 -0.049 -0.091
(0.873) (0.777) (0.700) (0.572) (0.502) (0.413) (0.489) (0.307)
No. of obs. 7689 7424 7689 7424 7689 7424 7689 7424
Control 2
Female eligible 0.056 0.042 0.068 0.049 0.067 0.049 0.072 0.053
(0.011) (0.129) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.034) (0.001) (0.031)
Male eligible 0.003 -0.028 -0.019 -0.078 -0.046 -0.112 -0.033 -0.126
(0.965) (0.743) (0.795) (0.459) (0.577) (0.330) (0.666) (0.289)
No. of obs. 1106 1015 1171 1079 1286 1183 1286 1206
Control 3
Female eligible 0.033 0.030 0.046 0.041 0.048 0.042 0.042 0.038
(0.114) (0.085) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.107) (0.094)
Male eligible -0.016 -0.017 -0.032 -0.038 -0.058 -0.066 -0.062 -0.100
(0.778) (0.760) (0.621) (0.569) (0.447) (0.411) (0.417) (0.291)
No. of obs. 4369 4260 4443 4333 4503 4392 4503 4392
Control 4
Female eligible 0.065 0.050 0.075 0.054 0.074 0.051 0.079 0.057
(0.002) (0.041) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.019)
Male eligible 0.000 -0.027 -0.029 -0.090 -0.052 -0.122 -0.038 -0.143
(0.994) (0.761) (0.723) (0.436) (0.565) (0.326) (0.647) (0.273)
No. of obs. 849 790 913 853 983 915 1003 933
Note: Average marginal effects as defined in equation (8). p-values are shown in parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after birth. Control 1 infants are infants who do not
live with eligibles. Control 2 infants live with old people who are between 60 and 74 at the infant’s birth date. Controls 3 infants live with people who are at most 60. Control 4
infants are infants who live with old people who are between 60 and 69. Uncond. refers to the diff-in-diff model with month of birth and region fixed effects. The Cond. model
additionally includes dummy variables for the education of the mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for whether the child is female, the number of
kids younger than five—at birth of infant—in the household, and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother.
and 2). In contrast to what we observe for the eligible female, the eligible male effect is not significant.
The sign of the effect is, nevertheless, negative and larger after controlling for additional covariates.
Estimates for the determinants of survival rates after 6 months follow a similar pattern. Interestingly,
the female eligible effect increases around 5 percentage points after 6 months in the unconditional
model (first row in column 3) and 4 percentage points in the conditional model (first row columns 4).
The point estimate for the male eligible effect is still negative and not significant. Similar results are
obtained when looking at the survival determinants after 9 and 12 months. These results suggest that
the positive effect on survival rates take place in the first 6 months after birth and only in the presence
of a female eligible.
We can study the robustness of these results to alternative definitions of the control group. When we
include as controls only infants who live in households where there are no old people—i.e. control 3
infants—the results are very similar to those using control 1 infants, arguably the result of the large
demographic weight of these households. When we include as controls only those infants who live in
households where there are old non-eligible people, the estimates of the female eligible effect become
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larger and are estimated more accurately. The negative effect of the male eligible effect, however,
remains insignificant.
The largest point estimates of the female eligible effect are obtained when we use as controls the
control 4 infants. Survival rates after 3 months improve around 6.5 percentage points according to the
unconditional model and around 5 percentage points according to the conditional model. This effect
increases after 6 months up to 7.5 percentage points and then it stabilizes to between 7.4 and 7.9 in
the first year of the newborn. According to the conditional model results, these effects are somewhat
smaller although still important: around 5.7 percentage points after a year.
4.2 Different effects for male and female infants
In Table 3 we report estimates of the female and male eligible effects for subsamples of only boys and
only girls. For brevity, we only report the marginal effects using control 1 and 4 infants with the full
set of additional covariates.12
Table 3: Average Marginal Effects. Different effects for male and female infants
Control 1 infants Control 4 infants
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Only boys
Female eligible 0.044 0.049 0.052 0.041 0.111 0.100 0.103 0.092
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.211) (0.000) (0.030) (0.012) (0.078)
Male eligible -0.006 -0.058 -0.100 -0.150 -0.069 -0.290 -0.300 -0.329
(0.913) (0.527) (0.372) (0.252) (0.705) (0.247) (0.214) (0.159)
No. of obs. 3779 3779 3824 3824 315 336 364 390
Only girls
Female eligible 0.018 0.036 0.035 0.038 0.084 0.080 0.080 0.146
(0.624) (0.039) (0.123) (0.128) (0.024) (0.030) (0.018) (0.000)
Male eligible -0.055 -0.015 -0.007 -0.017 0.042 -0.275 -0.331 -0.382
(0.135) (0.598) (0.771) (0.572) (0.482) (0.442) (0.311) (0.203)
No. of obs. 3135 3257 3345 3423 152 171 184 202
Note: Average marginal effects as defined in equation (8) for subsamples of only boys and only girls. p-values are shown in parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after birth.
Control 1 infants are infants who do not live with eligibles. Control 4 infants are infants who live with old people who are between 60 and 69. Controls are those in model Cond.
defined in Table 2 and include month of birth and region fixed effects, dummy variables for the education of the mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a
dummy for whether the child is female, the number of kids younger than five—at birth of infant—in the household, and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother.
The female eligible effect on boys is positive and generally significant—the only exception being the
effect after 12 months using control 1 infants. Using control 4 infants, the estimate of the marginal
effect on boys survival rates more than doubles. For example, after 12 months, survival rates improve
by 4.1 percentage points using control 1 infants but they improve by 9.2 percentage points using as
controls the more credible control 4 infants.
For girls, we also find a positive effect when there is a female eligible in the household. Using control
1 infants, the effect is smaller than for boys, and it is significant at the 10% level only after 6 months.
12Results using other controls and the unconditional model are similar. They are available upon request.
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However, with control 4 infants the estimated marginal effects for girls are—in spite of the smaller
sample—strongly significant. Interestingly, they become very close to those for boys (8 vs. 10 percent-
age points) after 3, 6, and 9 months and become larger after one year (14.6 vs. 9.2 percentage points).
The male eligible effect is almost always negative. Perhaps more importantly, it is never significant,
regardless of using the boys or the girls subsamples and both for control 1 and control 4 infants.13
Although we are agnostic as to the channels through which the effects take place, the findings are
broadly in line with results reported elsewhere. In particular, the asymmetry between the male and
female eligible effects replicate the basic results found in Duflo (2000, 2003). We do find that condi-
tioning the sample by infant’s gender does not alter neither the importance of the presence of a female
eligible, nor the apparent absence of any effect in the presence of a male eligible. In contrast, in Duflo
(2000) and Duflo (2003) the female eligible effect is significant only for girls. We observe a larger
estimated effect for girls one year after birth.
We claim in Section 6 that this asymmetric results are driven by assuming Parallel Paths both for
female–eligible and for male–eligible treatments. Before that, we need to rule out two alternative
potential explanations. First, the absence of effects in the case of male eligibles in our sample could
result from males strategically exploiting gender role differences in society. In that case, the male
eligible effect would not be negative when he is the only eligible individual in the household. Second,
the estimates presented so far rely on the assumption that the presence at the time of interview of an
eligible person coincides with her or his presence at the time of the infant’s birth. This is a strong
assumption and could lead to spurious asymmetric results if female and male eligible individuals are
not equally likely to remain in three-generation households.
4.3 Specialization
It could be argued that the absence of effects in the case of male eligibles masks a type of specialization
pattern within the household. In the presence of a female eligible individual, the male eligible would
expect the female to be the only contributor to the additional resources for the newborn. However, in
the absence of differentials in gender preferences, if the male eligible is the only eligible individual
in the household we would expect the male eligible effect to be of a similar magnitude to the female
eligible effect.
We present in Table 4 separate estimates using as treated three alternative subgroups. In the first spec-
ification, we use only those households in which the male eligible is the only eligible individual in the
household. In the second specification, we use only those households in which the female eligible is
the only eligible individual in the household. If the effect estimated in the previous specifications is
13In the unconditional model, not reported in Table 3, the negative effects of the male eligible effect for girls are around
−0.075 and significant at the 5% significance level when control 1 infants are used as controls.
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just an artifact from gender specialization, then we would expect that the effects for the only–one–male
eligible sample would be similar to the estimates reported until now for the female eligibles.
Table 4: Gender specialization in the provision of household resources
Control 1 infants Control 4 infants
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months 3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Male eligible alone
Male eligible 0.007 -0.036 -0.090 -0.022 -0.135 -0.203
(0.913) (0.721) (0.512) (0.870) (0.529) (0.403)
No. of obs. 7261 7290 7290 7290 585 666 720 748
No. of Treated 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
Female eligible alone
Female eligible 0.016 0.024 0.023 0.002 0.004 0.009 -0.013 -0.024
(0.601) (0.391) (0.508) (0.965) (0.960) (0.900) (0.892) (0.816)
No. of obs. 7291 7291 7291 7291 642 711 768 785
No. of Treated 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Neither is HH
Female eligible 0.019 0.034 0.034 0.025 0.030 0.041 0.033 0.032
(0.471) (0.069) (0.128) (0.461) (0.576) (0.279) (0.483) (0.556)
Male eligible -0.009 -0.006 -0.056 -0.012 0.000 -0.056
(0.910) (0.940) (0.622) (0.916) (0.997) (0.714)
No. of obs. 7321 7344 7344 7344 659 749 807 825
No. of Treated 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
Note: Average marginal effects as defined in equation (8) using only those households in which the male eligible is the only eligible individual in the household, using only those
households in which the female eligible is the only eligible individual in the household, and using only those households when neither the male eligible nor the female eligible are
reported as the household head. p-values are shown in parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after birth. Control 1 infants are infants who do not live with eligibles. Control 4
infants are infants who live with old people who are between 60 and 69. Controls are those in model Cond. defined in Table 2 and include month of birth and region fixed effects,
dummy variables for the education of the mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for whether the child is female, the number of kids younger than
five—at birth of infant—in the household, and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother. Absence of marginal effect estimates signals that a perfect prediction problem impedes the
sample identification of the effect.
Due to the small treated sample, we encounter a perfect prediction problem when we try to estimate the
effects for survival status after 3 months when the male eligible is alone. For all other models, the effects
are usually negative for the male eligible sample and usually positive for the female eligible sample.
However, due to the very small samples for the treated, the effects are never accurately estimated and
we cannot reach any clear conclusion using this testing strategy.14
Alternatively, we look at the estimates of the effects when neither the male eligible nor the female
eligible are reported as the household head. Nepal is a society where old people are frequently regarded
as the most respected members of the family, even if they do not have a predominant economic position
within the household. It is not rare to observe either a male or female eligible individual to be chosen
as the household head, and we hypothesize that in many cases household head status is only a sign of
respect to the elderly. We also assume that those elderly who are not chosen as household heads do not
command a dominant economic position within the household.
If the specialization explanation is right, we would argue that in those households in which neither the
14Using a linear probability model we avoid the identification problems that we have with the probit model. For the only–
one–male eligible sample, we find that the effects are negative and significant while in the only–one–female eligible sample
the results are positive and significant. Results are available upon request.
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male nor the female eligible are household heads, the differences between the effects of female and
male eligible should be smaller. Turning to our results, we find that point estimates are again positive
for the female eligible effect and negative for the male eligible. In the latter case, the effects are always
non-significant. However, in the case of the female eligible effect, the effects are sometimes significant
or borderline significant.
4.4 Retrospective information
The estimates presented so far rely on the assumption that the presence at the time of interview of an
eligible person coincides with her or his presence at the time of the infant’s birth. This assumption is
less credible the larger the time span between the date of birth and the time of the interview. Therefore,
in what follows we study the robustness of our results to alternative assumptions regarding retrospective
information.
We consider in Table 5 three alternative samples. In the so-called Minimized-delay sample, we use for
the pre-treatment period only infants born between June 1993 and June 1994. For the post-treatment
period, we use infants born between June 1997 and June 1998. Defining our samples in this way, we
make delay between births and the collection of information never larger than two and a half years for
the pre-treatment period and never larger than three and a half years for the post-treatment period. Be-
cause of this asymmetry, we also consider the Minimized-similar-delay sample that includes all infants
born between two and a half and three and a half years before the interview both for the pre-treatment
period and for the post-treatment period. Consequently, in the Minimized-similar-delay sample, infants
are born between June 1992 and June 1993 in the pre-treatment period and between June 1997 and
June 1998 in the post-treatment period.
Both the Minimized- and the Minimized-similar-delay samples only include infants born within a period
of 12 months. This greatly reduces the estimation sample and may potentially affect the accuracy of
the estimates. Consequently, we additionally create a larger sample—that we refer to as Similar-delay
sample—that includes children born between June 1991 and June 1993 for the pre-treatment period and
children born between June 1996 and June 1998 for the post-treatment period. Births in this sample
occur between two and a half and five years before the interview.
In Table 5 we present the basic diff-in-diffs estimates for the three alternative samples using the control
1 infants as the controls. When we consider the Minimized-delay sample we obtain positive point
estimates for the female eligible effect in all specifications and negative point estimates for the male
eligible effect in half of the specifications. However, all estimates are not significant with the exception
of the male eligible effect 9 months after birth, which is positive and significant. Hence, changing the
implicit assumption about retrospective information has an effect on the significance of our results.
The Minimized-delay pre-treatment sample differs in time span from the post-treatment sample. The
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Table 5: Retrospective Information: Results using Control 1 Infants
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Minimize delay 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Female eligible 0.011 0.014 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.001 0.008
(0.804) (0.626) (0.565) (0.394) (0.607) (0.451) (0.982) (0.860)
Male eligible -0.047 -0.004 -0.066 -0.010 0.044 0.035 0.027 0.021
(0.241) (0.859) (0.162) (0.731) (0.047) (0.038) (0.539) (0.599)
No. of obs. 2657 2554 2657 2554 2674 2571 2674 2571
Minimize similar delay
Female eligible 0.047 0.042 0.052 0.047 0.056 0.049 0.055 0.049
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.048) (0.047)
Male eligible -0.016 0.006 -0.013 -0.046 0.003 0.004 0.000 -0.053
(0.556) (0.774) (0.615) (0.383) (0.971) (0.953) (0.996) (0.670)
No. of obs. 2488 2403 2488 2403 2505 2420 2505 2420
Similar delay
Female eligible 0.036 0.024 0.050 0.038 0.053 0.039 0.047 0.032
(0.157) (0.374) (0.011) (0.077) (0.016) (0.113) (0.158) (0.376)
Male eligible -0.037 -0.045 -0.107 -0.126 -0.174 -0.191 -0.133 -0.253
(0.710) (0.648) (0.441) (0.383) (0.292) (0.259) (0.301) (0.171)
No. of obs. 5068 4891 5068 4891 5068 4891 5068 4891
Note: Average marginal effects as defined in equation (8) with alternative samples. The Minimized delay sample includes infants born between June 1993 and June 1994 for the
pre-treatment period and infants born between June 1997 and June 1998 for the post-treatment period. The Minimized similar delay sample includes infants born between two and
a half and three and a half years before the interview both for the pre-treatment period and for the post-treatment period. The Similar delay sample includes infants born between
two and a half and five years before the interview. p-values are shown in parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after birth. Control 1 infants are infants who do not live with
eligibles. Uncond. refers to the diff-in-diff model with month of birth and region fixed effects. The Cond. model additionally includes dummy variables for the education of the
mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for whether the child is female, the number of kids younger than five—at birth of infant—in the household,
and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother.
implicit assumption on retrospective information is less credible for the post-treatment period because
there are many observations in that period for which the distance between the date of birth and the
date of interview is larger than the largest distance in the pre-treatment period. This asymmetry could
create a bias in our diff-in-diffs estimations. In contrast, using the Minimized-similar-delay sample
we assume that there are no relevant changes in the composition of the families in the last three years
prior to the interview, regardless of whether the interview takes places before or after the start of the
implementation of the OAP programme. Interestingly, although the sample does not change much, the
female eligible effect is now larger than the original estimates and even more significant while the male
eligible effect is never significant.
One could nevertheless argue that the lack of significance for the positive point estimates of the male
eligible effect after nine months (see columns 5 and 6) might be due to the small size of the estimation
sample. To look at this possibility, we use the Similar-delay sample, which increases the sample size
with respect to the Minimize-similar-delay sample but makes the same assumption on retrospective
information both before and after the start of the policy. When we do this, the point estimates regarding
the female eligible effect become very similar to the original results (although they are not significant in
some cases). More interestingly, none of the point estimates of the male eligible effect are significant,
and all of them are negative.
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Assuming that the old people present in the household at the interview were already present at the date
of the infant’s birth is a potentially influential assumption. Our results show that alternative sample
specifications (which imply alternative assumptions on retrospective information) lead to slight changes
in the size of the effects and also to differences in the significance of the results. However, our results
also suggest that the asymmetry between the female and the male eligible effects is not an artifact of
this assumption. Moreover, in arguably the best alternative to our benchmark estimates—the estimates
obtained from the Minimized-similar-delay sample—we find that the female eligible effect is positive
and significant while the male eligible effect is not significant.
5 Testing common trends and an alternative identification strategy
So far, the identification of the effects of the OAP programme lies on the Parallel Paths assumption,
which states that average changes in survival status among those treated if untreated are equal to the
average changes in survival status among comparable controls. Violation of this assumption would lead
to inconsistent estimates of the effect.
It is customary to test for common pre-treatment trends to justify the Parallel Paths assumption. The
simplest way to do this is by conducting DID on the last pre-treatment period, a test that requires at
least two periods before treatment. In our benchmark sample we include all children born between July
1991 and June 1994 for the pre-treatment period. We know the exact birth date for each observation
so that for a sufficiently large sample we could consider as many periods as days in the pre-treatment
period. However, since the number of treated is small even when we group them by month of birth, we
opt for dividing the pre-treatment sample into only two periods: the first pre-treatment period includes
all births from July 1991 to December 1992 while the second pre-treatment period includes all births
between January 1993 and June 1994. We implement the test on pre-treatment common trends by
using only the pre-treatment sample and then computing the diff-in-diffs estimator as if the policy had
been implemented in January 1993 instead of July 1995. The test for common trends is the test on the
significance of the diff-in-diffs estimate for the marginal effect α (see equation (8)).
Table 6 reports the results of the tests for pre-treatment common trends for the female eligible effect
and the male eligible effect using all four alternative control groups and for both the unconditional and
the conditional specifications.
We find no evidence of a female eligible effect in almost all specifications and periods considered.
The only exceptions, for survival rates after 9 and 12 months, occur only in the unconditional model
and using control 2 infants. With our preferred control group, control 4 infants, we cannot reject that
controls and treated have common pre-treatment trends in survival status 3, 6, 9, and 12 months after
birth.
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Table 6: Tests for pre-treatment common trends
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Control 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Female eligible -0.001 -0.017 0.013 0.002 0.015 0.002 0.016 -0.001
(0.984) (0.811) (0.796) (0.969) (0.781) (0.968) (0.784) (0.990)
Male eligible -0.952 -0.960 -0.946 -0.954 -0.939 -0.948 -0.933 -0.943
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of obs. 3523 3365 3523 3365 3523 3365 3523 3397
Control 2
Female eligible 0.033 0.023 0.037 0.029 0.043 0.032 0.046 0.034
(0.356) (0.537) (0.140) (0.237) (0.037) (0.169) (0.032) (0.129)
Male eligible -0.975 -0.980 -0.977 -0.982 -0.974 -0.979 -0.973 -0.979
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of obs. 503 473 558 523 610 571 610 571
Control 3
Female eligible -0.012 -0.036 0.005 -0.010 0.004 -0.010 0.005 -0.017
(0.861) (0.681) (0.934) (0.880) (0.944) (0.886) (0.948) (0.832)
Male eligible -0.955 -0.962 -0.949 -0.957 -0.944 -0.951 -0.935 -0.945
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of obs. 2064 1997 2064 1997 2064 1997 2064 2009
Control 4
Female eligible 0.023 0.022 0.028 0.026 0.038 0.033 0.041 0.036
(0.651) (0.660) (0.451) (0.439) (0.195) (0.297) (0.180) (0.249)
Male eligible -0.976 -0.978 -0.980 -0.982 -0.977 -0.979 -0.976 -0.978
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
No. of obs. 409 369 452 405 484 432 484 432
Note: Tests for pre-treatment common trends for the female eligible effect and the male eligible effect. p-values are shown in parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after birth.
Control 1 infants are infants who do not live with eligibles. Control 2 infants live with old people who are between 60 and 74 at the infant’s birth date. Controls 3 infants live with
people who are at most 60. Control 4 infants are infants who live with old people who are between 60 and 69. Uncond. refers to the diff-in-diff model with month of birth and
region fixed effects. The Cond. model additionally includes dummy variables for the education of the mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for
whether the child is female, the number of kids younger than five—at birth of infant—in the household, and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother.
In contrast, we find very strong evidence of a negative and significant male eligible effect before treat-
ment for all specifications, time ranges, and control groups. In the presence of pre-treatment trend
differentials, Parallel Paths becomes less attractive as it implies that differing pre-treatment trends be-
come equal after treatment under no treatment. Hence, these tests suggest that the results reported so
far for the female eligible effect are based on a true assumption but the results for the male eligible
effect are based on an assumption that is false.
What economic process could motivate different pre-treatment trends for male treated and controls,
but the same pre-treatment trends for female treated and controls? One plausible explanation is the
existence of trends in unobservable quality differentials by type of households. Suppose that couples
live with elderly people if they cannot afford to live separately or if the elderly person needs their
assistance because no-one else can help. As the economy develops and wages improve, the proportion
of three-generation households where the young couple cannot afford to live separately will tend to
decrease. When looking at successive cross-sections of data, this effect creates a downward trend in
the relative average household wealth in three-generation households where the young couple cannot
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live separately. In contrast, economic growth does not improve the wealth of poor elderly who are
not property owners. Hence, economic growth should not change the formation of three-generation
households where the elderly requires assistance. As long as males are less affected by poverty than old
females, old females will tend to live in three-generation households where the old person needs help
while old males will live in households where the young couples are the ones who benefit economically
from the association. When using successive cross-sections of three-generation households, economic
progress will trigger a sample selection mechanism by which the average three-generation household
with an old male will suffer a relative decline in wealth.
In practice, researchers who find pre-treatment trend differentials often formulate flexible econometric
models to accommodate those trend differentials. In the next section, we follow Mora and Reggio
(2012) and explore an alternative identification strategy using a flexible model and under an alternative
assumption.
6 A flexible model with differing trends
Pre-treatment trend differentials in survival rates can be easily accommodated in the basic linear spec-
ification from equation (6) by including a time dummy for the last pre-treatment period, LastPre, and
its interaction with the treated indicator D:
S∗ = β0+βx+ γDD+ γLLastPre+ γPPost+φLD×LastPre+φPD×Post+ ε. (9)
Under the Parallel Paths assumption, φ = φP−φL. However, as argued in the previous subsection, the
Parallel Paths assumption is not appealing for the male eligible treatment because of the presence of
pre-treatment trend differentials between treated and controls. Mora and Reggio (2012) show that an
alternative assumption which identifies the policy effect in the presence of pre-treatment trend differ-
entials is the Parallel Growths assumption. Intuitively, Parallel Growths states that under no treatment
the survival status of the treated would have experienced the same acceleration as the survival status of




∆2S∗|D= 1,x]−E [∆2S∗|D= 0,x] . (10)
Hence, under equation (9) and Parallel Growths, φ = φP− 2φL. The parameter of interest α can then
be estimated using equation (8).
For the female eligible effect we do not expect a very different estimate under Parallel Growths than
under Parallel Paths because our pre-treatment trend differentials tests suggest that, for the female
eligible treatment, φL = 0. In contrast, the results of our common trend tests suggest that, for the male
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eligible treatment, φL < 0, and, hence, that φP−2φL > φP−φL. We thus expect a larger estimate of the
male eligible effect under Parallel Growths than under Parallel Paths. Intuitively, the Parallel Growths
assumption implicitly takes into account that the treated infants living with male eligibles would have
experienced a relative average decline in survival score under no treatment.
The added flexibility in equation (9) comes with a cost: in our data, sample identification of φP fails
for the male eligible treatment under the most flexible trend specification and the benchmark sample.
We present two strategies to overcome this problem: a) to extend the estimation sample to include ob-
servations from 1990; and b) to assume that, before 1993, infants face the same probability of survival
regardless of the presence of a male eligible (i.e. γD = 0).
We provide support for the Parallel Growths assumption by testing that pre-treatment average acceler-
ation was equal between the treated and the controls. As in the common-trends tests, we implement the
test on pre-treatment common accelerations by using only the pre-treatment sample. We now partition
the pre-treatment sample into three 12-month periods: from July 1991 to June 1992, from July 1992 to
June 1993, and from July 1993 to June 1994. We then compute the diff-in-double-diffs estimator as if
the policy had been implemented in July 1993 instead of July 1995. The test for common accelerations
is the test on the significance of the diff-in-double-diffs estimate for the marginal effect α .
Table 7 reports the results of the tests for pre-treatment common accelerations for the female eligible
effect and the male eligible effect using all four alternative control groups and for both the unconditional
and the conditional specifications. When we tested common pretreatment trends, we found no evidence
of a female eligible effect but very strong evidence of a negative and significant male eligible effect. In
contrast, the results in Table 7 show that there is no evidence of differences in accelerations between
treated and controls for the male eligible effects but the tests results suggest that the Parallel Growths
assumption is not appropriate for the female eligible effect.
The results from Table 6 and Table 7 hint that the effect of the female eligible effect should be identified
using the Parallel Paths assumption while the estimate of the male eligible effect should be identified
using the Parallel Growths assumption. Hence, in Table 8 we report, using estimates of equation (9),
estimated marginal effects under the Parallel Paths assumption for the female eligible effect and under
the Parallel Growths assumption for the male eligible effect. For brevity, we only show the results using
Control 4 infants.15
Table 8 corroborates the results so far concerning the female eligible treatment effect: results on sur-
vival status are always positive and significant for all time delays. Moreover, the size of the effects is
very similar to the estimated effects assuming Parallel Paths and using both estimates from equation
(6) and from equation (9).
The crucial novelty in Table 8 in relation to the results reported so far concerns the male eligible effect.
Assuming Parallel Growths overturns the results obtained by using Parallel Paths: The male eligible
15All results are available upon request.
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Table 7: Tests for pre-treatment common accelerations
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Control 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Female Eligible 0.066 0.059 0.074 0.067 0.082 0.074 0.089 0.080
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male eligible 0.022 0.026 -0.042 -0.035 -0.072 -0.058 0.044 -0.061
0.833 0.751 0.844 0.857 0.782 0.806 0.634 0.807
No. of obs. 4583 4382 4583 4382 4583 4382 4583 4428
Control 2
Female Eligible 0.079 0.081 0.077 0.090 0.083 0.097 0.090
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male eligible 0.064 0.017 0.026 -0.068 -0.040 0.049 -0.044
0.128 0.907 0.838 0.811 0.873 0.606 0.866
No. of obs. 686 750 704 782 736 782 736
Control 3
Female Eligible 0.067 0.060 0.076 0.068 0.084 0.077 0.094 0.085
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male eligible 0.014 0.012 -0.068 -0.088 -0.086 -0.094 0.041 -0.114
0.913 0.919 0.789 0.746 0.763 0.743 0.702 0.716
No. of obs. 2728 2643 2728 2643 2728 2643 2728 2661
Control 4
Female Eligible 0.086 0.091 0.084 0.096 0.087 0.102 0.093
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Male eligible 0.063 -0.006 0.001 0.011 0.020 0.079 0.022
0.343 0.978 0.994 0.954 0.901 0.103 0.898
No. of obs. 531 581 550 616 582 616 582
Note: Tests for pre-treatment common accelerations for the female eligible effect and the male eligible effect. p-values are shown in parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after
birth. Control 1 infants are infants who do not live with eligibles. Control 2 infants live with old people who are between 60 and 74 at the infant’s birth date. Controls 3 infants live
with people who are at most 60. Control 4 infants are infants who live with old people who are between 60 and 69. Uncond. refers to the diff-in-diff model with month of birth
and region fixed effects. The Cond. model additionally includes dummy variables for the education of the mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for
whether the child is female, the number of kids younger than five—at birth of infant—in the household, and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother.
effect changes from being negative and not-significant to being positive and strongly significant in most
specifications. The only exceptions are estimates for the Only–boys sample after 6, 9, and 12 months
in the conditional models where the point estimates are negative but very imprecisely estimated. These
conclusions are similar to those obtained with alternative controls. Regarding, the size of the effect
whenever is significant, it is closely similar to the size of the estimated effect for female eligible. In
fact, we can never reject that the two effects are equal in size.
Finally, in the presence of different pre-treatment common trends it is usual in diff–in–diffs applica-
tions to extend the benchmark model for the male eligible effect by introducing a group–specific linear
deterministic trend in equation (6). This is a more restrictive approach than identifying the male eligi-
ble effect using only the Parallel Growths assumption (Mora and Reggio, 2012) and this unnecessary
restriction could bias the estimates. In results we do not show for brevity, we find that the estimates are
also positive and significant but the point estimates are around 33% larger than the point estimates using
only the Parallel Growths assumption. Hence, although the basic result remains (i.e., the male eligible
effect is positive) we suspect that the deterministic linear trend specification introduces a positive bias.
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Table 8: Effects under Parallel Paths for female eligible and Parallel Growths for male eligible
3 months 6 months 9 months 12 months
Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond.
Pre-treatment sample: July 1990-June 1994
All
Female effect 0.063 0.053 0.074 0.059 0.071 0.056 0.075 0.062
0.006 0.030 0.000 0.009 0.006 0.035 0.011 0.026
Male effect 0.072 0.062 0.077 0.065 0.078 0.064 0.086 0.070
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Difference (p-value) 0.450 0.403 0.696 0.621 0.658 0.628 0.403 0.587
No. of obs. 978 916 1042 979 1115 1044 1135 1062
Only boys
Female effect 0.112 0.107 0.117 0.109 0.116 0.111 0.094 0.101
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.164 0.019
Male effect 0.105 0.094 0.066 -0.018 0.069 -0.024 0.113 -0.013
0.000 0.000 0.608 0.947 0.580 0.932 0.014 0.962
Difference (p-value) 0.837 0.918 0.617 0.446 0.697 0.421 0.770 0.522
No. of obs. 426 379 450 400 487 430 508 456
Model with γD = 0
All
Female effect 0.064 0.051 0.073 0.054 0.069 0.050 0.072 0.056
0.008 0.051 0.000 0.022 0.014 0.072 0.019 0.051
Male effect 0.062 0.052 0.062 0.045 0.058 0.036 0.075 0.039
0.023 0.065 0.051 0.267 0.179 0.504 0.003 0.527
Difference (p-value) 0.939 0.913 0.899 0.901 0.918 0.851 0.810 0.821
No. of obs. 849 790 913 853 983 915 1003 933
Only boys
Female effect 0.118 0.114 0.119 0.108 0.115 0.110 0.092 0.102
0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.018 0.003 0.237 0.027
Male effect 0.096 0.067 0.028 -0.127 0.022 -0.140 0.091 -0.167
0.032 0.502 0.871 0.730 0.902 0.708 0.273 0.672
Difference (p-value) 0.840 0.562 0.497 0.297 0.546 0.268 0.948 0.289
No. of obs. 359 315 383 336 418 364 439 390
Note: Average marginal effects obtained using equation (9) and assuming Parallel Paths for the female eligible and Parallel Growths for the male eligible effect. Panel Pre-treatment
sample: July 1990-June 1994 extends the estimation sample to include observations from 1990. Panel Model with γD = 0 restricts γD in equation (9). p-values are shown in
parenthesis. “Months” refers to months after birth. Control 4 infants are infants who live with old people who are between 60 and 69. Uncond. refers to the diff-in-diff model
with month of birth and region fixed effects. Uncond. refers to the diff-in-diff model with month of birth and region fixed effects. The Cond. model additionally includes dummy
variables for the education of the mother, the mother’s age at the child’s birth and its square, a dummy for whether the child is female, the number of kids younger than five—at
birth of infant—in the household, and dummies for the ethnicity of the mother.
To sum up, our results show that the Parallel Path assumption is essential to find differences between
grandmothers and grandfathers. Under the Parallel Growths assumption and a flexible specification for
the econometric model, we find no gender differences in how a positive shock in income among old
people affects the welfare of infants living with them.
7 Conclusions
Many studies find evidence that presence of a grandmother is associated with higher child survival rates
while no such association is found in the case of a grandfather. We exploit income variation from the
introduction of a non-contributory universal pension scheme in Nepal in 1995. Using cross-sectional
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data from the 1996 and 2001 Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys, we obtain diff–in-diffs estimates
that are consistent with these results: we find positive and significant effects on survival rates for an
income increase of a female person older than 75 who lives in the same household while negative and
sometimes significant effects for the income increase of an old male.
These results are qualitatively similar across alternative definitions of the control group, for both boys
and girls, and do not depend on: a) how we exploit retrospective information in the data; b) whether
the female (male) eligible is the only eligible in the household; or c) the family status of the eligible.
However, the results are not robust to alternative assumptions for the diff–in–diffs estimates. More pre-
cisely, when we implement a flexible identification strategy based on the Parallel Growths assumption
defined in Mora and Reggio (2012) for the male eligible effect and on the Parallel Paths assumption
for the female eligible effect, we find no significant gender differences in how grandparents’ economic
conditions affect infant survival rates.
We validate the Parallel Growths assumption with a pre-treatment common acceleration test that is
similar in spirit to the pre-treatment common tests used to validate the Parallel Paths assumption. We
motivate the different results of these tests for female and male beneficiaries by the following argument.
If couples tend to live with a male beneficiary when they have economic problems and tend to live with
a female beneficiary when she has economic problems, then economic growth will result in successive
cross-sections where three-generation households with an old male will suffer a relative decline in
wealth. Hence, our findings can be interpreted as suggestive that cross-sectional analysis may bias
downwards the estimates of the effect of grandfathers.
We leave for future work the study of the channels through which the effects reported in this paper take
place. In particular, it is not clear whether the effects are just a consequence of higher income in the
treated households. For example, if risk averse parents respond to the program with higher fertility, then
the results found would be compatible with these type of parents having better success in bringing up
kids. In addition, if only those eligible that worry more about the family end up collecting the benefits,
then our results would likely underestimate the average effect of the income effect.
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Chapter 3: The Effect on Citation Inequality of Differences in 




The field dependence of reference and citation counts in scientific articles has been recognized 
since the beginning of Scientometrics as a field of study (see inter alia Pinski and Narin, 1976, 
Murugesan and Moravcsik, 1978, and Garfield, 1979). There are multiple reasons. Consider the 
differences across scientific disciplines in, for example, (i) size, measured by the number of 
publications in the periodical literature; (ii) the average number of authors per paper; (iii) the average 
paper length; (iv) the average number of papers per author in a given period of time; (v) the theoretical 
or experimental mix that characterizes each discipline; (vi) the average number of references per paper; 
(vii) the proportion of references that are made to other articles in the periodical literature; (viii) the 
percentage of internationally co-authored papers, or (ix) the speed at which the citation process 
evolves.  
This paper develops a measuring framework where it is possible to quantify the importance of 
differences in citation practices. We use a model in which the number of citations received by an 
article is a function of two variables: the article’s underlying scientific influence, and the field to which 
it belongs. In this context, the citation inequality of the distribution consisting of all articles in all fields 
–the all-fields case– is the result of two forces: differences in scientific influence, and differences in 
citation practices across fields. The first aim of the paper is how to isolate the citation inequality 
attributable to the latter, and how to measure its importance relative to overall citation inequality of all 
sorts. 
The first difficulty we must confront is that the characteristics of the scientific influence 
distributions are a priori unknown. Thus, even if they were observable, we would not know how to 
compare the scientific influence of any two articles belonging to different fields. To overcome this 
difficulty, we make the strong assumption that articles in the same quantile of the scientific influence 
distribution have the same degree of scientific influence independently of the field to which they belong. 
Thus, if your article and mine belong, for example, to the 80th percentile of our respective 
distributions, then we assume that they have the same degree of scientific influence.  
The next difficulty is that scientific influence is an unobservable variable. To overcome this 
difficulty, we may remain agnostic about the myriad of motives researchers have in their citation 
behavior as long as we are allowed to assume that citation impact varies monotonically with scientific 
influence (for a survey of the controversies concerning the meaning of citation counts, see Bornmann 
and Daniel, 2008). Thus, if one article has greater scientific influence than another one in the same 
homogeneous field, then we expect the former to have also a greater citation impact than the latter.1 
The monotonicity assumption ensures that, for any field, the quantiles of the (unobservable) scientific 
influence distribution coincide with the quantiles of the corresponding (observable) citation 
distribution. Therefore, if the mean citation of articles in the 80th percentile of your field is, for 
example, twice as large as the mean citation of articles in the same percentile in my field, this means 
                                                           
1 The idea that citations is an observable indicator for a latent concept of scientific or scholarly influence, as well as the 
monotonicity assumption, are also found in Ravallion and Wagstaff (2011) in a different scenario: the construction of 
bibliometric measures of research impact. 
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that your field uses double number of citations than mine to represent the same status in scientific 
influence. The implication is that the citation inequality observed at any quantile can be solely 
attributed to idiosyncratic differences in citation practices. Thus, the aggregation of this measure over 
all quantiles provides a method of quantifying the effect of these differences (This is, essentially, John 
Roemer’s, 1998, model for the study of inequality of opportunities in an economic or sociological 
context).  
We implement this model by using an additively decomposable inequality index, in which case 
the citation inequality attributed to differences in citation practices is captured by a between-group 
inequality term in the double partition by field and citation quantile (Ruiz-Castillo, 2003). Specifically, 
using a dataset of 4.4 million articles published in 1998-2003 with a five-year citation window and an 
appropriate citation inequality index, we estimate that the citation inequality attributable to differences 
in citation practices across the 22 fields (219 sub-fields) distinguished by Thomson Scientific 
represents about 14% (18%) of overall citation inequality. 
It would appear that, regardless of how their impact can be measured, differences in publication 
and citation practices pose insurmountable obstacles to direct comparisons of the absolute number of 
citations received by articles in different fields. For example, in the dataset used in this paper, how can 
we interpret the fact that the mean citation in Mathematics is 2.4, about eight and a half times smaller 
than in Molecular Biology and Genetics where it is equal to 20.4 citations? This paper shows that the 
striking similarity between citation distributions (documented at different aggregation levels in 
Albarrán and Ruiz-Castillo, 2011, Albarrán et al., 2011, and Radicchi and Castellano, 2012a), causes the 
citation inequality attributable to different citation practices to be approximately constant over a wide 
range of quantiles. This allows its effect to be rather well estimated over that interval. Consequently, 
we provide a set of exchange rates and their standard deviations (StDevs hereafter) that serve to answer 
the following two questions. Firstly, how many citations in a given field are equivalent to, say, 10 
citations in the all-fields case? For example, in Clinical Medicine the answer is 12.1 with a StDev of 0.6, 
while in Mathematics the answer is 3.3 with a StDev of 0.2. Secondly, how much can we reduce the 
effect of different citation practices by normalizing the raw citation data with the exchange rates? We 
find that this normalization procedure reduces this effect from 14% (18%) to around 2% (3.8%) of 
overall citation inequality. 
The difficulty of comparing citation counts across scientific fields is a very well known issue that 
has worried practitioners of Scientometrics since its inception. Differences in citation practices are 
usually taken into account by choosing the world mean citation rates as normalization factors (see inter 
alia Moed et al., 1985, 1988, 1995, Braun et al., 1985, Schubert et al., 1983, 1987, 1988, Schubert and 
Braun, 1986, 1996, and Vinkler 1986, 2003). More recently, other contributions support this traditional 
procedure on different grounds (Radicchi et al., 2008, Radicchi and Castellano, 2012a, 2012b). In our 
last contribution, we find that using field mean citations as normalization factors leads practically to 
the same reduction of the effect of differences in citation practices on citation inequality as our 
exchange rates. We show how our model helps explaining why the traditional model is so successful.2 
                                                           
2 Methods that use mean citations or exchange rates as normalization factors belong to the class of target or “cited side” 
normalization procedures. Following an idea in Small and Sweeney (1985), source or “citing side” procedures have been 
76 
 
The rest of the paper consists of five Sections. Section II is devoted to a review of the literature 
on normalization using field citation means. Section III introduces the model for the measurement of 
the effect of differences in citation practices, while Section IV contains an estimate of this effect in 
term of an appropriate additively decomposable citation inequality index. Section V presents the 
estimation of average-based exchange rates and its StDevs over a large quantile interval, and discusses 
the consequences of using such field exchange rates and mean citations as normalization factors. 
Section VI contains some concluding comments. 
 
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE  
 
From an operational point of view, a scientific field is a collection of papers published in a set of 
closely related professional journals. A field is said to be homogeneous if the number of citations received 
by its papers is comparable independently of the journal where each has been published. The problem 
we confront in this paper arises when one wants to evaluate research units publishing in closely related 
but heterogeneous fields –such as a Chemistry department working in Organic and Inorganic 
Chemistry– or, more simply, when one wants to directly compare the citations received by two papers 
in different scientific fields at any aggregation level.  
As indicated in the Introduction, the traditional solution is to rely on the world mean citation in 
each field as the normalization factor. Note that no confidence interval is usually provided in 
applications of this normalization procedure. This is probably due to the high variances that 
characterize highly skewed citation distributions (for the 22 fields covered in this paper, see column 4 
in Table A1 in the Appendix). More importantly, no deep explanation is usually given for mean 
normalization. It is simply agreed that the field mean citation captures well the expected value with 
which actual citation counts in that field can be related in order to compare normalized ratios across 
fields.  
Let s1 be the mean of a citation distribution, and let s2 be the mean of those articles with citations 
above s1. Under the idea that the difference (s2 – s1) is a very good proxy for the StDev of citation 
distributions, Glänzel (2011) suggests a normalization of the raw data using this average-based 
difference. 
In an important move, Radicchi et al. (2008) and Radicchi and Castellano (2012b) have recently 
justified the traditional solution on strong empirical grounds, namely, the universality claim according to 
which citation distributions in all fields exclusively differ by a scale factor. However, using a large 
dataset of 3.7 million articles published in 1998-2002, Albarrán et al. (2011) establish that the 
universality claim fails at both ends of the citation distributions at different aggregation levels, 
including a set of 219 sub-fields identified with the Web of Science subject-categories distinguished by 
Thomson Scientific (using a different methodology, Waltman et al., 2011 reach the same conclusion). 
In the first place, Albarrán et al. (2011) find that the existence of a power law cannot be rejected at the 
top of the upper tail in 140 out of 219 sub-fields. On average, power laws represent 2% of all articles 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
recently suggested (see inter alia Zitt and Small, 2008, Moed, 2010, and Leydesdorff and Opthof, 2010). Since our dataset 
lacks citing side information, applying this type of procedure is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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in a sub-field, and account for about 13.5% of all citations. However, the large dispersion of the power 
law parameters is a clear indication that excellence is not equally structured in all citation distributions.3 
In the second place, the proportion of articles without citations and with some citations below the 
mean at the sub-field level represent on average 24.7% and 43.9% of all articles, respectively, with large 
SDs equal to 13.9 and 12.5. Possibly, this is partly due to the fact that a common five-year citation 
window was taken for all sub-fields in spite of the large differences in the time that it takes for citation 
processes to reach a given degree of completion.  
This assessment contrasts with the more optimistic view in Radicchi et al. (2008) that supports 
the universality claim with a methodology that does not inform about how to treat the assignment of 
articles to multiple sub-fields, omits articles without citations, examines distributions at a limited set of 
points and, above all, covers only 14 of the 219 sub-fields. Radicchi and Castellano (2012b), which is 
free from other methodological shortcomings, focus only on 10 sub-fields within Physics. However, in 
a very important and more recent contribution that uses a dataset of about three million papers, 
covering 172 subject-categories, Radicchi and Castellano (2012a) –RC hereafter– also reject the 
universality claim. This seems to preclude certain normalization procedures. “Making citation counts 
independent of the subject-categories seems therefore not possible with the use of linear transformations, because the 
difference between citation distributions of different subject-categories is not only due to a single scaling factor.” (RC, p. 
2). More generally, “A universal criterion for the complete suppression of differences among scientific domains probably 
does not exist. There are too many factors to account for, and consequently the ‘philosophy’ at the basis of a ‘fair’ 
normalization procedure is subjective” (RC, p. 7). Nevertheless, RC demonstrate that, provided one is 
prepared to make strong assumptions, it is possible to find interesting normalization procedures. 
Ultimately, these normalization procedures work well in practice due to the similarity between citation 
distributions –a crucial aspect that deserves a few lines. 
Generally, citation distributions are very different in many respects and, particularly, in size and 
mean citation rates. Consequently, it is very useful to use a size- and scale-invariant approach in order 
to focus on the shape of such distributions. One example is the Characteristic Scores and Scales (CSS 
hereafter) technique, introduced by Schubert et al. (1987) in the analysis of citation distributions. The 
CCS permits the partition of any citation distribution into a number of classes as a function of their 
members’ citation characteristics. The following characteristic scores are determined: s1 = mean of a 
citation distribution; s2 = mean citation of articles with citations above s1, and s3 = mean citation of 
articles with citations above s2. Although there is no universal distribution over the entire domain of all 
fields at any aggregate level, striking similarities over a broad partition of citation distributions at all 
aggregate levels have been found. In particular, on average, the proportion of articles at different 
aggregation levels that (i) receive none or few citations below s1, (ii) are fairly well cited, namely, with 
citations between s1 and s2, and (iii) are remarkably or outstandingly cited with citations above s2 is, 
approximately, 69/21/10. These three classes of articles account for the proportions 21/34/45 of all 
                                                           
3 In addition, consider the possibility of defining a high-impact indicator over the sub-set of articles with citations above the 
80th percentile of citation distributions. The distribution of high-impact values for the 219 sub-fields according to an 
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The lessons that can be drawn from this paper can be summarized as follows. 
(1) We have provided a simple method for the measurement of the effect of differences in 
citation practices across scientific fields. Using a member of a family of additively separable citation 
inequality indices, this effect is well captured by a between-group term –denoted IDCP– in the double 
partition by field and quantile of the overall citation distribution in the all-fields case. It should be 
noted that this is a distribution free method, in the sense that it does not require that the scientific 
influence or the citation distributions satisfy any specific assumptions. We use a large dataset of 4.4 
million articles and a five-year citation window. When the classification of articles goes from 22 broad 
fields to 219 sub-fields, the estimated IDCP term increases. We have estimated that the IDCP term 
represents about 14% of overall citation inequality in the case of 22 fields and about 18% in the case of 
219 sub-fields.  
(2) The striking similarity of citation distributions allows the effect of idiosyncratic citation 
practices to be rather well estimated over a wide range of intermediate quantiles where citation 
distributions seem to differ by a scale factor. Consequently, a set of ERs has been estimated in the 
interval [706, 998] for the case of 22 fields and in the interval [661, 978] for the case of 219 sub-fields. 
With the ERs, we can translate citation counts of articles in different fields within that interval into the 
citations in a reference situation, and normalize the raw citation data. Such ERs are estimated with a 
reasonably low StDev for 20 out of 22 fields and 187 out of 219 sub-fields. 
It should be stressed that, for uncited and poorly cited articles below the mean, and for articles 
in the very upper tail of citation distributions, no clear answer to the comparability of citation counts 
for articles in different fields can be provided. Since the citation process evolves at different velocity in 
different fields, using variable citation windows to ensure that the process has reached a similar stage in 
all fields should improve field comparability at the lower tail of citation distributions.  
(3) The success of any normalization procedure in eliminating as much as possible the impact of 
differences in citation practices can be evaluated by the reduction it induces in the IDCP term. In our 
case, it has been established that both the procedure that uses our ERs, as well as the traditional 
method of taking the field citation means as normalization factors reduces the importance of the IDCP 
term relative to overall citation inequality from around 14% to 2% in the case of 22 fields, and from 
around 18% to 3.8% (3.4% with sub-field mean citations) in the case of 219 sub-fields. The paper 
provides an empirical explanation of why the two methods are equally successful.  
Other normalization proposals –such as the one in RC, or those based on citing side procedures 
quoted in the Introduction, might be analogously evaluated. In turn, it would be interesting to evaluate 
the normalization procedure based on the ERs in terms of the reduction of the bias in the RC model. 
Given how near our ERs are from those based on the fields’ mean citation rates, the conjecture is that 
our procedure would perform as well as the approximation provided by these means in RC. 
(4) Interestingly enough, our results at the lowest aggregate level about the ERs and their role 




One limitation of this study is that we cannot take into account possible differences in 
citation practices within sub-fields. For example, large differences between basic and clinical 
research areas within medical Web of Science subject-categories have been recently revealed in Van 
Eck et al. (2012). Naturally, our methods can be equally applied to future classification systems 
consisting of more homogeneous sub-fields than the Web of Science constructs available to us in 
this paper. 
(5) Policy makers and other interested parties should be very cautious when comparing citation 
performance in different scientific fields. More research is still needed. However, together with the 
important contribution by RC, the results of this paper indicate that the combination of interesting 
assumptions with the empirical similarity of citation distributions paves the way for meaningful 
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Table A1. Number of Articles and Mean Citation Rates by Field  
 
 Number of Articles %  Mean Citation 
Standard 
Deviation 
A. LIFE SCIENCES 1,806,398 40.4    
1. Biology & Biochemistry 275,568 6.2  12.6 20.1 
2. Clinical Medicine 947,261 21.2  9.7 21.6 
3. Immunology 60,875 1.4  16.0 23.0 
4. Microbiology 73,039 1.6  11.4 13.9 
5. Molecular Biology & Genetics 122,233 2.7  20.4 32.7 
6. Neuroscience & Behav. Science 140,686 3.2  13.7 18.2 
7. Pharmacology & Toxicology 76,728 1.7  8.0 11.0 
8. Psychiatry & Psychology 110,008 2.5  7.0 11.3 
B. PHYSICAL SCIENCES 1,282,919 28.7    
9. Chemistry 550,147 12.3  7.6 14.2 
10. Computer Science 98,727 2.2  3.0 13.8 
11. Mathematics 117,496 2.6  2.5 5.2 
12. Physics 456,144 10.2  6.9 14.9 
13. Space Science 60,405 1.4  11.0 20.5 
C. OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES 1,150,428 25.7    
14. Agricultural Sciences 82,837 1.9  4.9 7.2 
15. Engineering 356,269 8.0  3.2 5.8 
16. Environment & Ecology 109,826 2.5  7.1 10.3 
17. Geoscience 120,059 2.7  6.7 10.0 
18. Materials Science 199,364 4.5  4.5 8.9 
19. Multidisciplinary 20,672 0.5  3.2 7.0 
20. Plant & Animal Science 261,401 5.8  5.1 8.0 
D. SOCIAL SCIENCES 232,587 5.2    
21. Economics & Business 63,380 1.4  4.0 7.1 
22. Social Sciences, General 169,207 3.8  3.3 5.7 
      
ALL FIELDS 4,472,332 100  7.9 16.4 





Table B1. Exchange Rates, Standard Deviations, and Coefficient of variation for the [356, 705] Interval 
 
 Exchange Rates Standard Deviation  Coefficient of Variation 
 (1) (2) (3) 
A. LIFE SCIENCES    
1. Biology & Biochemistry 18.1 1.0 0.053 
2. Clinical Medicine 11.3 0.6 0.054 
3. Immunology 23.8 1.9 0.078 
4. Microbiology 18.1 1.4 0.079 
5. Molecular Biology & Genetics 25.6 1.0 0.040 
6. Neuroscience & Behav. Science 20.5 1.5 0.075 
7. Pharmacology & Toxicology 11.6 0.9 0.078 
8. Psychiatry & Psychology 8.8 0.8 0.091 
B. PHYSICAL SCIENCES    
9. Chemistry 10.2 0.8 0.079 
10. Computer Science 2.2 1.1 0.506 
11. Mathematics 3.0 0.7 0.237 
12. Physics 7.6 0.7 0.088 
13. Space Science 13.7 1.0 0.072 
C. OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES    
14. Agricultural Sciences 6.4 0.9 0.147 
15. Engineering 3.7 0.6 0.167 
16. Environment & Ecology 10.6 0.8 0.076 
17. Geoscience 9.5 0.9 0.092 
18. Materials Science 4.9 0.9 0.174 
19. Multidisciplinary 2.4 1.1 0.472 
20. Plant & Animal Science 7.0 0.6 0.092 
D. SOCIAL SCIENCES    
21. Economics & Business 4.4 0.7 0.169 





Table 2A . Number of Articles and Mean Citation Rates in the 219 Sub-fields and the 19 Fields in the Fractional Case  
? 
                                                                                                           Number of               %                      Mean          Standard 
                                                                                                              Articles                                         Citation       Deviation 
                                                                                                                  (1)                      (2)                        (3)                 (4)      
A. LIFE SCIENCES      
I .  BIOSCIENCES 342,480.5 7.67  15.8 20.1 
1. BIOLOGY 19,590.7 0.44  7.3 8.4 
2. BIOLOGY, MISCELLANEOUS 277.1 0.01  3.3 0.9 
3. EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 5,953.0 0.13  12.6 11.5 
4. BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 17,636.6 0.39  9.6 10.7 
5. BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 161,192.8 3.61  17.4 19.7 
6. BIOPHYSICS 28,162.4 0.63  10.9 8.3 
7. CELL BIOLOGY 53,873.7 1.21  21.2 20.3 
8. GENETICS & HEREDITY 43,311.1 0.97  15.8 20.3 
9. DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 12,483.3 0.28  20.0 17.6 
      
II .  BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 247,383.6 5.54  9.0 9.9 
10. PATHOLOGY 22,487.5 0.50  9.9 11.7 
11. ANATOMY & MORPHOLOGY 4,835.0 0.11  5.5 5.2 
12. ENGINEERING, BIOMEDICAL 12,047.9 0.27  7.1 4.8 
13. BIOTECHNOLOGY & APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 37,682.5 0.84  9.2 11.4 
14.  MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY 8,619.5 0.19  6.6 8.9 
15. MICROSCOPY 3,376.8 0.08  6.3 6.4 
16. PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACY 77,316.8 1.73  8.5 8.8 
17. TOXICOLOGY 19,485.3 0.44  7.3 5.8 
18. PHYSIOLOGY 29,551.8 0.66  10.9 7.9 
19. MEDICINE, RESEARCH & EXPERIMENTAL 31,980.5 0.72  12.2 18.0 
      
III .  CLINICAL MEDICINE I (INTERNAL) 440,082.7 9.86  12.6 22.8 
20. CARDIAC & CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 44591.9 1.00  10.2 12.3 
21. RESPIRATORY SYSTEM 19873.3 0.45  10.1 8.9 
22. ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 47015.3 1.05  13.8 17.2 
23. ANESTHESIOLOGY 16604.1 0.37  6.8 7.9 
24. CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE 9488.3 0.21  11.5 11.4 
25. EMERGENCY MEDICINE 5752.0 0.13  4.7 5.6 
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IV. CLINICAL MEDICINE II (NON-INTERNAL)  490,198.0 10.98  7.8 9.2 









































































































       
V. CLINICAL MEDICINE III  86,658.5 1.94  5.9 6.0 
















































       
VI. NEUROSCIENCES & BEHAVIORAL 184,618.5 4.13  9.8 10.1 











































































      
B. PHYSICAL SCIENCES      
VII.  CHEMISTRY 513,159.1 11.49  7.4 8.7 


















































      
VIII.  PHYSICS  522,921.8 11.71  6.4 11.2 



































































      
IX. SPACE SCIENCES 61,173.1 1.37  12.0 19.2 





      
X. MATHEMATICS 139,956.3 3.13  2.8 9.4 

























      
XI. COMPUTER SCIENCE  113,370.0 2.54  3.4 5.8 








































      
C. OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES      
XII.  ENGINEERING 288,058.5 6.45  3.3 3.4 











































































































      
XIII .  MATERIALS SCIENCE 185,225.7 4.15  4.4 5.1 










139. MATERIALS SCIENCE, CERAMICS 18,866.3 0.42  3.5 
 
4.8 



































      
XIV. GEOSCIENCES 144,907.0 3.25  6.0 7.0 



































































      
XV. AGRICULTURAL & ENVIRONMENT 180,472.2 4.04  5.6 6.1 























































171. HORTICULTURE 7,683.9 0.17 
 
 3.3 2.6 
      
XVI. BIOLOGY (ORGANISMIC AND      
SUPRAORGONISMIC LEVEL) 323,550.6 7.25  7.0 8.0 
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XVII.  MULTIDISCIPLINARY 27,218.9 0.61  3.2 6.5 





      
D. SOCIAL SCIENCES      
XVIII.  SOCIAL SCIENCES, GENERAL 118,297.3 2.65  3.0 3.6 







































































































































      
XIX. ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 55,615.8 1.25  4.1 5.1 
































      
Total 4,465,348 100.00 Mean 5.9 3.6 









?????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????? ????????????????
?????????? ???????? ???????????? ???????????? ?????? ?????????????? ??????????????? ?
??????? ???????Π? ??????? ? ???????? ??????? ???????????? ??????? ????????? ???????
? ????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????????? ???? ??? ???
?????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
???????ε???????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ????? ??????
??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ???? ??????
???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
???????ε????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
???????ε??????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
?????????ε????????? ??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????
??? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? ??????
???? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
?????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???? ????? ??????
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
??????????????? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????
? ??? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????
??? ?????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ??? ???? ?????





Table 1B. Citation Inequality Decomposition at the Sub-field Level 
 
  
A. FRACTIONAL  Within-group   Skewness of             IDCP   Overall       Percentages In %: 
             CASE                 Term, W Science Term, S          Term Inequality 
                       (1)                        (2)                 (3)               (4)  (1)/(4)  (2)/(4)  (3)/(4) 
 
 0.0030 0.7062 0.1552 0.8644 0.35 81.70 17.95 
 
 
B. MULTIPLICATIVE                    
                                                                                                                                   Overall                       Percentages In %: 
             CASE              W’                       S’                            IDCP’     Inequality (1)/(4)  (2)/(4)  (3)/(4) 
         (1)                      (2)    (3)        (4) 
 



















Table 2A. Exchange Rates, Standard Deviations, and Coefficient of variation for the [706, 998] Interval, and Exchange 
Rates Based on Mean Citations 
 
  
   Exchange         Standard          Coefficient of          % of           ERs Based on      ERs Based on Mean Cits. 
       Rates            Deviation             Variation         Citations       Mean Citations     In the [706, 998] Interval 
 
        (1)                    (2)                 (3)                   (4)                      (5)                            (6) 
  
1. Biology & Biochemistry 15.8 0.9 0.054 68.0 16.0 15.3 
2. Clinical Medicine 12.1 0.6 0.049 71.8 12.4 12.5 
3. Immunology 19.5 0.9 0.048 66.3 20.4 19.0 
4. Microbiology 14.4 1.3 0.092 65.8 14.6 13.5 
5. Molecular Biology & Genetics 25.7 0.6 0.022 71.1 25.9 25.9 
6. Neuroscience & Behav. Science 17.1 0.8 0.050 67.2 17.5 16.5 
7. Pharmacology & Toxicology 10.1 0.6 0.056 68.4 10.2 9.8 
8. Psychiatry & Psychology 9.1 0.2 0.025 72.4 9.0 9.1 
9. Chemistry 9.9 0.4 0.037 70.9 9.7 9.7 
10. Computer Science 3.7 0.5 0.124 76.3 3.8 4.0 
11. Mathematics 3.3 0.2 0.059 75.4 3.1 3.3 
12. Physics 8.8 0.5 0.061 74.2 8.7 9.1 
13. Space Science 14.2 0.3 0.019 71.9 14.0 14.2 
14. Agricultural Sciences 6.5 0.4 0.056 72.5 6.2 6.3 
15. Engineering 4.4 0.2 0.054 75.9 4.1 4.4 
16. Environment & Ecology 9.1 0.7 0.073 68.3 9.1 8.7 
17. Geoscience 8.9 0.6 0.069 70.1 8.6 8.5 
18. Materials Science 5.9 0.3 0.048 75.0 5.8 6.1 
19. Multidisciplinary 4.3 0.7 0.158 81.6 4.1 4.7 
20. Plant & Animal Science 6.7 0.3 0.045 71.3 6.5 6.5 
21. Economics & Business 5.2 0.4 0.068 75.6 5.0 5.3 
22. Social Sciences, General 4.5 0.2 0.045 75.1 4.2 4.5 
























Term,  W 






Percentages In %: 
(1)/(4) (2)/(4) (3)/(4) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A. RAW DATA        
All Quantiles 0.0046 0.7488 0.1221 0.8755 0.53 85.52 13.95 
[1, 705]   0.0449    5.13 
[706, 998]   0.0717    8.18 
[999, 1000]   0.0056    0.64 
        
B. EXCHANGE RATE 
NORMALIZATION 
       
All Quantiles 0.0051 0.7788 0.0167 0.8006 0.63 97.28 2.09 
[1, 705]   0.0127    1.59 
[706, 998]   0.0018    0.23 
[999, 1000]   0.0022    0.27 
        
C. NORMALIZATION  
WITH TWO EXCHANGE 
RATES 
       
All Quantiles 0.0050 0.7715 0.0147 0.7913 0.64 97.50 1.86 
[1, 705]   0.0108    1.36 
[706, 998]   0.0018    0.23 
[999, 1000]   0.0021    0.27 
        
D. MEAN 
NORMALIZATION 
       
All Quantiles 0.0050 0.7794 0.0164 0.8008 0.63 97.32 2.05 
[1, 705]   0.0124    1.55 
[706, 998]   0.0020    0.25 
[999, 1000]   0.0020    0.25 
        
E. GLÄNZEL 
NORMALIZATION 
       
All Quantiles 0.0048 0.7638 0.0241 0.7928 0.61 96.35 3.05 
[1, 705]   0.0184    2.32 
[706, 998]   0.0047    0.60 
[999, 1000]   0.0010    0.13 
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Table 2B. Exchange Rates, Standard Deviations, and Coefficients of Variation for the [661, 978] Interval In the Fractional 
Approach 
A. LIFE SCIENCES 
I. BIOSCIENCES 
1 BIOLOGY 10.3 0.3 0.032 64.1 9.8 
2 BIOLOGY, MISCELLANEOUS 5.0 0.3 0.063 65.4 4.6 
3 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 16.1 1.8 0.109 56.3 16.4 
4 BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 11.5 0.7 0.060 52.9 12.8 
5 
BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY 
20.6 0.5 0.023 58.2 21.2 
6 BIOPHYSICS 14.0 0.7 0.053 58.7 14.1 
7 CELL BIOLOGY 26.9 0.9 0.032 60.3 27.3 
8 GENETICS & HEREDITY 19.4 0.4 0.022 57.7 20.5 
9 DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 23.4 0.4 0.016 59.0 24.0 
      
II. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
     
10 PATHOLOGY 11.8 0.3 0.023 62.3 11.5 
11 ANATOMY & MORPHOLOGY 7.7 0.5 0.066 60.9 7.4 
12 ENGINEERING, BIOMEDICAL 9.5 0.5 0.053 61.3 9.1 
13 
BIOTECHNOLOGY & APPLIED 
MICROBIOLOGY 
11.5 0.3 0.024 58.0 11.9 
14 MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY 8.1 0.3 0.031 62.0 7.9 
15 MICROSCOPY 8.6 0.7 0.077 60.8 8.3 
16 PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACY 10.6 0.5 0.046 60.0 10.5 
17 TOXICOLOGY 9.7 0.7 0.071 58.9 9.6 
18 PHYSIOLOGY 14.0 1.4 0.102 59.4 13.5 
19 
MEDICINE, RESEARCH & 
EXPERIMENTAL 
15.4 2.6 0.171 61.2 16.5 
      
III. CLINICAL MEDICINE I 
(INTERNAL)      
20 CARDIAC & CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 14.9 1.0 0.070 61.6 15.1 
21 RESPIRATORY SYSTEM 13.7 0.7 0.051 60.6 13.4 
22 ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 16.9 1.1 0.066 58.3 16.9 
23 ANESTHESIOLOGY 9.2 0.3 0.037 62.8 8.8 
24 CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE 14.8 0.5 0.036 61.9 14.2 
25 EMERGENCY MEDICINE 5.8 0.3 0.050 62.8 5.5 
26 GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 13.5 0.3 0.022 60.1 13.6 
27 MEDICINE, GENERAL & INTERNAL 12.0 4.9 0.405 52.1 16.7 
28 TROPICAL MEDICINE 7.2 0.5 0.074 62.1 6.8 
29 HEMATOLOGY 22.2 0.3 0.014 60.2 22.3 
30 ONCOLOGY 18.0 0.6 0.031 58.6 18.3 
31 ALLERGY 12.2 0.5 0.038 63.1 11.5 
32 IMMUNOLOGY 17.8 0.3 0.017 59.0 18.3 
33 INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15.4 1.0 0.068 59.6 15.1 
      
  Exchange Standard  Coefficient % of   Exch. Rates 




Variation Citations Based on Mean 
      Citations 
           (1)   (2)  (3)         (4) (5) 
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IV. CLINICAL MEDICINE II (NON-INTERNAL) 
    
34 GERIATRICS & GERONTOLOGY 11.2 0.6 0.051 60.9 10.9 
35 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 9.2 0.4 0.044 62.3 8.8 
36 ANDROLOGY 7.3 0.5 0.068 60.3 7.1 
37 REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 12.5 1.1 0.089 59.0 12.3 
38 GERONTOLOGY 10.2 0.5 0.049 62.7 9.6 
39 DENTISTRY & ORAL SURGERY 7.2 0.6 0.077 60.6 6.9 
40 DERMATOLOGY 8.2 0.3 0.038 62.1 7.9 
41 UROLOGY & NEPHROLOGY 12.3 0.3 0.025 61.6 12.0 
42 OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 6.0 0.4 0.069 62.5 5.6 
43 OPHTHALMOLOGY 9.5 0.3 0.034 61.7 9.2 
44 
INTEGRATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY 
MEDICINE 
6.3 0.6 0.097 61.4 5.9 
45 CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 12.4 0.3 0.023 61.3 12.1 
46 PSYCHIATRY 13.1 0.3 0.019 62.0 12.7 
47 
RADIOLOGY, NUCLEAR MED. & MED. 
IMAGING 
10.1 0.3 0.026 61.5 9.9 
48 ORTHOPEDICS 7.9 0.3 0.043 61.6 7.6 
49 RHEUMATOLOGY 14.6 0.6 0.041 59.7 14.5 
50 SPORT SCIENCES 8.1 0.5 0.064 62.2 7.7 
51 SURGERY 8.5 0.2 0.028 61.9 8.3 
52 TRANSPLANTATION 9.5 0.2 0.026 61.9 9.2 
53 PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISEASE 20.2 0.3 0.013 59.8 20.4 
54 PEDIATRICS 7.7 0.3 0.035 62.1 7.5 
      
V. CLINICAL MEDICINE III 
     
55 HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES 7.9 0.5 0.061 60.3 7.7 
56 HEALTH POLICY & SERVICES 8.4 0.4 0.042 59.3 8.5 
57 MEDICINE, LEGAL 5.8 0.4 0.072 60.5 5.6 
58 NURSING 4.3 0.4 0.090 61.9 4.1 
59 
PUBLIC, ENV. & OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH 
9.7 0.3 0.034 60.8 9.5 
60 REHABILITATION 5.9 0.4 0.065 62.2 5.6 
61 SUBSTANCE ABUSE 9.8 0.9 0.096 59.2 9.6 
62 EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES 4.0 0.3 0.068 64.9 3.7 
63 MEDICAL INFORMATICS 5.7 0.3 0.045 62.9 5.5 
      
VI. NEUROSCIENCES & BEHAVIORAL 
     
64 NEUROIMAGING 14.6 0.4 0.025 63.1 14.0 
65 NEUROSCIENCES 16.9 0.5 0.031 59.6 16.9 
66 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 11.5 1.4 0.119 56.0 11.7 
67 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL 9.9 0.9 0.086 56.9 10.1 
68 PSYCHOLOGY 10.3 0.7 0.068 60.6 9.9 
69 PSYCHOLOGY, APPLIED 6.4 0.4 0.070 62.4 6.0 
70 PSYCHOLOGY, CLINICAL 9.9 0.4 0.042 60.6 9.7 
71 PSYCHOLOGY, DEVELOPMENTAL 10.6 0.5 0.051 60.8 10.2 
72 PSYCHOLOGY, EDUCATIONAL 6.8 0.3 0.040 64.2 6.5 
73 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL 10.2 0.5 0.046 61.2 9.9 
74 PSYCHOLOGY, MATHEMATICAL 6.9 0.3 0.038 61.3 6.8 
75 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 6.2 0.5 0.087 63.3 6.2 
76 PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS 3.7 0.4 0.106 67.8 3.4 
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77 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL 8.3 0.3 0.032 61.5 8.2 
78 SOCIAL SCIENCES, BIOMEDICAL 7.2 0.3 0.047 61.2 7.0 
      
B. PHYSICAL SCIENCES 
     
VII. CHEMISTRY 
     
79 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 11.9 1.2 0.103 65.4 11.5 
80 CHEMISTRY, INORGANIC & NUCLEAR 9.2 0.7 0.074 61.4 8.8 
81 CHEMISTRY, ANALYTICAL 9.9 0.4 0.044 60.5 9.7 
82 CHEMISTRY, APPLIED 7.6 0.5 0.070 62.3 7.2 
83 ENGINEERING, CHEMICAL 6.0 0.3 0.044 63.7 5.7 
84 CHEMISTRY, MEDICINAL 9.8 0.8 0.083 59.4 9.6 
85 CHEMISTRY, ORGANIC 10.7 1.0 0.096 59.3 10.4 
86 CHEMISTRY, PHYSICAL 10.5 0.5 0.047 60.5 10.3 
87 ELECTROCHEMISTRY 10.2 0.8 0.076 60.4 9.9 
88 POLYMER SCIENCE 8.2 0.3 0.031 61.4 8.1 
      
VIII. PHYSICS 
     
89 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 10.0 1.7 0.169 61.8 10.5 
90 SPECTROSCOPY 7.6 0.4 0.050 62.1 7.3 
91 ACOUSTICS 5.5 0.3 0.055 63.3 5.2 
92 OPTICS 7.3 0.3 0.036 62.7 7.0 
93 PHYSICS, APPLIED 7.5 0.4 0.048 60.7 7.6 
94 
PHYSICS, ATOMIC, MOLECULAR & 
CHEMICAL 
11.0 0.8 0.074 59.8 10.7 
95 THERMODYNAMICS 4.8 0.4 0.080 61.6 4.6 
96 PHYSICS, MATHEMATICAL 7.3 0.3 0.035 61.7 7.2 
97 PHYSICS, NUCLEAR 6.2 0.4 0.065 62.0 6.2 
98 PHYSICS, PARTICLES & SUB-FIELDS 10.8 1.1 0.102 59.8 11.4 
99 PHYSICS, CONDENSED MATTER 7.4 0.3 0.045 61.4 7.4 
100 PHYSICS OF SOLIDS, FLUIDS & PLASMAS 9.3 0.6 0.063 59.8 9.1 
101 CRYSTALLOGRAPHY 5.1 0.3 0.053 58.8 5.2 
      
IX. SPACE SCIENCES 
     
102 ASTRONOMY & ASTROPHYSICS 14.8 0.3 0.018 60.6 14.8 
      
X. MATHEMATICS 
     
103 MATHEMATICS, APPLIED 3.9 0.2 0.062 65.7 3.6 




5.6 0.3 0.045 60.8 5.6 
106 
SOCIAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICAL 
METHODS 
5.5 0.3 0.045 61.4 5.5 
107 PURE MATHEMATICS 2.8 0.2 0.087 66.4 2.6 
      
XI. COMPUTER SCIENCE 
     
108 
COMP. SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE 
5.4 0.6 0.118 63.3 5.4 
109 COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS 3.6 0.4 0.108 66.7 3.4 
110 
COMP. SCIENCE, HARDWARE & 
ARCHITECTURE 
4.0 0.5 0.124 61.4 4.1 
111 
COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 




COMP. SC., INTERDISCIPLINARY 
APPLICATIONS 
5.5 0.6 0.102 58.1 6.0 
113 
COMP. SCIENCE, SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING 
3.6 0.4 0.107 65.5 3.4 
114 
COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & 
METHODS 
3.1 0.4 0.115 65.5 3.0 
115 
MATHEMATICAL & COMPUTATIONAL 
BIOLOGY 
9.8 0.4 0.044 52.9 11.4 
      
C. OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES 
     
XII. ENGINEERING 
     
116 
ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & 
ELECTRONIC 
4.7 0.4 0.077 63.1 4.6 
117 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3.8 0.5 0.144 62.2 3.9 
118 
CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING 
TECHNOLOGY 
3.5 0.3 0.090 65.4 3.1 
119 ENGINEERING, CIVIL 3.4 0.3 0.086 67.0 3.1 
120 ENGINEERING, ENVIRONMENTAL 9.1 0.3 0.035 62.4 8.7 
121 ENGINEERING, MARINE 1.6 0.3 0.212 71.5 1.4 
122 
TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY 
2.1 0.5 0.227 69.9 2.0 
123 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL 3.3 0.3 0.091 66.6 2.9 
124 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING 3.6 0.3 0.089 64.8 3.2 
125 ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL 3.9 0.2 0.060 63.7 3.7 
126 MECHANICS 5.2 0.3 0.050 63.8 4.9 
127 ROBOTICS 3.8 0.2 0.065 65.0 3.6 
128 INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION 5.1 0.3 0.051 65.0 4.7 
129 
IMAGING SCIENCE & PHOTOGR. 
TECHNOLOGY 
7.4 0.4 0.061 64.6 7.0 
130 ENERGY & FUELS 5.0 0.3 0.064 64.9 4.7 
131 NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 4.4 0.3 0.061 64.0 4.1 
132 ENGINEERING, PETROLEUM 1.7 0.4 0.255 73.5 1.5 
133 AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS 4.1 0.2 0.059 63.8 3.9 
134 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 3.9 0.4 0.089 66.0 3.7 
135 ERGONOMICS 4.8 0.4 0.088 63.0 4.4 
136 
OPERATIONS RES. & MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE 
4.1 0.2 0.060 63.6 3.8 
      
XIII. MATERIALS SCIENCE 




6.4 0.4 0.056 60.7 6.4 
138 MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS 13.0 1.1 0.085 59.3 12.7 
139 MATERIALS SCIENCE, CERAMICS 4.7 0.3 0.074 68.3 4.2 
140 
MAT. SC., CHARACTERIZATION & 
TESTING 
2.2 0.4 0.167 70.6 2.0 
141 
MATERIALS SCIENCE, COATINGS & 
FILMS 
7.5 0.4 0.057 61.0 7.3 
142 MATERIALS SCIENCE, COMPOSITES 3.4 0.3 0.087 65.9 3.1 
143 MATERIALS SCIENCE, PAPER & WOOD 2.9 0.3 0.092 68.1 2.6 
144 MATERIALS SCIENCE, TEXTILES 2.9 0.3 0.095 65.5 2.7 
145 
METALL. & METALLURGICAL 
ENGINEERING 
4.7 0.4 0.089 63.5 4.7 
146 NANOSCIENCE & NANOTECHNOLOGY 8.0 0.3 0.036 60.0 8.1 




     
147 GEOCHEMISTRY & GEOPHYSICS 9.7 0.6 0.066 61.5 9.3 
148 GEOGRAPHY, PHYSICAL 9.1 0.9 0.097 59.8 8.8 
149 GEOLOGY 8.0 0.5 0.061 62.4 7.5 
150 ENGINEERING, GEOLOGICAL 3.8 0.3 0.093 62.1 3.6 
151 PALEONTOLOGY 6.5 0.4 0.057 63.7 6.1 
152 REMOTE SENSING 7.8 0.3 0.037 60.8 7.8 
153 OCEANOGRAPHY 10.1 1.0 0.101 61.6 9.5 
154 ENGINEERING, OCEAN 3.6 0.4 0.106 66.7 3.4 
155 
METEOROLOGY & ATMOSPHERIC 
SCIENCES 
10.9 0.5 0.047 61.3 10.5 
156 ENGINEERING, AEROSPACE 2.5 0.2 0.095 68.4 2.2 
157 MINERALOGY 6.9 0.4 0.060 61.4 6.6 
158 MINING & MINERAL PROCESSING 4.0 0.3 0.069 65.5 3.7 
159 GEOSCIENCES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 7.3 0.4 0.055 62.7 6.9 
      
XV. AGRICULTURAL & 
ENVIRONMENT      
160 AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING 5.0 0.4 0.073 61.6 4.7 
161 AGRICULTURE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 6.8 0.3 0.045 63.8 6.6 
162 AGRONOMY 5.8 0.3 0.050 62.9 5.5 
163 LIMNOLOGY 9.7 0.8 0.078 60.8 9.3 
164 SOIL SCIENCE 6.9 0.5 0.072 62.5 6.5 
165 BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 8.8 0.4 0.046 62.1 8.5 
166 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 8.9 0.5 0.056 60.1 8.8 
167 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 5.0 0.4 0.072 61.4 4.8 
168 FOOD SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 7.1 0.5 0.075 61.9 6.7 
169 NUTRITION & DIETETICS 11.4 0.4 0.037 61.3 11.1 
170 
AGRICULTURE, DAIRY & ANIMAL 
SCIENCE 
5.4 0.3 0.051 66.5 4.9 
171 HORTICULTURE 6.0 0.3 0.045 62.9 5.8 
      
XVI. BIOLOGY (ORGANISMIC AND 
     
SUPRAORGONISMIC LEVEL) 
     
172 ORNITHOLOGY 5.5 0.5 0.082 59.7 5.4 
173 ZOOLOGY 7.5 0.5 0.068 61.8 7.1 
174 ENTOMOLOGY 5.5 0.4 0.071 62.9 5.1 
175 WATER RESOURCES 6.3 0.5 0.075 61.7 5.9 
176 FISHERIES 7.1 0.8 0.115 59.3 6.9 
177 MARINE & FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 8.2 0.9 0.115 59.2 7.9 
178 MICROBIOLOGY 14.3 1.1 0.077 59.3 14.0 
179 PARASITOLOGY 8.1 0.6 0.070 59.6 8.0 
180 VIROLOGY 18.8 1.6 0.083 57.7 18.9 
181 FORESTRY 7.2 0.6 0.089 60.0 7.0 
182 MYCOLOGY 6.8 0.3 0.046 62.1 6.5 
183 PLANT SCIENCES 9.6 0.3 0.029 60.1 9.8 
184 ECOLOGY 11.4 1.0 0.087 59.7 11.0 
185 VETERINARY SCIENCES 5.2 0.3 0.056 65.9 4.8 
      
XVII. MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
     
186 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 4.0 0.6 0.158 64.3 4.0 
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D. SOCIAL SCIENCES 
     
XVIII. SOCIAL SCIENCES, GENERAL 
     
187 CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 4.8 0.3 0.058 66.5 4.4 
188 LAW 4.3 0.3 0.076 65.1 4.1 
189 POLITICAL SCIENCE 3.3 0.4 0.119 65.5 3.2 
190 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 3.6 0.3 0.075 66.2 3.3 
191 ETHNIC STUDIES 2.5 0.3 0.115 65.7 2.4 
192 FAMILY STUDIES 5.7 0.3 0.057 62.1 5.5 
193 SOCIAL ISSUES 3.4 0.3 0.091 64.4 3.3 
194 SOCIAL WORK 3.9 0.3 0.078 63.2 3.7 
195 SOCIOLOGY 4.2 0.3 0.065 65.6 3.9 
196 WOMEN'S STUDIES 4.1 0.2 0.061 63.8 3.8 
197 
EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL 
RESEARCH 
3.3 0.3 0.085 64.6 3.1 
198 EDUCATION, SPECIAL 5.0 0.3 0.065 62.7 4.7 
199 AREA STUDIES 1.9 0.3 0.157 67.0 1.8 
200 GEOGRAPHY 5.8 0.3 0.057 60.5 5.7 
201 PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT 4.4 0.3 0.059 61.3 4.4 
202 TRANSPORTATION 5.3 0.4 0.079 61.8 5.0 
203 URBAN STUDIES 4.4 0.3 0.068 61.7 4.2 
204 ETHICS 3.3 0.3 0.092 65.6 3.0 
205 MEDICAL ETHICS 5.2 0.4 0.075 62.1 4.9 
206 ANTHROPOLOGY 4.4 0.3 0.074 66.3 4.1 
207 COMMUNICATION 4.6 0.3 0.060 64.1 4.3 
208 DEMOGRAPHY 5.5 0.3 0.053 61.8 5.3 
209 HISTORY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 2.1 0.3 0.140 69.2 1.8 
210 
INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY 
SCIENCE 
4.1 0.4 0.103 65.2 3.9 
211 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2.9 0.4 0.134 65.4 2.8 
212 LINGUISTICS 6.1 0.3 0.049 63.0 5.8 
213 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY 3.6 0.4 0.100 66.7 3.3 
      
XIX. ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 
     
214 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY 3.8 0.3 0.082 63.9 3.5 
215 ECONOMICS 4.6 0.3 0.074 61.9 4.6 
216 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LABOR 4.6 0.4 0.086 63.3 4.2 
217 BUSINESS 6.7 0.3 0.047 64.0 6.4 
218 BUSINESS, FINANCE 6.3 0.5 0.087 63.6 6.2 
219 MANAGEMENT 6.4 0.4 0.055 63.5 6.2 
Mean     0.071 62.2   











Table 3B. Citation Inequality Decomposition at the Sub-field Level In the Fractional Case 
 Quantiles Within-group Skew. of Sc.       IDCP Total Citation Percentages In %: 
     Term,  W  Term, S        Term  Inequality (1)/(4) (2)/(4) (3)/(4) 
          (1)         (2)           (3)        (4)           (5)           (6)         (7) 
A. Raw Data 1,000       0.0030     0.7062 0.1552       0.8644 0.35 81.70 17.95 
 [1, 660]   0.0463    5.36 
 [661, 978]   0.0750    8.68 
 [979, 1000]   0.0338    3.91 
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A. LIFE SCIENCES 
     
 
I. BIOSCIENCES 
     1 BIOLOGY 10.5 0.4 0.035 63.8 10.0 
2 BIOLOGY, MISCELLANEOUS 4.7 0.3 0.067 64.7 4.4 
3 EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY 16.1 1.7 0.108 56.7 16.3 
4 BIOCHEMICAL RESEARCH METHODS 11.5 0.6 0.054 54.7 12.4 
5 BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 20.6 0.4 0.021 58.4 21.2 
6 BIOPHYSICS 14 0.7 0.050 58.4 14.1 
7 CELL BIOLOGY 27 1 0.038 60.4 27.5 
8 GENETICS & HEREDITY 19.7 0.4 0.021 58.5 20.5 
9 DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 24.4 0.5 0.021 60.4 24.6 
  
     
 II. BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH      10 PATHOLOGY 11.7 0.3 0.024 62 11.5 
11 ANATOMY & MORPHOLOGY 7.8 0.5 0.064 60.9 7.6 
12 ENGINEERING, BIOMEDICAL 9.6 0.5 0.048 61.2 9.2 
13 BIOTECHNOLOGY & APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY 
11.6 0.3 0.022 57.9 12.1 
14 MEDICAL LABORATORY TECHNOLOGY 8.1 0.3 0.031 61.3 8.0 
15 MICROSCOPY 8.5 0.6 0.068 60.6 8.3 
16 PHARMACOLOGY & PHARMACY 10.7 0.4 0.041 59.8 10.6 
17 TOXICOLOGY 9.6 0.6 0.067 59.2 9.5 
18 PHYSIOLOGY 14.1 1.4 0.101 59.3 13.7 
19 MEDICINE, RESEARCH & EXPERIMENTAL 15.7 2.8 0.180 59.9 17.2 
  
     
 III. CLINICAL MEDICINE I (INTERNAL)     20 CARDIAC & CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEMS 14.9 1.1 0.076 61.3 15.2 
21 RESPIRATORY SYSTEM 13.5 0.6 0.042 60.6 13.2 
22 ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 16.7 1.1 0.066 58.2 16.9 
23 ANESTHESIOLOGY 9.4 0.3 0.032 62.8 8.9 
24 CRITICAL CARE MEDICINE 14.6 0.4 0.030 61.5 14.2 
25 EMERGENCY MEDICINE 5.8 0.3 0.050 62.2 5.6 
26 GASTROENTEROLOGY & HEPATOLOGY 13.7 0.4 0.027 60.4 13.8 
27 MEDICINE, GENERAL & INTERNAL 12.1 5 0.411 52.2 16.9 
28 TROPICAL MEDICINE 7.2 0.5 0.069 62.1 6.8 
29 HEMATOLOGY 21.9 0.4 0.020 61 21.8 
30 ONCOLOGY 18 0.5 0.027 58.8 18.3 
31 ALLERGY 12.2 0.4 0.033 62.7 11.7 
32 IMMUNOLOGY 17.8 0.3 0.016 58.9 18.3 
33 INFECTIOUS DISEASES 15.3 0.9 0.060 59.4 15.2 
  
     
  Exchange Standard  Coeficient  % of    Exch. Rates 




Variation   Citations   Based on Mean 
        Citations 
       (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5) 
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 IV. CLINICAL MEDICINE II (NON-INTERNAL) 
    
34 GERIATRICS & GERONTOLOGY 11.1 0.6 0.054 61.5 10.7 
35 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 9.2 0.4 0.042 62.1 8.8 
36 ANDROLOGY 7.4 0.6 0.079 60.1 7.2 
37 REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 12.6 1.1 0.088 58.7 12.4 
38 GERONTOLOGY 10 0.4 0.038 63.3 9.4 
39 DENTISTRY & ORAL SURGERY  7.2 0.5 0.073 60.6 7.0 
40 DERMATOLOGY 8.1 0.3 0.036 62.1 7.8 
41 UROLOGY & NEPHROLOGY 12.4 0.3 0.022 61.9 12.0 
42 OTORHINOLARYNGOLOGY 6.1 0.4 0.069 62.4 5.7 
43 OPHTHALMOLOGY 9.5 0.3 0.030 61.3 9.3 
44 INTEGRATIVE & COMPLEMENTARY MEDICINE 
6.2 0.6 0.090 61.2 5.9 
45 CLINICAL NEUROLOGY 12.4 0.3 0.021 61.4 12.2 
46 PSYCHIATRY 13.1 0.3 0.020 62 12.8 
47 RADIOLOGY, NUCLEAR MED. & MED. IMAGING 
10.4 0.3 0.025 61.4 10.3 
48 ORTHOPEDICS 7.9 0.3 0.038 61.4 7.7 
49 RHEUMATOLOGY 14.6 0.6 0.038 59.7 14.6 
50 SPORT SCIENCES 8.2 0.5 0.056 62.5 7.7 
51 SURGERY 8.6 0.2 0.028 62 8.4 
52 TRANSPLANTATION 9.3 0.3 0.029 61.9 9.1 
53 PERIPHERAL VASCULAR DISEASE 20.4 0.3 0.013 60.3 20.5 
54 PEDIATRICS 7.7 0.3 0.035 61.8 7.5 
 
 
     
 V. CLINICAL MEDICINE III 
     
55 HEALTH CARE SCIENCES & SERVICES 7.8 0.4 0.049 60.7 7.6 
56 HEALTH POLICY & SERVICES 8.2 0.3 0.039 59.3 8.2 
57 MEDICINE, LEGAL 5.8 0.4 0.069 60.5 5.6 
58 NURSING 4.4 0.4 0.091 62.4 4.1 
59 PUBLIC, ENV. & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 9.6 0.3 0.035 60.7 9.5 
60 REHABILITATION 5.9 0.4 0.060 62.5 5.6 
61 SUBSTANCE ABUSE 10 0.9 0.090 59.1 9.8 
62 EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES 4 0.3 0.071 64.8 3.8 
63 MEDICAL INFORMATICS 5.7 0.3 0.046 61.6 5.6 
 
 
     
 VI. NEUROSCIENCES & BEHAVIORAL 
    
64 NEUROIMAGING 14.6 0.4 0.026 63.1 14.0 
65 NEUROSCIENCES 17 0.5 0.029 59.5 17.1 
66 BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 11.5 1.3 0.115 56 11.7 
67 PSYCHOLOGY, BIOLOGICAL 9.9 0.8 0.084 57.3 10.0 
68 PSYCHOLOGY 10.6 0.7 0.069 60.1 10.3 
69 PSYCHOLOGY, APPLIED 6.5 0.4 0.063 61.9 6.2 
70 PSYCHOLOGY, CLINICAL 10 0.4 0.038 61.2 9.8 
71 PSYCHOLOGY, DEVELOPMENTAL 10.4 0.5 0.052 60.8 10.1 
72 PSYCHOLOGY, EDUCATIONAL 7.1 0.3 0.043 64 6.7 
73 PSYCHOLOGY, EXPERIMENTAL 10.2 0.4 0.042 61 10.0 
74 PSYCHOLOGY, MATHEMATICAL 7 0.3 0.038 61 6.9 
75 PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 6.4 0.6 0.092 62.6 6.4 
76 PSYCHOLOGY, PSYCHOANALYSIS 3.8 0.4 0.100 66.3 3.5 
77 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL 8.3 0.3 0.031 61.6 8.1 
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78 SOCIAL SCIENCES, BIOMEDICAL 7.4 0.3 0.039 60.7 7.3 
 
 
     
 B. PHYSICAL SCIENCES 
     
 VII. CHEMISTRY 
     
79 CHEMISTRY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 12 1.3 0.108 65 11.7 
80 CHEMISTRY, INORGANIC & NUCLEAR 9.1 0.6 0.062 61.6 8.7 
81 CHEMISTRY, ANALYTICAL 10 0.5 0.046 60.6 9.8 
82 CHEMISTRY, APPLIED 7.7 0.5 0.063 61.9 7.3 
83 ENGINEERING, CHEMICAL 6 0.3 0.045 63.9 5.7 
84 CHEMISTRY, MEDICINAL 9.8 0.8 0.078 59 9.7 
85 CHEMISTRY, ORGANIC 10.7 1 0.090 59.1 10.5 
86 CHEMISTRY, PHYSICAL 10.5 0.4 0.043 60 10.4 
87 ELECTROCHEMISTRY 10.4 0.7 0.072 60.6 10.0 
88 POLYMER SCIENCE 8.3 0.3 0.031 61.3 8.1 
 
 
     
 VIII. PHYSICS 
     
89 PHYSICS, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 10.1 1.7 0.169 62.2 10.6 
90 SPECTROSCOPY 7.7 0.3 0.043 61.8 7.4 
91 ACOUSTICS 5.6 0.3 0.052 62.7 5.3 
92 OPTICS 7.3 0.3 0.038 62.8 7.1 
93 PHYSICS, APPLIED 7.5 0.4 0.049 60.9 7.6 
94 PHYSICS, ATOMIC, MOLECULAR & CHEMICAL 11.1 0.8 0.071 59.1 11.0 
95 THERMODYNAMICS 4.8 0.4 0.081 61.7 4.6 
96 PHYSICS, MATHEMATICAL 7.5 0.3 0.037 61.6 7.4 
97 PHYSICS, NUCLEAR 6.6 0.4 0.067 63.3 6.4 
98 PHYSICS, PARTICLES & SUB-FIELDS 11.1 1.2 0.106 60.7 11.6 
99 PHYSICS, CONDENSED MATTER 7.5 0.3 0.039 62 7.4 
100 PHYSICS OF SOLIDS, FLUIDS & PLASMAS 9.4 0.6 0.064 60 9.2 
101 CRYSTALLOGRAPHY 5.2 0.2 0.046 56.4 5.6 
 
 
     
 IX. SPACE SCIENCES 
     
102 ASTRONOMY & ASTROPHYSICS 14.9 0.3 0.018 60.7 14.9 
 
 
     
 X. MATHEMATICS 
     
103 MATHEMATICS, APPLIED 3.7 0.3 0.075 65 3.5 
104 STATISTICS & PROBABILITY 5.4 0.5 0.097 54.1 6.2 
105 MATH., INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS 5.6 0.2 0.044 61.6 5.5 
106 SOCIAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICAL METHODS 
5.6 0.3 0.047 61.4 5.5 
107 PURE MATHEMATICS 2.8 0.2 0.087 66 2.6 
 
 
     
 XI. COMPUTER SCIENCE 
     
108 COMP. SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 4.8 0.5 0.107 63.4 4.8 
109 COMPUTER SCIENCE, CYBERNETICS 3.7 0.4 0.102 67.1 3.4 
110 
COMP. SCIENCE, HARDWARE & 
ARCHITECTURE 
3.9 0.5 0.123 62.9 4.0 
111 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
4.3 0.7 0.154 62.5 4.5 
112 COMP. SC., INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS 
5.7 0.6 0.099 56.6 6.3 
113 COMP. SCIENCE, SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 3.7 0.4 0.114 65 3.5 




MATHEMATICAL & COMPUTATIONAL 
BIOLOGY 
9.8 0.5 0.047 49.7 12.2 
 
 
     
 C. OTHER NATURAL SCIENCES 
     
 XII. ENGINEERING 
     
116 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC 4.8 0.4 0.077 63 4.7 
117 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 3.7 0.5 0.147 63.6 3.8 
118 CONSTRUCTION & BUILDING TECHNOLOGY 3.5 0.3 0.088 65.5 3.2 
119 ENGINEERING, CIVIL 3.4 0.3 0.087 66.3 3.2 
120 ENGINEERING, ENVIRONMENTAL 9 0.3 0.034 62.5 8.7 
121 ENGINEERING, MARINE 1.5 0.3 0.210 71.5 1.4 
122 
TRANSPORTATION SCIENCE & 
TECHNOLOGY 
2.1 0.5 0.233 70.9 1.9 
123 ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL 3.3 0.3 0.088 66.2 3.0 
124 ENGINEERING, MANUFACTURING 3.6 0.3 0.087 65.3 3.2 
125 ENGINEERING, MECHANICAL 4 0.2 0.060 63.9 3.8 
126 MECHANICS 5.2 0.3 0.049 63.4 4.9 
127 ROBOTICS 3.7 0.3 0.069 65 3.5 
128 INSTRUMENTS & INSTRUMENTATION 5.2 0.2 0.046 64.4 4.9 
129 IMAGING SCIENCE & PHOTOGR. TECHNOLOGY 
7.5 0.4 0.058 63.8 7.2 
130 ENERGY & FUELS 5.2 0.3 0.056 64.5 4.9 
131 NUCLEAR SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 4.4 0.3 0.059 62.9 4.2 
132 ENGINEERING, PETROLEUM 1.7 0.4 0.257 73.5 1.5 
133 AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS 4.1 0.2 0.060 64.5 3.8 
134 ENGINEERING, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 3.9 0.4 0.101 65.9 3.6 
135 ERGONOMICS 4.8 0.4 0.080 62.4 4.5 
136 
OPERATIONS RES. & MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE 
4 0.2 0.061 63.9 3.8 
 
 
     
 XIII. MATERIALS SCIENCE 
     
137 MATERIALS SCIENCE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 6.5 0.4 0.061 60.6 6.6 
138 MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS 13 1.1 0.084 59.1 12.8 
139 MATERIALS SCIENCE, CERAMICS 4.8 0.4 0.075 68.1 4.3 
140 MAT. SC., CHARACTERIZATION & TESTING 2.2 0.4 0.189 69.5 2.0 
141 MATERIALS SCIENCE, COATINGS & FILMS 7.5 0.5 0.065 61.4 7.2 
142 MATERIALS SCIENCE, COMPOSITES 3.5 0.3 0.084 65.1 3.3 
143 MATERIALS SCIENCE, PAPER & WOOD 3 0.3 0.091 68 2.6 
144 MATERIALS SCIENCE, TEXTILES 2.9 0.3 0.089 65.5 2.7 
145 METALL. & METALLURGICAL ENGINEERING 4.6 0.4 0.082 64.5 4.4 
146 NANOSCIENCE & NANOTECHNOLOGY 8.2 0.4 0.044 59.6 8.4 
 
 
     
 XIV. GEOSCIENCES 
     
147 GEOCHEMISTRY & GEOPHYSICS 9.8 0.6 0.060 61.7 9.4 
148 GEOGRAPHY, PHYSICAL 9 0.8 0.088 59.9 8.7 
149 GEOLOGY 8 0.4 0.055 62.7 7.6 
150 ENGINEERING, GEOLOGICAL 3.7 0.3 0.088 62.5 3.5 
151 PALEONTOLOGY 6.4 0.4 0.055 63.1 6.0 
152 REMOTE SENSING 7.4 0.3 0.043 60.6 7.3 
153 OCEANOGRAPHY 10 0.9 0.090 61.2 9.5 
154 ENGINEERING, OCEAN 3.8 0.4 0.098 64.8 3.6 
155 METEOROLOGY & ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES 10.6 0.4 0.037 61.3 10.3 
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156 ENGINEERING, AEROSPACE 2.6 0.2 0.091 68.7 2.3 
157 MINERALOGY 7.2 0.4 0.060 61.7 6.8 
158 MINING & MINERAL PROCESSING 4.1 0.3 0.065 65.8 3.9 
159 GEOSCIENCES, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 7.3 0.4 0.050 62.6 6.9 
 
 
     
  XV. AGRICULTURAL & ENVIRONMENT 
    
160 AGRICULTURAL ENGINEERING 4.9 0.4 0.072 62 4.7 
161 AGRICULTURE, MULTIDISCIPLINARY 6.9 0.3 0.038 64.7 6.4 
162 AGRONOMY 5.9 0.3 0.046 63 5.6 
163 LIMNOLOGY 9.5 0.6 0.065 61 9.2 
164 SOIL SCIENCE 6.9 0.5 0.074 62.1 6.5 
165 BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 8.8 0.3 0.037 62.7 8.4 
166 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES 8.9 0.5 0.051 60.8 8.7 
167 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES 4.9 0.3 0.071 61.7 4.7 
168 FOOD SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 7.1 0.5 0.067 61.8 6.8 
169 NUTRITION & DIETETICS 11.4 0.3 0.030 61.3 11.1 
170 AGRICULTURE, DAIRY & ANIMAL SCIENCE 5.4 0.3 0.048 65.9 5.0 
171 HORTICULTURE 6.2 0.3 0.044 62.9 6.0 
 
 
     
 XVI. BIOLOGY (ORGANISMIC AND 
     
 SUPRAORGONISMIC LEVEL) 
     
172 ORNITHOLOGY 5.5 0.4 0.077 59.8 5.4 
173 ZOOLOGY 7.5 0.5 0.065 61.4 7.2 
174 ENTOMOLOGY 5.5 0.4 0.067 63 5.1 
175 WATER RESOURCES 6.2 0.4 0.068 62.2 5.8 
176 FISHERIES 7.1 0.8 0.110 60 6.8 
177 MARINE & FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 8.2 0.9 0.113 59.2 7.9 
178 MICROBIOLOGY 14.3 1 0.071 58.9 14.2 
179 PARASITOLOGY 8.1 0.6 0.072 60 7.9 
180 VIROLOGY 18.7 1.5 0.082 57.6 18.8 
181 FORESTRY 7 0.6 0.079 60.2 6.8 
182 MYCOLOGY 6.8 0.3 0.046 62.3 6.5 
183 PLANT SCIENCES 9.6 0.3 0.027 60.7 9.6 
184 ECOLOGY 11.4 1 0.085 59.7 11.1 
185 VETERINARY SCIENCES 5.2 0.3 0.054 65.4 4.8 
 
 
     
 XVII. MULTIDISCIPLINARY 
     
186 MULTIDISCIPLINARY SCIENCES 4.1 0.6 0.161 64.2 4.1 
 
 
     
 D. SOCIAL SCIENCES 
     
 XVIII. SOCIAL SCIENCES, GENERAL 
     
187 CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 4.9 0.3 0.065 66.5 4.5 
188 LAW 4.4 0.4 0.083 64.7 4.2 
189 POLITICAL SCIENCE 3.3 0.4 0.119 65.7 3.2 
190 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 3.7 0.3 0.075 65.9 3.4 
191 ETHNIC STUDIES 2.6 0.3 0.103 66 2.4 
192 FAMILY STUDIES 5.8 0.3 0.055 62 5.6 
193 SOCIAL ISSUES 3.6 0.3 0.088 65.5 3.4 
194 SOCIAL WORK 3.9 0.3 0.069 63.4 3.6 
195 SOCIOLOGY 4.2 0.3 0.067 65.1 4.0 
196 WOMEN'S STUDIES 4 0.3 0.063 64 3.8 
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197 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 3.3 0.3 0.088 64.3 3.1 
198 EDUCATION, SPECIAL 5.1 0.3 0.059 62.5 4.9 
199 AREA STUDIES 2 0.3 0.154 67.4 1.8 
200 GEOGRAPHY 5.8 0.3 0.054 60.8 5.7 
201 PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT 4.3 0.3 0.060 62.4 4.2 
202 TRANSPORTATION 5.1 0.4 0.073 62.2 4.9 
203 URBAN STUDIES 4.3 0.3 0.064 62.3 4.1 
204 ETHICS 3.5 0.3 0.080 65.3 3.2 
205 MEDICAL ETHICS 5.2 0.4 0.071 62.1 4.9 
206 ANTHROPOLOGY 4.3 0.3 0.075 65.9 4.0 
207 COMMUNICATION 4.3 0.3 0.065 63.4 4.0 
208 DEMOGRAPHY 5.6 0.3 0.048 61.3 5.5 
209 HISTORY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 2.1 0.3 0.145 69.1 1.8 
210 INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE 
3.9 0.5 0.127 64.1 3.8 
211 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2.9 0.4 0.140 65.5 2.9 
212 LINGUISTICS 6 0.3 0.046 63.5 5.7 
213 SOCIAL SCIENCES, INTERDISCIPLINARY 3.5 0.3 0.098 66.1 3.3 
 
 
     
 XIX. ECONOMICS & BUSINESS 
     
214 AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY 3.8 0.3 0.073 63.6 3.6 
215 ECONOMICS 4.6 0.4 0.077 62 4.6 
216 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & LABOR 4.5 0.3 0.077 64.1 4.1 
217 BUSINESS 6.7 0.4 0.056 64.3 6.4 
218 BUSINESS, FINANCE 6.4 0.6 0.094 64.3 6.3 
219 MANAGEMENT 6.4 0.4 0.061 63.6 6.2 
       
 










Table B5 . Citation Inequality Decomposition Sat the Sub-field level. The Multiplicative Case. 
 
 Quantiles Within-group Skew. of Sc.       IDCP  Total Citation Percentages In %: 
      Term,  W         Term, 
S  
       Term Inequality (1)/(4) (2)/(4) (3)/(4) 
          (1)         (2)           (3)        (4)           (5)           (6)         (7) 
A. Raw Data All quantiles       0.0030      0.6950 0.1544     0.8524 0.35 81.54 18.11 
 [1, 660]   0.0469    5.50 
 [661, 978]   0.0766    8.98 
 [979, 1000]   0.0310    3.63 
         
         
B. Sub-field ER  All quantiles       0.0030        0.7212 0.0268     0.7510 0.41 96.03 3.57 
Normalization [1, 660]   0.0160    2.13 
 [661, 978]   0.0023    0.31 
 [979, 1000]   0.0085    1.13 
         
C. Sub-field Mean All quantiles       0.0029      0.7168 0.0243     0.7440 0.39 96.34 3.27 
Normalization [1, 660]   0.0164    2.20 
 [661, 978]   0.0023    0.31 
 [979, 1000]   0.0056    0.76 
         
????
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Exchange Rates. Fractional Case 

























Figure B2 . Weighted Citation Inequality Due to Differences in Citation Practices, v









Figure B3 . A Comparison at the Sub-field Level of the Estimated ERs Over the ?661, 978?  Interval versus  the Exchange Rates 
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